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Purpose: The UK government is reluctant to adopt auditors’ professional liability 
capping strategy as recommended by the European Union in 2008 based on fear of 
poor audit quality. Therefore, this study aims to investigate whether auditors in the UK 
will relax their professional scepticism attitude towards financial statements integrity; 
whether capping can help to demonopolize the current audit market in the UK that is 
currently dominated by the big four audit firms; and whether audit profession can 
survive and grow in the face of colossal legal claims against auditors in the UK through 
a qualitative empirical study.  
 
Methodology/Methods: The underpinning philosophical stance of this study is 
interpretivism as the topic centres on human behaviours. It has collected and analysed 
primary data based on survey of 2000 population and 30 semi-structured interviews 
among audit staff in the UK, using descriptive statistics and as a means of data 
analysis. 
 
Significance: This study will promote a non-monodirectional audit reform in the UK 
through policy makers. 
 
Contribution: This study revealed that auditor’s liability capping is the panacea to the 
existing large legal claims against auditors in the UK. Therefore, the study has 
uncovered the existing knowledge gap regarding the impact of auditors’ professional 
liability capping on listed companies’ financial statements integrity, the audit market 
and audit profession in the UK within the ambit of numerous literatures on the topic. 
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Following the demise of Enron Corporation in the United States of America and its 
auditors (Arthur Andersen) in 2002 and  the collapsed of Northern Rock Bank in the 
UK in 2007, the amount of legal claims against auditors in the United Kingdom has 
increased significantly (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2015). Thus, it has been 
argued that the unprecedented corporate failures in the last decade were allegedly 
attributed to financial statements window-dressing or accounting irregularities by some 
listed companies. This has led to aged-long debate in the UK in relation to auditors’ 
liability capping.  
The most recent, but infamous accounting irregularities as reported in the UK is the 
Tesco saga, where profit was allegedly overstated by £264 million in 2014 (Felsted & 
Oakley, 2014). The demise of Enron in 2001 in the United States, Independent 
Insurance collapsed in the UK, the collapsed of Northern Rock Bank in the UK in 2007, 
and the collapsed of Nortel Networks in Canada in 2002 were all attributed to 
accounting irregularities (Thorne et al., 2010). 
Bollen et al., (2005), find out in  their study that a significant category of business 
failures in Europe are related to fraudulent or unethical behaviour by company 
managers or employees. By interpretation, if this infamous, but accounting 
malpractices continues, auditors are most likely to be sued by various stakeholders as 
defective financial statements will become inevitable. This unpleasant situation 
manifested in the UK particularly as the level of civil claim against auditors in the UK 
increased to a point that company’s Act of 2000 was changed in 2006 in attempt to 
ameliorate auditors’ liability by the UK government. 
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As the level of litigations against auditors increased across Europe, the European 
Union Commission recommended measures in 2008 on how to minimize auditors’ 
liability, following its threat to the profession’s existence. (Flores, 2011; Giudici, 2012; 
Samsonova & Humphrey, 2014). 
However, the regulatory effort from the UK government and the European Union as 
mentioned above, regarding the appropriate strategy on how to limit auditors’ liability 
has evoked divergent opinions from various stakeholders on the subject matter 
(Humphrey & Samsonova, 2015; Philipsen, 2014).  
Watts and Zimmermann (1983), Lim and Tan (2008),  Firth (1990), Wilson and 
Grimlund (1990), Weber et al., (2008) argued that audit failure do affect auditors’ 
reputation even when there is no legal claim against them as this adversely impact on 
their market share. In the same vein, European Union (2008), Arthur Andersen &Co, 
et al., (1996), Philipsen (2014), Davies, (2010) advocated for auditors’ liability reforms 
in the UK in order to possibly salvage the audit profession from going into extinction or 
the demise of another big 4 accounting firms. 
 As the presumably genuine campaign for auditors’ liability reforms continues in the 
UK, there is a lacuna if the impact of the anticipated reform is not properly ex-ray in 
relation to listed companies’ financial statements integrity, audit market and its 
profession in the UK. This is where this study sits. Thus, it intends to cover the existing 
vacuum on this topic as it builds on exiting literature in conjunction with primary data 
collection. 
By exploring information from relevant accounting literature and empirical data within 
the study, it is hoped that important contribution has been made to this aged-long 
debateable topic through this study. Thus, a rethink on a topical subject area of this 
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magnitude could be stimulated. Furthermore, the concerns raised by various 
stakeholders on this subject area could be hopefully addressed. 
2.0 MOTIVE 
There has been a growing concern among academics, lawyers, shareholders, and 
Auditors in the United Kingdom regarding the need to limit auditor’s civil liabilities. 
Though the UK legislation have experienced changes in the past decade to possibly 
meet the yearnings of various stakeholders regarding auditors’ civil liabilities in the UK, 
this effort has proved futile as the value of litigation claims against auditors in the UK 
has grown exponentially over the years. Therefore, the motive of this study is of twofold: 
firstly, to properly investigate the impact auditor liability capping can possibly have on 
listed companies’ financial statements’ integrity, audit market and its profession in the 
UK. Secondly, to possibly aid the UK government through this study in order to possibly 
avoid mono-directional audit reform which could possibly cause a demise among the 
big four accounting firms in the UK as cautioned by European Union Commission in 
2008. 
3.0 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Auditors’ liabilities have been a topical debate for the past decade in the UK (Moizer 
& Hansford-Smith,1998). The debate has metamorphosed through several legal shifts 
(Bush et al., 2007). For example, the debate has graduated from joint-and-several 
liabilities as encapsulated in the UK Company’s act of 2000, to limited liabilities 
partnerships in the UK Company’s act of 2006 (Davis, 2010).   
Currently, the debate is resting on the following liability sharing formulae: proportionate 
liabilities sharing among the parties that contribute to the misstatements of financial 
statements (company’s directors and auditors), liability limitation agreement (LLA) as 
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approved by shareholders, and liability capping as a multiple of audit fees (Firth et al., 
2011).  
Joint-and-several liabilities law in the UK, permit shareholders of companies to sue an 
audit firm and its partners for the full recovery of their financial losses resulting from 
defective financial statements (Chung et al., 2010). On the other hand, proportionate 
liabilities sharing will require auditors to contribute to the remuneration of the financially 
injured party, based on their material negligence (Hughes, 2009). In contrast, auditors’ 
liabilities capping is based on the multiple of audit fee, while liability limitation 
agreement between listed companies’ directors and its auditors must be approved by 
shareholders (Finley, 2015). 
AS the debate for auditors’ liability capping lingers, critiques could ponder to know why 
shareholders hire the service of auditors in the first place. For example, auditors’ 
liability is a function of auditors’ services.  Wallace, (2004); Yu, (2012); Finley, (2015) 
argued that shareholders do hire the services of auditor owing to the following reasons: 
Firstly, there is a divorce between ownership and management of companies. Thus, 
as shareholders delegate management power to directors, agency concept erupts and 
conflict of interest between shareholders and directors could emerge. Secondly, the 
problem of information asymmetry exists between directors and shareholders as the 
latter do not have daily operational information of the company.  Therefore, it is 
expected that auditors should bridge the gap and help to minimize the fiduciary 
relationships breach risk that could exist between the shareholders of a company and 
its directors as the latter is information equipped than the former (Flood, 2011). The 
aforementioned gap in the UK’s company act of 2006 is termed ‘duty of care’ from 
auditors to shareholders.  It is this duty of care that forms one of the bases of auditors’ 
liabilities in the UK. 
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European Union Commission, [EUC] (2008) noted there is a growing fear that if 
auditors’ liability is not controlled, the resultant effect could become colossally 
unbearable. Upon this understanding, the EUC recommended to European countries 
in 2008 on how to find a possible solution to the epidemics of legal suits against 
auditors. 
Paradoxically, there is also a growing fear in the UK, that capping auditor’s liabilities 
could adversely affect the integrity of listed companies’ financial statements, audit 
profession and its market in the UK (Simunic et al., 2008; Francis and Yu, 2009; Amini 
& Ahmadi, 2015).  In contrast Andre, et al., (2011.) argued that the fear is borne out of 
myopia. They further cautioned that in order to avoid dumping the expectations of 
accounting information users in the abyss, auditors’ liabilities capping is urgently 
necessary.  
The above existing dichotomies and fears among professionals and investors in the 
UK stems the basis of this study.  Thus, to investigate the impact auditor’s liabilities 
capping could possibly have on listed companies’ financial statements’ integrity, audit 
profession and its market in the UK. 
Owing to the vast nature of this aged-long, contemporary and controversial topic as 
different groups of stakeholders hold divergent constructs on the debateable topic, it 
is imperative in the light of this study to investigate the impact auditors’ liability capping 
can possibly have on listed companies’ financial statements’ integrity, the audit 
profession and its market in the UK.  The study also examines the drivers of this 
debateable topic. Thus, legal precedents and pronouncements were examined in 
detail in order to possibly gauge the legal stance, the ontological, epistemological and 
the philosophical constructs held by various stakeholders on this topic. 
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4.0 AIM OF THE STUDY 
The overall aim of this study is to properly investigate the impact auditors’ liabilities 
capping can possibly have on listed companies’ financial statements’ integrity, audit 
profession and its market in the UK. 
5.0 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Within the context of auditors’ liabilities capping and its impact on listed companies’ 
financial statements integrity, the audit profession and its market in the UK, the specific 
objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To gain an understanding from the perspective of the qualified and non-
qualified Accountants in the UK, whether auditors in the UK will relax their 
professional scepticism attitude if their liability is capped. 
2. To investigate whether auditors’ liability capping can possibly demonopolize the 
UK audit market that is currently controlled by the Big Four international audit 
firms.     
3. To investigate whether audit profession in the UK can survive and grow should 
the UK Chartered Accountants are continuously exposed to unlimited liability 
business risk. 
6.0 RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study examines the following questions in the light of this debateable topic in 
order to possibly come up with plausible conclusion and recommendations at the end 
of the study. 
Will auditors in the UK maintain a professional scepticism attitude If their                    
professional liability is capped? 
Can auditors’ liability capping help to demonopolize the current UK audit market?  
 
Page 7 of 253 
 
Can audit profession in the UK survive and grow should the UK Chartered Accountants 
are continuously exposed to unlimited liability business risk. 
What are the sources and drivers of auditors’ liability in the UK? 
7.0 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
A research of this magnitude centres on vast and contemporary issues within the UK. 
Consequently, the study is confined to the UK. Time limitation on the research topic 
and its associated financial cost propelled the researcher to opt for the above-
mentioned option. Moreover, credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability as expected within the study was another propelling force. 
The target audience are: Qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK, 
institutional and individual shareholders of listed companies and top management in 
the UK. The essence of this choice is because the issue at stake is presumed having 
impact on the chosen audience in practical terms. Therefore, the researcher deemed 
it expedient to have their opinions and feelings described, analysed, discussed and 
summarised within the study. 
8.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Following the unprecedented corporate failures in the last decade, and the allegedly 
window-dressing of financial statements by listed companies, resulting from arguably 
accounting irregularities across the globe, auditors’ liability has been an aged-long 
debate in the UK. The most recent, but infamous accounting irregularities as reported 
in the UK is the Tesco saga, where profit was allegedly overstated by £264 million in 
2014 (Felsted & Oakley, 2014). The demise of Enron in 2001 in the United States, 
Independent Insurance collapsed in the UK, the collapsed of Northern Rock Bank in 
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the UK in 2007, and the collapsed of Nortel Networks in Canada in 2002 were all 
attributed to accounting irregularities (Thorne et al., 2010). 
In 2008, the EU recommended three strategies to its member states as a possible 
strategy that could help to ameliorate pathetic legal claim against auditors in Europe.  
Auditors liability capping was one of the three strategies. This strategy was 
necessitated by the danger of the audit profession going into extinction resulting from 
civil liabilities (Davie, 2010). 
In the same vein, it is anticipated that the UK government may legalise auditors’ 
liabilities capping, without a due consideration on its likely impact on listed companies’ 
financial statements’ integrity, audit market and its profession in the UK (Defond, 
2012).   
9.0 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is structured into eight chapters as follows. Chapter one: This consists of 
the introduction that primarily investigated the development of auditors’ liability in the 
UK within the scope of the study. Motive of the study. This section briefly explained 
the motive that propelled the study. Background of the study. This section explained 
the various stages of failed audit reforms in the UK, the existing dichotomies and 
debate that have emanated from the controversial topic. Aim of the study. This section 
briefly states the overall aim of the study which is to understand the possible impact 
of audit reform in the UK. Objective of the study. This section clearly stated the specific 
objectives of the study. Research questions. This section clearly defined the study 
questions as a guide.  Scope of the study. This section briefly defined and narrow the 
scope of the study to the UK only.  Statement of the problems. This section highlights 
accounting irregularities practices and its implication in the UK within the context of 
the study. 
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Chapter Two: Conceptual framework. This section consists of conceptual framework 
in relation to the study. 
Chapter Three: Literature Review. This chapter was organized into fourteen broad 
sections. It primarily focused on the history and development of auditors’ liability in the 
UK, the source or drivers of auditors’ liability in the UK and the measures the UK has 
taken in order to enhance financial statement integrity. 
Chapter four: Research Methodology and methods. This chapter depicted in detail the 
philosophical stance of the study, research methods and procedures that comprised 
the research protocol utilized in line with the research plan within the study. The 
research plan introduced the overall research design protocol.  Attention was given to 
the role of the researcher and ideas generated by a pilot study.   A detailed protocol 
addressing sampling procedures, participant selection, data collection and analysis 
procedures, as well as issues related to the reliability, validity, and trustworthiness of 
findings were specified. 
Chapter Five:  This chapter is made up of qualitative data analysis and discussion of 
interviews findings of the study. Thus, analysis of  data collected was described having 
used interview protocol as method of inquiry in gaining the solicitation of verbal data.  
The findings of the collected data were transcribed to learn about participants’ 
perceptions, feeling and experiences.  Particular attention was given to a discussion 
of the findings to establish the trustworthiness of conclusions. 
Chapter Six: This chapter is made of analysis and discussion of survey findings of the 
study. Particular attention was given to the discussion of findings in the previous 
chapter and some accounting literature in chapter three, using descriptive statistics as 
a method of analysis in order to enhance a robust description, analysis and discussion. 
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Chapter Seven: This chapter consists of conclusion, contribution, recommendations 
based on findings from the study, implications and summary. Attention was given to 
addressing the implications of the findings, as well as providing suggestions for future 
research on the topic. 
Chapter eight: This is the last part of the study; it contains details of in-text references.  
10.0 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has summarily presented the entirety of the study by giving readers a 
mental picture of what they can found in each chapter within the study. It started with 
introduction which briefly elucidated into corporate failure which has formed the basis 
of auditors’ liability in the UK and ended with the study structure. 
Having presumably gain an understanding regarding what this study entails through 
this chapter, the next chapter will look into conceptual framework. Thus, it will look into 
conceptual framework from definition perspective and explain the conceptual 
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CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
In order to realise the objective of this section in relation to what it is meant to do within 
the context of this study, it is deemed expedient to quickly bring to the attention of 
readers what “concept” means. For example, Antonenko, (2015) lamented that though 
there is great deal of consonance among scholars regarding the significance of 
conceptual frameworks in social study, conceptual frameworks have been 
interchangeably used with theoretical frameworks though their meanings are different. 
Thus, a pronounced lack of understanding regarding the definition and functions of 
conceptual frameworks which could in turn impedes on researchers’ ability in 
designing an effective research. Jabareen, (2009) argued that “conceptual framework” 
and theoretical framework are often vaguely and imprecisely used interchangeably in 
some literature, despite their difference in meanings and functions. Imenda, (2014) 
argued that while a theoretical framework is theory-based study with 
deductive approach, conceptual framework tends to build on existing 
theory, or construct a model or theory in explaining a phenomenon using 
inductive approach. 
The above corroborative explanations suggest that an understanding about concept 
could potentially enhances readers understanding about conceptual frameworks and 
it could possibly help to avoid academic guess work in relation to the use of some 
terminologies in this study.  
Merriam-Webster online dictionary defined concept to be  “an idea of what something 
is or how it works‟. In the same vein, Jabareen, (2009) noted that “every concept 
contains components originating from other concepts; and every concept is 
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considered as the point of coincidence”. Bryman, (2016, P.151) defined concept to be 
the building blocks of theory and points with which social research is conducted. 
Based on the unambiguous definitions and explanation of concept within its usage in 
this section, it can be reasonably argued that concept is not a stand-alone term. Thus, 
it relates to other belief and theories in making meanings and explanations in social 
research. 
Having presumably gained an understanding about the term “concept”, the question 
that follows is: what is conceptual framework, and where and how is it used in 
research?  Miles et al., (2014. P.20) described conceptual framework to be a 
graphically or narrative form of expression that reveals the key factors, variables, 
constructs and presumed interrelationship among them within a study. Ravitch, and 
Riggan, (2012) viewed conceptual framework to be an argument in a study that reveal 
why a study is significant, and why the means of the proposed strategy is appropriate. 
In the same vein, Tamene, (2016) defined conceptual framework to be related 
concepts that link the core components of the research design that responds to the 
questions in qualitative research paradigms and are products of qualitative processes 
of theorization, 
Corroboratively, Creswell, (2015. P. 8) defined conceptual frameworks to be the 
general beliefs, diagrams or assumptions that underpin a study. 
Based on the views, definitions, and explanations of conceptual framework as 
evidenced within this section, it can be reasonably interpreted that conceptual 
framework serves as a guide for empirical study, hence it specifies questions and 
strategies to be explored. Thus, it is the intellectual platform that help to maintain 
ontological and epistemological consistency within a study, by underpinning and 
contextualising the various facets of a study. 
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Having presumably gained an understanding about conceptual framework within the 
remits of definitions and explanations, thus as the base line for valid explanations and 
creation of understanding in qualitative research, the conceptual framework that 
underpin this study is called agency behaviour as diagrammatically designed by the 
researcher within figure 2.1 below.  
The essence of figure 2.1 below are of fivefold: 
• It revealed to readers of this study, the parties that can arguably contribute to 
the misstatement of financial statements in the UK as indicated by the arrows 
pointing at defective financial statements within figure 2.1 below. These parties 
are; Executive directors, Audit committee, Chief Accountant and External 
Auditors. 
• It also suggests to readers of this research  that defective financial statement 
on the other hand can adversely affect audit profession in the UK as the arrow 
that emanated from defective financial statements position is pointing at audit 
profession as evidenced in figure 2.1 below. This is more likely to be the case 
in the UK if young talents are discouraged from venturing into audit profession 
in the UK resulting from business risk. 
• Moreover, figure 2.1 below suggest to readers that auditors’ liability is a 
derivative of defective financial statements as the arrow from defective financial 
statement position is pointing at auditors’ liability. 
• The diagram as depicted in figure 2.1 below suggest that auditors’ liability on 
the spectrum can adversely affect audit market and external auditors in the UK. 
Thus, colossal legal claims against auditors in the UK could cause the UK audit 
market and the  number of registered auditors in the UK to shrink as indicated 
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by the two arrows from auditors’ liability position, pointing at audit market and 
external auditors respectively. 
• Finally, figure 2.1 below also suggest to readers that auditors’ liability can 
adversely affect audit market, audit profession and external auditors  in the UK. 
Thus, the arrows that emanated from auditors’ liability positions pointed directly 
to audit market, audit profession and external auditors in the UK. 
Based on explanations regarding figure 2.1 as witnessed within this section, it can be 
argued that the conceptual framework of this study has graphically revealed the key 
factors, variables, and presumed interrelationship among them within the study as 
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FIGURE 2. 1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (AGENCY BEHAVIOUR)  
As depicted in figure 2.1, it could be construed that  agents at various capacities are 
the architects of defective financial statements. If this hypothetical statement is 
deemed valid,  auditors’ liability in the UK could be seen to be a product of agents’ 
collective failure. For example, the executive directors are responsible for the listed 
companies’ general strategic policies formation as required by the UK corporate 
governance code. (Financial Reporting Council 2016). The executive directors are 
also responsible for the assurance of internal control efficacy (Financial reporting 
Council 2014). The internal control departments are usually headed by a senior 
management called “Chief Accountant”. The primary function of internal control is to 
ensure that data are accurately captured, and that reports are produced purportedly.  
On the other hand, the audit committee work collectively with the executive directors 
towards the strengthening of financial statement integrity. The audit committee usually 
assesses the adequacy of internal control mechanisms while the chief Accountant 
report directly to audit committee in relation to internal control deficiency or efficacy 
(FRC, 2014). The remedial effort of audit committee in this direction is expected to 
further strengthen the integrity of financial statements. If internal control mechanisms 
are found to be weak as reported by the Chief Accountant, or as directly detected by 
the audit committee, this weakness will be reported to the executive directors for 
immediate corrections. 
The external auditors on the spectrum, as indicated within figure 2.1, assesses the fair 
preparation and presentation of financial statements as required by the UK corporate 
governance code (FRC 2012). Thus, the responsibility of auditors in this case is to 
assess and report, whether the financial statements that are prepared and presented 
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by companies’ directors “represent the true and fair view of the companies’ financial 
position” at that material time (FRC 2012).     
As evidenced in figure 2.1, the defectiveness of financial statements which could 
invariably cascaded into auditors’ liability in the UK can be described to be an 
aggregated agency failure. The executive directors might have failed to set up an 
effective internal control system. Thus, weak internal control mechanisms that can be  
circumvented by unauthorised person or officers within or outside the company; failure 
of audit committee who could not spot the weakness in the internal control 
mechanisms, as they are required to do some control testing unannounced, thereby 
strengthening the integrity of financial statements as produced from the system. Recall 
that it is a requirement from the UK corporate governance code perspective that at 
least one member of audit committee should have recent financial reporting 
experience in the UK (Miko & Kamardin, 2015; FRC 2016). Next is the failure of the 
Chief Accountant who could not spot and report any weakness in the internal control 
system. For example, the difference in inventory at the beginning and end of 
accounting period would represents goods sold for the period. If this value is multiplied 
by selling price, sales revenue will be arrived at. Discrepancy between good sold for 
the period and sales revenue will suggest to the Chief Accountant that financial 
statements are at the risk of being wind-dressed.  
The above analogy was the case in Tesco sage in 2014, when profit was overstated 
by £264M ( Felsted & Oakley, 2014; The guardian, 2016). In this case, unsold 
inventory was recognised as revenue. At the same time, the same inventory value was 
recognised at the statement of financial position as current assets. On aggregate, this 
resulted to double accounting practice and non-challan attitude towards the conformity 
of IAS 18 rules in relation to revenue recognition. 
 
Page 17 of 253 
 
The final agency failure as depicted in figure 2.1 is the external auditors’ failure. 
Professionally speaking, auditors are expected to express positive assurance in 
relation to financial statements. Thus, that nothing has come to their notice that would 
make them to cast any doubt on the integrity of the financial statements, as prepared 
and presented to them by the companies’ director. Based on this understanding, 
external auditors usually issue unqualified reported on the financial statements. 
On aggregate, the collective agents’ failure within the context of auditor liability in the 
UK as evidenced in figure  2.1 could possibly resulted to defective financial 
statements. When financial statements become defective, shareholders usually sue 
auditors in the UK as they felt bamboozled (ACCA, 2013). 
The impact of auditors’ liability in the UK as indicated in figure 2.1 are of various 
dimensions. Firstly, audit market in the UK has been monopolised by the big four. 
Namely, Deloitte, PWC, KPMG, and EY.   Evidence from literature review within this 
study suggests that audit clients are only accepting audit firms who can afford 
damages claims from shareholders if financial statements become defective  (Philisen, 
2014).  As a result, the big four dominate the UK audit market based on financial 
muscles which they flex when it comes to damages pay out (Davies, 2010). 
The second effect of auditors’ liability in the UK is the size of external auditors in the 
UK. The medium size audit firms in the UK are not willing to accept large companies 
as their clients, or shareholders in the UK refusal to accept medium size audit firm 
based on “deep pocket” reason (Davies, 2010 ; Philisen, 2014). Consequently,  the 
number of external auditors that are available in the UK   will continue to shrink. If this 
become the case, auditors’ liability in the UK could become inevitable. For example, 
the demand for the service of external auditors in the UK could be higher than its 
supply within the context of the big four.     
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Based on discussion within the lens of agency behaviour  as witnessed in this section, 
questions that could readily come to mind within this section is: who is an agent and 
whether there is any existing theory that could possibly help to explain agency 
behaviour as discussed within figure 2.1; why agents can possibly  fail to represent 
the best interest of their principal and whether agency behaviour has financial cost 
implication? Answers to these questions are discussed below.  
Practical Law, (2020), defined  an agent to be someone  who agrees and is authorized 
to act on behalf of another, a principal, in pursuant to agency relationship.  In the same 
vein, Collins Dictionary of Law, (2006) defined an agent to be “a person who is 
authorized to act for another (the agent's principal) through employment, by contract 
or apparent authority”. 
It can be reasonably construe from the above definitions that an agent is someone 
who exercises a delegated authority on behalf of another party called principal.  
Having unambiguously gained an understanding about agent based on the above 
definitions, the remaining questions regarding any existing theory that can possibly 
help to explain agency behaviour and why  agents can possibly fail to represent the 
best of their principal in conjunction with agency cost will be discussed below 
simultaneously.  
The existing theory that can possibly help to explain the behaviour of agents within the 
realm of this study is called agency theory. Therefore, agency theory will serve as 
panacea being the existing theory that can possibly help to explain agency behaviour 
in conjunction with the cost implication of monitoring agents within the remit of this 
section. 
The premise of agency theory holds that the fiduciary confidence that is reposed on 
directors of listed companies by their principals (shareholders)  could be abused  in 
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the form of moral hazard as a result of self-interest or personal aggrandisement motive 
(Jensen and Meckling ,1976). The synopsis of agency theory as propounded by 
Jensen and Meckling in relation to this study is that when shareholders delegate 
management and professional authority to directors and external auditors, principal-
agent relationship has been established. While shareholders are the principal, 
directors and external auditors are the agents. The theory explained that both principal 
and agent are self-centred, that  they consider their personal aggrandisement as a top 
priority.  
By interpretation, agency theory suggests that there is a potential risk that the two 
agents within the context of this study (companies’ directors and statutory auditors) 
could breach the fiduciary relationship that is reposed on them by their principals 
(shareholders) in the form of moral hazard resulting from self-interest. Based on this 
presumption, agency theory suggested that there should be goal congruence contract 
that could serve as mitigation strategy in the light of self-interest risk. Thus, a contract 
between principal and agent should be written in such a manner that both party’s 
interest should be incorporated in the contract so that the performance of an agent 
can be monitored, measured and analysed objectively (Jensen and Meckling ,1976). 
Agency theory further identified several types of costs which are associated with the 
panacea to conflict of interest based on agency relationship. However, some of these 
cost implications are not criticism free. For example, Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, (2013) 
argued  that agency theory is primarily concerned with how best to align the interests 
of agents to that of principal, or how best to possibly motivate  agents in order to 
mitigate the risk towards objectivity. Whether this criticism is acceptable to reader of 
this study is another question that is beyond the scope of this study.  
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Critics could argue within the lens of agency theory that it is feasible for directors of 
companies who are primary agents to the shareholders (principal) to possibly window-
dress financial statements in order to present a false claim healthy financial statement. 
In the same vein, that auditors can possibly circumvent audit methodology 
(substantive testing) in order to possibly minimise audit cost.  All to the detriments of 
their principal (shareholders). If this become the case in the UK, one could reasonably 
argue that the criticism of Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, (2013) lacked merit. 
The implication of agency theory in relation to this study is that financial statements’ 
integrity must be monitored effectively and efficiently if the expectation of accounting 
information users regarding “true and fair view” of financial position of entities must not 
go into abyss. 
Another implication is that the cost of enhancing financial statements’ integrity could 
be expensive. For example, both directors and external auditors are agents to their 
principal (shareholders). While directors are the primary agent, external auditors are 
the secondary agents. Because of this argument, part of this research questions were 
carefully formulated in order to possibly gauge the anticipated impact capping could 
have on audited financial statements’ integrity in the UK, audit market and its 
profession in the UK in relation to agency behavior that is egocentric in line with agency 
theory presumption.  Thus. will auditors in the UK display a lackadaisical attitude if 
their civil liability is capped?  
Though the premise of agency theory appeared valid as it forms the fundamental basis 
of explaining the research phenomenon in terms of human behavior, yet, the theory is 
not criticism free. For example, Nyberg et al., (2010), argued that the incentive 
alignment as propounded by agency theory lacked empirical studies prove among 
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Chief Executive officer (CEO). Furthermore, the incentive excludes auditors 
completely.  
The views of O’Reilly and Main, (2010) appeared to have had a positive correlation to 
the views of Nyberg et al. They argued that empirical studies do not support the views 
of agency theory on the ground of incentives and performance.  
The opinion of the researcher regarding the proposition of  agency theory is that the 
theory  tends to be myopic in nature. For example, the theory failed to recognise the 
fact that principal and agent could have  different risk appetite. This could in turn impact 
on investment decision of directors in the UK. Concerning auditors, their audit 
methodology could be circumvented by directors resulting from their financial reporting 
knowledge or the auditors are unable to detect material misstatements in the financial 
statements based on their inherent potentiality. If this becomes the case, is principal’s 
interest fully represented by the auditors? 
One of the merits of  agency theory is that it has successfully explained what one could 
expect as a plausible outcome in relation to the research questions. The theory 
explained that the natural agent behaviour which is based on self-interest will prevail. 
However, empirical study has been conducted within this study in order to possibly 
gauge the updated social reality regarding agency behaviour within the context of this 
study. This is necessary because the premise of this study’s philosophical stance 
holds that social reality as constructed by human exist in variegated forms, and that 
they are time and context contingent (Biggam, 2015, P. 168). It could be argued 
therefore, that the social reality that existed in the days of Jensen and Meckling might  
have evolved significantly within the lens of time and context.  
It should be noted however that agency theory play a pivotal role in this study as it has 
possibly explained how an agent could behave (auditors in the UK) if their professional 
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liability is capped, thereby answering the why and how questions within a qualitative 
study of this magnitude. 
2.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
In summary, future behaviour of agents are volatile as they are difficult to predict. If 
this ontological view is deemed or construe to be valid, the need to conduct empirical 
study in relation to this study become justifiable. 
Having discussed agency theory in the light of auditors in the UK presumed behaviour 
which could be at variance with shareholders’ interest if their professional liability is 
capped as well as its merits and criticisms, the next chapter which is  literature review 
will principally look into the development of auditors’ liability, drivers and sources of 
auditors’ liability,  the effort of the UK government and accountancy professional 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW: DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITORS LIABILITY IN THE UK 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to gain a fuller understanding and contribute into the 
debate about the sources, driver of auditors’ liability and audit failure in detail. This is 
expedient because auditors’ liability is a product of audit failure. 
In order to realise the aforementioned purpose, this chapter is structured as follows: 
Section 3.1 briefly looked into the overview of the Auditors’ Liability in the UK.  3:2 briefly 
looked into the definition of audit.  section 3:3 examined the history of audit and 
auditors in the UK. Section 3:4 examined the development of auditors’ liability in the 
UK in detail. Section 3:5 examined the definition of audit failure. Section 3:6 examined 
in detail the drivers of audit failure. Section 3:7 examined some of the source of 
auditors’ liability in the UK. Section 3:8 investigated the drivers of auditors’ liability in 
the UK. Section 3:9 investigated the UK government and accounting professional body 
in the UK regulatory effort towards auditors’ liability problem in the UK. Section 3:10 
examined part of stakeholder constructs. Section 3.11 summarised the entire chapter. 
3.1 Overview of  Auditors’ Liability in the UK 
Auditors’ liability has become an aged long topical debate in the UK for the past 
decade (Moizer & Hansford-Smith,1998). The debate has evolved through several 
legal amendments (Bush et al., 2007). For example, the debate has shifted from 
several-and-joint liabilities as detailed in the UK Company’s act of 2000, to limited 
liabilities partnerships as reported in the Company’s act of 2006 (Davis, 2010). 
Currently, the debate centred on Limited Liability Agreement (LLA) and proportionate 
liabilities or capping. Thus, a mechanism that permits auditors to limit their civil liability 
in the event of audit failure through agreement with shareholders or proportionate 
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liability sharing between auditors and company’s directors based on each party’s 
material contribution to financial statements misstatement. The alternative to this is 
capping. A system that requires auditors to single-handedly bears audit failure liability 
as a multiple of audit fees (Firth et al., 2011).  
Joint-and-several liabilities law in the UK, permit shareholders of companies to sue an 
audit firm and its partners for the full recovery of their losses resulting from defective 
financial statements (Chung et al., 2010). On the other hand, proportionate auditor’s 
liabilities require auditors to contribute to the remuneration of the financially injured 
party, based on their material negligence (Hughes, 2009). In contrast, auditors’ 
liabilities capping is based on the multiple of audit fees as approved by shareholders 
(Finley, 2015). 
Though the reviewed pertinent literature within this section revealed that auditors’ 
liability in the UK has become an endless debate as it has metamorphosized through 
several legal amendments, what remains unknown within the current literature as 
reviewed within this section  is why this has become the  case in the UK. Thus, an 
insight that causes the debate to be a transcending one could have improved body of 
knowledge within the embers of this section. However, it is expedient to remind 
readers of this study that an attempt to provide an answer to this question could lead 
to a drift or over-discussion within this chapter. Based on this prudent thinking, several 
sections that are relevant to the objective of this chapter and the entire study  will be 
discussed below. 
3.2 Definition of Audit  
In order to fully grasp or comprehend the historical development of auditor liability in 
the UK, it is useful to have a short review of the term audit. Thus, it is hoped that by 
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this short definition of audit, readers should have an idea of what audit entails in the 
first place. 
The term audit is derived from Latin word “audire”, and it originated from the old Roman 
Empire, which means to hear or question (Gupta, 2011; Domingues et al.,2011; 
Romero,2010). Oxford online dictionary, (2014) on the other hand, defined audit as a 
‘systematic review or assessment of something’. However. Office of the  Director for 
Audit, (2020) defined an audit to be “an independent examination with a view to 
establishing accuracy, conformity to laws and administrative rules and regulations, 
performance, and truthfulness”. 
From the above definitions of audit, it is clear that the essence and functions of audit 
is to add value to organization, establish accuracy and enhance conformity, 
performance and truthfulness in relation to regulations or laws.  Therefore, an 
individual, group of individuals, or firms that perform the above mentioned services is 
called auditor Romero, (2010). In the same vein, it could be interpreted that the 
essence of questioning based on Gupta, (2011) definition of audit is to mitigate 
financial reporting irregularities. If this is not the case, what is the essence of 
questioning? 
Irrespective of the divergence in terminologies used in defining auditor, the nexus is 
an auditor is a professional who has the necessary skills and expertise to express 
unbiased audit opinion on financial statements, thereby boosting the confidence of 
accounting information users. 
Though it is unequivocally clear about what audit is meant to do, whether audit has 
fulfilled this objective specifically in the UK is another debate that is beyond the scope 
of this study. One could argue that it has due to its practice in the UK. Otherwise, 
government would have promulgated legislations that could have possibly barred it 
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practice. The other side of the argument could debunk such claim. For example, if it 
has fulfilled or is meeting its objective, why do companies have defective financial 
statements which is a product of auditors’ liability in the UK? 
Having presumably gained an understanding regarding the meaning of audit and 
whether it has fulfilled its objective specifically in the UK, the next section will briefly 
look into the history of audit and auditor in the UK in attempt to understand and when 
and why audit became a practice in the UK. 
3.3   History of Audit and Auditor in the UK 
Lee, (1994) opined that the history of audit at global level lacked chronological 
documentation. As such, the history of audit and auditor in the UK are not exempted.  
However, the functions of audit in the UK can be traced to the existence of the ancient 
Exchequer of England as established in England during the reign of Henry 1(1100-
1135) (Teck-Heang, and Ali,2008). Thus, special personnel in the capacity of audit 
officers were appointed to ensure that the revenue generated by the state and its 
associated expenditure and transactions were transparently accounted for (Gul, et al., 
1994, p. 1). The person who was mandated to oversee the accounts in order to possibly 
prevent fraud was called “auditor” (Abdel-Qader, 2002). 
The preceding paragraph has suggested a point which needs to be elucidated.  
Personnel where appointed regarding the revenue generated and its associated 
expenditure in order to possibly ensure transparency and accountability during the 
reign of Henry 1 (1100-1135) in England. This could be interpreted that manipulations 
of financial statements for personal aggrandisement was in practice in those days, 
hence personnel were appointed to stop it. It could be further construe that personnel 
in the capacity of management were appointed to ensure transparency and 
accountability. Therefore, one could argue that it has been the responsibility of 
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management to put control in place that can prevent and detect fraud from happening. 
This is an argument that will be considered from variegated sources within the context 
of auditors’ duties and responsibility as part of this study. 
The practice of auditing became firm, paramount and well established as necessitated 
by the advent of the industrial revolution in the UK between 1840s-1920s (Gill & 
Cosserat, 1996, p. 9; Ricchiute, 1989, p. 9). 
Brown, (1962) find out that the advent of industrial revolution changed the form of 
enterprise in the UK. Large scales of operations that were beyond the control of its 
owners were established. This was however necessitated by the dire need of 
consumers in the UK as demand for goods and services outstripped their supply. As 
a result, large scale of production through factories and machine-based production 
were established (Abdel-Qader, 2002).  
As it became apparent in the UK that the need of consumers was a matter of necessity, 
industrial revolution was perceived to be the panacea in the UK. As a result, huge 
amount of capital was required to possibly keep the industrial revolution dream alive 
and turned the economic mirage of the British people into a reality (Abdel-Qader, 
2002). At first, capital requirement was an obstacle to the dreamed economy of the 
British. The emergence of a “middle class” during the industrial revolution period 
however provided the funds for the establishment of large industrial and commercial 
undertakings (Teck-Heang, and Ali,2008). Though the first challenge was overcome 
by the provision of capital by the “middle class”, the share market during this period 
was unregulated and highly speculative (Gul, et al., 1994,). The aftermath effect of the 
unregulated market increased the rate of financial failure (Porter, et al, 2005). For 
example, liability was unlimited, and investors were liable for the debts of the business. 
In the face of this new problem in the form of financial failure which was a product of 
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industrial revolution, it became crystal clear that the growing number of investors in 
the UK were in dire need of protection in order to possibly eradicate financial failure in 
the system (Porter, et al, 2005).  
The existence of the aforementioned problem forced the emergence of audit 
profession in the UK (Brown, 1962). As a direct response to this problem of financial 
failure in the share market with unlimited liability to the UK investors, the Joint Stock 
Companies Act was passed in the UK in 1844 (Meuwissen, 2014).  The Joint Stock 
Companies Act mandated company’s Directors to ensure that the company’s 
accounting records are balanced, and that the accounting records must represent a 
“true and fair view” of the company status. In addition, the Act provided the 
appointment of auditors to check the accounts of the company (Collings, 2011). 
However, the annual presentation of the balance sheet to the shareholders and the 
requirement of a statutory audit were only made compulsory in 1900 under the 
Companies Act 1862 (UK) (Leung, et al., 2007). 
From the historical background of audit and auditor in the UK as revealed within 
section, it is evident that the fiduciary business relationship that existed and that 
continue to exist between directors and shareholders have been relegated and it will 
continue to be relegated. Thus, financial statements failure in the 1860s that 
promulgated the emergence of company’s Act of 1862 and 1890 in conjunction with 
the stock market regulation is happening till date. If this claim is not true, this research 
topic would not have emerged.  
Most of the blame have been centred on auditors’ inability to detect and prevent fraud 
from happening in companies (Okaro and Okafor 2013). The question that remained 
unanswered from 1860s till date is, has the UK government done enough in terms of 
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corporate governance code and legislation to possibly reduce financial statements 
failure?  
This question will be properly examined at the later part of this study within the context 
of the UK government and accounting professional bodies in the UK regarding their 
efforts towards the strengthening of financial statements integrity in the UK. 
The synopsis of this section based on audit and auditors’ history in the UK is that the 
misstatement of financial statements in the UK is an aged-long problem that is yet to 
be solved in the modern-day UK economy. 
Having gained an understanding  regarding the history of audit and auditor in the UK, 
next section will look into the development of auditors’ liability in the UK. 
3.4 Development of Auditors’ Liability in the UK 
Going by the definition of audit as previously discussed within this chapter, thus it has 
to do with questioning. If this definition is globally acceptable both from academic and 
legal community, this could possibly trigger few more questions. Thus, why should 
there be questioning in the first place? Who should be questioned? What is the primary 
duty of auditors? Is it that of a “watchdog or a bloodhound”? 
Brown, (1962) lamented that the primary responsibility of auditor during the industrial 
revolution in the UK as the starting point of auditor liability in the UK was erroneously 
presumed. Thus, shareholders or users of accounting information presumed that the 
primary duty of auditor in the company was to determine whether defalcation had taken 
place. This presumption remains one of the propelling forces behind auditors’ liability 
in the UK till date. Teck-Heang, and Ali, (2008), and Gul, et al., (1994,) argued that 
during the reign of Henry 1 (1100-1135) in England, the primary responsibility of auditor 
was to ensure transparent accountability towards the revenue generated in conjunction 
with its associated expenditure by the UK government. In contrast,  Abdel-Qader, 
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(2002) and Meuwissen, (2014), noted that during the industrial revolution in the UK, 
the primary assignment of auditor was to detect fraud. 
The degree of contradictions between scholars as witnessed within this section further 
revealed the dichotomous nature of auditors’ liability debate in the UK within the lens 
of centripetal and centrifugal force.  
The starting point in the annals within the development of auditor liability in the UK can 
be traced to the court verdict of London and General Bank (1895) and Cotton Mill 
(1896), (Pallisserry, 2012; ACCA,2013; Collings, 2014).  Thus, the auditors (Mr. 
Pickering and Mr. Peasegood), were found guilty of negligence by the presiding Judge 
in the lower court (Pallisserry, 2012). 
However, in the Appeal Court, Lindley L.J who was the presiding Judge overturned the 
previous court's decision and his opinion on the auditor's duty is as follows: 
“the duty of an auditor is to convey information, not to arouse inquiry and 
although an auditor might infer from an unusual statement that something 
was seriously wrong, it by no means followed that ordinary people would 
have their suspicions aroused. It is not the auditor's duty to guarantee the 
books showing the true position of the company's affairs or to guarantee 
that the balance-sheet was accurate”. 
 
Within a similar case of Kingston Cotton Mill (No 2) [ 1895], the auditors (Messrs 
Pickering & Peasegood) relied on the inventory certificate as presented by the 
company’s director. As a result, the presiding Judge Vaughan Williams J found the 
auditor guilty of negligence. Justice Lopes L.J who was the presiding Judge in the 
Appeal Court overturned the decision in his famous judgement as follows: 
“It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to perform 
that skill, care and caution which a reasonably competent, careful and 
cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable skill, care and caution must 
depend on the particular circumstances of each case. An auditor is not 
bound to be a detective or as was said to approach his work with suspicion 
or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is a 
watchdog but not a bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried servants of 
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the company in whom confidence is placed by the company” (Pallisserry, 
2012; ACCA,2013; Collings, 2014).     
 
As reported in the court case between ADT Ltd v BDO Binder Hamlyn (1995) (Woolf, 
2006), P. 381 and  Kaplan, (2007), P. 181, the presiding judge, Justice May found 
Binder Hamlyn the then auditors to Britannia Security Systems Group guilty on the 
ground of negligent as the auditors confirmed to ADT Ltd representative that the 
audited financial statements “represent a true and fair view”. 
In juxtaposing the court verdicts within this section with reference to auditors’ liability 
in the UK, it could be inferred or interpreted that auditors in the UK will undoubtedly 
owe duty of care to a third party. Thus, in the UK, when auditors apparently become 
aware that a third party will place reliance on the audited financial statements, duty of 
care has been established (Kaplan, 2007), P. 181. Common law in the UK seems to 
be consistent in this legal area as evident in a case between Bannerman v Royal Bank 
of Scotland (Kaplan, 2008, P. 198). 
It could be argued also that auditors should take every necessary and reasonable step 
with reference to the necessary regulatory rules when they are confirming or 
debunking the assertions in the financial statement of listed companies in order to 
possibly avoid legal liabilities in the UK. However, it could be further argued as well 
that the degree of reasonableness that is expected from auditors in the UK in order to 
possibly avoid indirect duty of care to third party do not have legal or dictionary 
definition.  Therefore, auditors in the UK who approach their professional duties with 
an attitude of professional scepticism could face another accusation on the ground of 
suspiciousness. Therefore, auditors in the UK could face a dilemma in attempt to draw 
a borderline between suspiciousness and professional scepticism in the light of legal 
vail of negligence as evident in court verdicts within this section. 
 
Page 32 of 253 
 
In summary, this section has  looked at some previous legal cases against auditors 
within the lens of auditors’ liability development in the UK in conjunction with the 
circumstances that could constitute duty of care from auditors to a third party who 
voluntarily rely on the audited financial statements and make some economic 
investment.  Finding within this section revealed that Judges verdicts were based on 
their level of erudition or  legal stance within the context of auditors’ liability in the UK, 
thereby revealing its dichotomous nature in the form of transcending debate in the UK. 
The next section within this chapter will examine the definition of audit failure.  
3.5 Definition of Audit Failure 
In order to possibly discuss this section with a high degree of competence and make 
a meaningful contribution to the body knowledge through this research as expected, it 
is pertinent to gain an understanding about the term “Audit Failure” 
Financial Times, (2016) defined Audit Failure to be a situation that occurs when an 
examination of company’s financial statements failed to yield its purported results. 
Though this definition appears to be grammatically sound, it has put readers in the 
dark. For example, it failed to mention specifically the purported result that is expected 
from audit. 
Niven, (2014) on the other hand defined audit failure to be a situation where audited 
financial statements failed to disclose to financial market the poor financial position of 
an entity. Though this second definition appears appealing and meaningful, yet it has 
generated another interpretation into to the debate. Thus, it suggests that the primary 
objective of audit is to disclose the poor financial position of an entity to its 
shareholders. Whether this interpretation is beyond the context of this study, 
erroneous or possibly true, further analysis will shed more light on this argument within 
this study.   
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Furthermore, Tysiac, (2014) defined audit failure to be a situation whereby audit 
procedures or methodology failed to detect and report a material misstatement as 
contained in the financial statements. Going by this third definition of audit failure, it is 
unequivocally clear what audit is meant to do. Thus, to detect and report material 
misstatement as contained in the financial statement. Once again, this assertion in the 
interim is more of hypothetical statement. However, a critical examination of auditors’ 
responsibility at a later stage in this study will either help to accepts or refute the above-
mentioned assertion.  
The synopsis of audit failure definitions as evidenced within this section is that audit 
failure has become a global phenomenon that cuts across international economics 
(Okaro, and Okafor, 2013). The collapse of Enron and Word Com, John Matthews 
Bank (JMB), Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Barring Brothers, 
Nomura Security, Brex and Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), to mention but 
a few were all allegedly attributed to audit failure (Okaro, and Okafor, 2013). Thus, 
they occurred as auditors failed to discover material misstatements in the financial 
statements. The implication of this unfortunate situation could be interpreted that 
accounting information users or the entire financial market has been unintentionally 
cajoled by auditors as they undoubtedly rely on the audited financial statements that 
are misstated and make some economic investment decisions. From shareholders’ 
perspective, this could mean that the whole audit process is an exercise of academic 
and legal gymnastics as it failed its objective within the context of corporate failures 
as previously discussed. 
Having examined the meaning of audit failure definition from three different sources in 
conjunction with its associating implications, the following section will look into the 
drivers of audit failure in the UK.  
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3.6 Drivers of Audit Failure  
The following points have been widely claimed to be responsible for audit failure in 
some accounting, finance and auditing literature: 
• The first point that has been attributed to driver of audit failure is called 
employment affiliation. This occurs when individual leaves the audit team to 
work for audit client (Baber, et al., 2014). This type of employment strategy has 
raised both professional and international concern following the collapse of 
Enron in the US (Nonna, et al., 2011). The concern is that will auditor in this 
circumstance be able to maintain independence and exercise professional 
scepticism? In the US for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requires a 
cooling off period of one year before such individual can be employed. In the UK 
on the other hand, a cooling off period is not required before any individual who 
is in position to influence audit report can be employed by a firm (Fenech, 2019).  
Baber, et al., (2014) argued that though it is reasonable to accept one-year 
cooling period before an audit staff can be employed by the audit client as 
independence of the individual staff might have been impaired prior to 
accepting the new employment from the audit client. Thus, the would-be staff 
to the audit client might have been having personal relationships with the audit 
client. This is expected to create familiarity threat which could in turn impair the 
integrity of the audited financial statements and the independence of the audit 
staff (Aaron, et al., 2018). 
It can be reasonably argued that employment affiliation is most likely to create fear in 
the minds of accounting information users in the UK, resulting from  the fact that an 
ex-audit staff is now employed by the same audit client, thereby creating  self-interest 
and familiarity threat without mitigation strategy. 
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Furthermore, the formal audit staff who is now a staff to the audit firm’s client is 
expected to  know the audit methodology of its formal employer. Therefore, he or she 
could circumvent the audit methodology of the audit firm. The resultant effect of this 
unprofessional attitude could mean a defective audit which could in turn form the basis 
of auditor liability. 
Though it has not been reported that this is the case in the UK, critics would expect 
the audit firm to adopt a more stringent and mitigating strategy. For example, the audit 
firm should change the entire audit methodology once it becomes clear that one of its 
staff will be joining the audit client as an employee (Hatice, 2016). 
The other side of the argument  is that the mitigating strategy could be time consuming 
and financial cost absorbing. Thus, this could possibly raise the audit cost if value for 
money audit objective must be realised. If this become the case, the question now is 
who will “bell the Cat”? Thus, who will be responsible for the additional mitigation 
strategy cost? Is it the audit firm or the shareholders through the entity’s financial 
resources? Tentative answers to this question could be as follows: auditors should be 
responsible for the additional cost resulting from mitigation strategy because duty of 
care demands for effective audit. Therefore, auditors should focus on their primary 
objective of the audit which is to ensure that financial statements of the auditing entity 
represent a true and fair view of the entity’s financial status. If this point is claimed to 
be hypothetically valid, it could imply that auditors should accepts losses while 
maintaining a professional scepticism attitude which is expected to enhance the 
integrity of audited financial statements. Critiques could however question the 
reasonableness of the aforementioned tentative recommendation base on  fairness 
from  auditors in the UK perspective. Davies, (2010) however described this 
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recommendation to be an unfair  treatment from auditors’ perspective. Thus, paying 
extra cost for the decision made by the entity’s management. 
On the other hand, one could also argue further that management should be 
responsible for the extra cost of audit mitigation strategy. For example, it is 
management’s decision to employ an audit staff. Therefore, they should be 
responsible for the associated cost if their interest is in line with shareholders’ objective 
of hiring auditors. In order to possibly remain focus within the context of this study, the 
expediency or reasonableness of the recommendation within this paragraph will be 
relaxed. 
Having carefully discussed employment affiliation being one of the drivers of audit 
failure as reported in several literatures, the next point will consider the concept 
corporate fraud. Thus, it will look into its meaning and examine how it forms part of 
audit failure. 
• The second point in relation to driver of audit failure is called corporate fraud. In 
order to discuss this second point objectively, the researcher deemed it 
expedient to possibly have a look at the meaning of fraud and corporate fraud. 
It is hoped that this prudent step will enable readers to fully understand what 
corporate fraud entails. 
Oxford Dictionaries (2014) and Xin Sun et al., (2011) defined fraud as the 
“wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain”. 
In the same vein, BPP Learning Media, (2010, p.76) defined fraud as the 
intentional act executed by individual, or group of individuals, with the use of 
deception in order to obtain illegal advantage. On the other hand, Omoteso 
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and Obalola, (2014); Gupta, (2015) defined corporate fraud to be operational 
risk faced by various business across national economies. 
From the above unequivocal definitions of fraud, it can be construed that fraud 
is an act that involves the manipulations of facts and figures for personal or 
corporate aggrandisement. 
Furthermore, Omoteso and Obalola, (2014), lamented that the high degree and 
frequency of fraud, coupled with its sophisticated level with the aid of modern 
technology has made it a huge concern for both business owners and business 
manager. By simple interpretation, this means financial statement will 
undoubtedly continue to be defective. If this become the case in the UK, who 
will be held account for this unethical practice? 
The views of Omoteso and Obalola, (2014), tend to corroborate with the views 
of (Teck-Heang, and Ali,2008; Abdel-Qader, 2002; Gul, et al., 1994, p. 1). Thus, 
when the Exchequer of England was established during the reign of Henry 
1(1100-1135) there was need to appoint special personnel in the capacity of 
audit officers. Their primary duties were to ensure that the revenue generated 
by the state and its associated expenditure and transactions were transparently 
accounted for in order to possibly prevent frauds. Unfortunately, this unethical  
accounting malpractice is happening in the UK till date. For example, The 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK fined Barclays’ banks £72 million 
for poor handling of financial crime risks (FCA, 2016). This same bank was fined 
£290 million by USA and the UK authority for the manipulation of London 
interbank offered rate (LIBOR) (Financial Times, 2012).  
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The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE’s, 2014) reported that a 
typical organisation loses 5% of its revenue on annul basis, resulting from fraud. 
This was estimated to worth about $3.7 trillion.  
In similar situation, The guardian, (2016), reported that former senior directors 
of Tesco have been charged with fraud in relation to £263M, resulting from 
revenue overstatement.  
Based on the variegated reports or findings from reliable sources as evidenced 
within this section regarding corporate fraud which usually causes financial 
statements to be misstated and in turn form part of auditors’ liability in the UK, 
the question that could follows is: who should be responsible for the prevention 
and detection of fraud at corporate level? Thus, is it the auditors or the 
management of companies? 
Davies, (2010) and Abugu & Joseph, (2014)  opined that unfortunately, users 
of audited financial statements expect the auditors to possess the necessary 
skills and expertise to detect or prevent fraud from happening in an organization 
as part of auditors’ responsibilities. Whenever auditors failed to cover this gap 
as expected by the users of financial statements, they are usually sued auditors 
for professional negligence (Davies, 2010). 
The summary of this point regarding corporate fraud based on finding within 
this section in the UK is that this unethical practice is real and has corrosively 
damaged the confidence of accounting information users. This further imply that 
financial statements may not present the true and fair view of corporate affairs 
resulting from corporate fraud. 
In order to possibly remain focus in relation to the aim of this chapter, attention 
will be directed to the next point that is called “infective audit committee. For 
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example, it will look into what ineffective audit committee means and how it 
forms part of audit failure which is a function of auditors’ liability. 
• The third point to be considered within the sphere of audit failure drivers in the 
UK is called ineffective audit committee. In order to discuss this objectively and 
comprehensively, the starting point will be the meaning of ineffectiveness. This 
is essential because it could possibly enhance the propensity of readers’ 
understanding.  
English Oxford Living Online Dictionaries defined ineffectiveness to  mean “the 
quality of not producing any significant or desired effect”. By simple 
interpretation, this suggests that audit committee are not formed on 
ceremonious ground, rather for a desired effect. The next question that follows 
is: what is this desired effect?  Miko, & Kamardin, (2015); Sultana, (2015); 
Dobija, (2015), opined that the desired effect of audit committee is to enhance 
the integrity of financial statements. 
By inference, it could be interpreted that something is wrong in the first place 
hence the presence of audit committee was meant to correct it.  Thus, why 
should audit committee guarantee the quality of financial statements that are 
prepared by directors?  
Felix, (2015), Davies, (2010), Dobija, (2015) and Lisic, et all., (2015) argued 
that when shareholder delegate management power to directors, agency 
problem erupts, while shareholders are the principal, the directors are the 
agents. As a result of this divorce between ownership and management in term 
of corporations, shareholders understand that information asymmetry problem 
could exist. For example, shareholders do not have access to daily operational 
information compared to directors. Felix, (2015) and Davies, (2010) further 
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stressed that the aforementioned gap between shareholders and director could 
encourage moral hazard practicing from directors’ perspective. Therefore, the 
audit committee are employed to bridge this gap (Kang, et all.,2015). However, 
ASIC, (2012); European Commission, (2010);  FRC, (2013a);  IFIAR, 
(2014); and PCAOB, (2013) argued that International regulatory inspectors 
have reported audit deficiencies and hence called for the need to improve audit 
quality.  
Findings within this section suggests that audit committee have failed their respective 
responsibilities, hence improvement was recommended.  However, this failure could 
further increase agency cost in financial terms. 
In summary, audit committee ineffectiveness is a function of defective financial 
statements, which could in turn form a part of auditors’ liability. With reference to the 
UK as the centre of this study. It must be mentioned however that there is no 
theoretical or empirical report within the limit of this study to suggest that this is the 
case in the UK. 
Having looked at the meaning of ineffective audit committee, functions of audit 
committee and assessment as to whether audit committee have lived up to their 
expectation exhaustively, the next section has examined the sources of auditors’ 
liabilities in the UK. 
3.7 SOURCES OF AUDITORS’ LIABILITIES IN THE UK 
In order to fully comprehend what this section entails; it is pertinent to grasp the 
meaning of the term source(s). Merriam-Webster online dictionary defined  source 
to be a ‘point of origin’.  
From the above unambiguous definition, it is presumably and clearly understood that 
for auditors to assume liabilities to anyone who rely on audited financial statements in 
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the capacity of audit clients or a third party, there must be fundamental, constructive 
or legal bases.  
Going by the title of this section, the first point to be considered being one of the  
sources of auditors’ liabilities in the UK called expectation gap. Pourheydari & 
Abousaiedi, (2011) defined expectation gap to be the difference between what 
auditors in the UK, FRC, and ISAs perceived to be the duty and responsibility of 
auditors in the UK in practical and legal terms, in comparison to what users of 
accounting information perceived to be the duty and responsibility of auditors in the 
UK. The views of Noghondari & Foong, (2013) on the same subject matter tends to 
corroborate with the definition of expectation gap. Thus,  they defined expectation gap 
as the variance between what financial statements users take auditors responsibilities 
to be, and what auditors themselves think about their responsibilities from legal and 
practical perspective. Houghton et al., (2011) in the same vein buttressed the 
aforementioned definitions. They defined expectation gap as the difference between 
what auditors’ duty and responsibility are in practical terms as against the expectations 
of the accounting information users in terms of auditors’ duties and responsibilities. 
 It can be construed based on definitions within this section  that there is misconception 
from users of accounting information on the role of auditors in enhancing financial 
statements integrity, and what auditors’ roles are in practical terms. 
In order to possibly broaden the understanding of readers with reference to this 
section, expectation gap as a term has been grouped into twofold and discussed 
below: 
• The first on the list is called standard gap. Thus, this is  the difference in relation 
to the interpretation held by users of audited financial statements, and the 
interpretative versions of ISAs and FRC within the UK version of the regulatory 
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standard (Kaplan, 2007, P. 190). For example, (Kaplan, 2007, P. 190) and 
(Porter et al., 2012) have argued that the users of audited financial statements 
do interpret parts of auditing standard based on their understanding in order to 
possibly suit their aims and objectives. Thus, users of accounting information 
believed that it is auditors’ responsibility to detect fraud or possibly prevent fraud 
(Davies, 2010). However, Statements of Auditing Standard 99 and 140 (SAS), 
Woolf, (2006, P. 385), Reffett, (2014, p. 24) argued that users of audited 
financial statements do expect auditors to detect any material error, mistakes, 
or fraud that could on aggregate or individually cause audited financial 
statements to be unreliable. 
It can be argued that the explanation of SAS with reference to auditors’ duty 
and responsibility in relation to fraud detection and prevention as discussed 
within this section is significant. However, the term that has been used 
“material,” exacerbated the debate as it lacked universally acceptable definition. 
• The second on the list is called fraud detection and prevention. (Oxford 
Dictionaries and Xin Sun et al., (2011) defined fraud to be “wrongful or criminal 
deception intended to result in financial or personal gain”. However, BPP 
Learning Media (2010, p.76) defined fraud to be an intentional act executed by 
individual, group of individuals or corporations, using deception means in order 
to possibly obtain illegal advantage.  
Based on the above definitions of fraud, it is vividly clear that fraud is an intentional 
act, for example, the manipulation of facts and figures in order to realise personal or 
corporate illegal objective. 
 
Page 43 of 253 
 
Unfortunately, accounting information users do expect the external auditors to possess 
the necessary skills or expertise that can possibly help to detect or prevent fraud from 
happening in any entity as part of auditors’ legal or constructive responsibilities 
(Davies,2010) and (Abugu & Joseph, 2014).  
In sharp contrast,  BPP Learning Media, (2010, p. 77), and FRC, (2016) clearly stated 
that the duties of fraud prevention and detection are vested in the hands of entity’s 
management and not auditors.  The standard nevertheless highlighted that auditors 
are expected to maintain a high degree of professional scepticism attitude.  
Corroboratively, a careful examination of the  famous judicial pronouncement of Lord 
Denning in the case of Fomento (Sterling Area) V Selsdon Fountain Pen Co Ltd 
(1958), revealed the following; auditors should approach their professional and 
scepticism duties with enquiring minds, and reasonable care. Thus, it should be devoid 
of suspiciousness or dishonesty from directors’ perspective but believing that 
unintentional mistakes or errors might inherently or potentially existed in the financial 
statements which need to be corrected (BPP Learning Media,2010, p. 66). 
Based on the legal verdict of Lord Denning, it is evident that the professional duty of 
auditors of is to express unbiased objective audit opinion on the financial statements.  
This is however different from the expectation of the financial statements users who 
believe that it is part of auditors’ responsibility to detect or prevent fraud from 
happening in organisations as evidenced by reasons of suing auditors in the UK within 
the context of this study (Davies, 2010). 
Critics could argue that the legal judgement of Lording Dinning do not necessarily 
serve as panacea to auditors’ liabilities debate in the UK.  For example, the terms used 
by Lord Denning “reasonable care” lack universally acceptable definition. Therefore, 
individual legal stance, erudition, ontology, intuitive thinking and ethical philosophical 
 
Page 44 of 253 
 
stance could influence legal verdicts in a subjective manner. Secondly, critics could 
ponder to know how possible is it for someone to maintain an enquiry mind without 
being suspicious simultaneously? Finally, Lord Denning recommended that auditors 
should approach their professional duties with inquiring mind that is devoid of 
suspiciousness and dishonesty. But auditors should however believe in their minds 
that unintentional mistakes or errors might exist in the financial statements which need 
to be corrected.  By interpretation, the last sentence from Denning could possibly 
suggest to readers of this study that auditors’ responsibilities are to correct mistakes 
and not fraud prevention nor detection as perceived by the users of audited financial 
statements.  
The critique of Lord Denning’s legal verdict as discussed in this section further 
revealed the complexity and the volatility of this study. It has variegated definitions, 
interpretations, constructs and explanations that are subject to individual or group of 
individual’s moral and cognitive ability, or legal stance on the topic. For example, why 
the (ISA 240, and  FRC, (2016) viewed auditors’ responsibilities from angle of 
elevation perspective by claiming that it is management’s duty to put control in place 
that can prevent and detect fraud, the users of financial statements viewed such 
recommendation from angle of depression  by claiming that it is auditors’ duty to 
prevent and detect fraud.   
Irrespective of the legal dichotomies that exist as witnessed within this section between 
regulatory standards, legal pronouncements, individual opinion and users of 
accounting information pertaining to auditors’ responsibility, (fraud prevention and 
detection), critics could ponder to know the drivers of auditors’ liabilities in the UK. In 
order to possibly answer this question meritoriously, the section will look into the 
drivers of auditors’ liabilities in the UK. 
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3.8 DRIVERS OF AUDITORS’ LIABILITY IN THE UK  
Deep pocketing has been described as one of the drivers of auditors’ liability in the UK 
(Davies, 2010). As the name imply, it is a term used in describing the motive of 
individual or group of individuals who capitalised on the complexity or weakness of the 
common law in England, regarding who auditors owe duty of care (Davies, 2010). 
However, deep pocketing as a term lack dictionary or universal acceptable definition. 
English common law, specifically the law of tort permits individual or group of 
individuals (plaintiff) under joint-and-several liability law to sue auditors or their 
partners on the basis of their financial strength, or auditors’ assets value whenever 
financial statements become defective (Sunder et al., 2007). Consequently, litigants 
usually sue auditors in the UK for a very high financial value as a means of extorting 
auditors, within the ambit of legal vail even when the level of auditors’ negligence is 
less in relative to the defectiveness of the audited financial statements (Price 
Waterhouse et al., 1992). 
However, further argument can emanate  objectively that auditors in the UK are not 
the creator of defective financial statements in the UK. In the same vein, auditors’ 
professional ethics in conjunction with relevant reporting standards demands that 
auditors in the UK should maintained a high degree of meticulousness in the course 
of their professional duties, as this could minimise the size and value of their legal 
liability in the UK as previously discussed within this chapter.   
Paradoxically, the other side of the argument could be interpreted that auditors should 
be seen as the creators of the opportunities in the first place, while the litigants should 
be seen as the users of the created opportunities. Therefore, auditors should try as 
much as possible to avoid being a contributor to the defectiveness of the audited 
financial statements. This is a point that Davies and Price Waterhouse failed to take 
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into cognisance in their argument within this section. However, other drivers of 
auditors’ liability in the UK have been subdivided into twofold and discussed below: 
• The first on the list is called common law (liability in tort). The doctrine of tort in 
the UK permits anyone who involuntarily relied on the audited financial 
statements other than the shareholders is to sue the auditors if they suffer 
financial injury or loss (Beasley et al., 2003, P. 114). This type of legal 
empowerment given to a third party in terms of the right to sue auditors when 
audited financial statements become defective has been described to be duty 
of care (Crosserat & Ridda, 2010). 
The law of tort is complicated, controversial and difficult to interpret. Arguably 
due to the complexity of its nature. As a result of its dynamism in nature, 
incongruous verdicts have been found in legal cases between auditors in the 
UK and their plaintiffs (Beasley et al., 2003, P. 116). The first of the abundance 
examples in literature is the case between Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman 
and others (1990) (BPP Learning Media, 2010, p. 67). Caparo relied on the 
audited financial statements and invested in Fidelity. However, when the 
audited financial statements of Fidelity were restated, the reported profit was 
overturned to be a loss. Based on this new development (defective financial 
statements), the auditors were sued by the plaintiff, claiming that the auditors 
owed them a duty of care. 
The House of Lord in the UK listened to the plaintiff and the defendant as the 
case was brought to them for settlement. The House of Lord in its verdict, 
declared the legal claim of the plaintiff to be “null and void”. Thus, that the 
auditor’s own duty of care to shareholders as a body and not as individual like 
Caparo. The House of Lord potentially noted that the auditors were not in 
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position to know the intensions of Caparo. As a result, duty of care does not 
exist between Caparo and the auditors (BPP Learning Media, 2010, p. 67). 
In contrast, in the case between Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) v Bannerman 
Johnstone Maclay (2002), the presiding Judge ruled that duty of care indirectly existed 
between RBS and the auditors, as the plaintiff and the defendant (Bannerman) who 
was the auditor (Kaplan, 2007, P.183).  
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) requested APC limited who was a customer to the bank 
(RBS) to produced audited financial statements in pursuance to renewable overdraft 
facility. The auditors of APC were aware about RBS request and it was granted. 
However,  APC was put into receivership with approximately $13.25 million owing to 
RBS. The bank sued the auditors on the ground of duty of care (Kaplan, 2007, P.183).  
The presiding Judge argued that indirect duty of care existed between the bank and 
auditors. The judge further argued that the financial statements of APC wouldn’t have 
been prepared on the basis of going concern. This would have dissuaded the bank 
from granting a further overdraft judge argued. Consequently, the plaintiff claim was 
awarded (Kaplan, 2007, P.183).  
The contradictions as witnessed from the two cases within this section is a revelation 
of three significant issues. Firstly, the common law that deals with auditors’ liabilities 
in the UK is complicated, controversial, and repugnant. Secondly, it is sometimes 
subject to the presiding Judge’s level of erudition in conjunction with his or her legal 
stance regarding auditors’ liability.  Finally, auditors are faced with an unending 
dilemma as they are confused: who they owe duty of care, as legal precedents appear 
confusing as evidenced from this section.  
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Having examined the drivers of auditors’ liabilities in the UK, the next section will look 
into what has been done by the UK government and accounting professional bodies 
as an attempt to promote audited financial statements integrity in the UK. 
3.9 UK GOVERNEMTN AND PROFESSIONAL BODIES EFFORT 
In order to possibly enhance financial statements integrity and stimulate confidence in 
the stock market in the UK, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) an independent 
body that is responsible for setting the UK Corporate Governance Codes, the UK 
standard on auditing and actuarial work has recently updated its publications in the 
following area: Audit Quality, Non audit Service fees cap, and financial reporting.  
FRC, (2016) reported that its previous guidance on, Audit quality, Non-audit fees cap, 
Risk and financial reporting as reported in its ( 2012, and 2013,) versions have been 
updated specifically in 2014 and 2016 as follows: 
The first on the list is called audit quality. As auditors’ liability debate which a function 
of defective audited financial statements lingers in the UK, this has caused a concern 
for both FRC and accounting professional bodies in the UK. Thus, it has become 
imperative that financial statements should purportedly present the actual true and fair 
view of companies’ state of affair for a particular period. In response to this yearning, 
the FRC put strategies in place that could ensure that by 2019 about 90% of audit 
assignment review are free from amendments as against 77% as threshold that is 
currently in place (FRC,2016). By inference, if 90% of audit assignment in the UK are 
free from amendments, the probability of having a defective financial statement which 
in turn determine auditors’ liability in the UK could be limited to 10%. 
Though the declaration from FRC sounds mathematically interesting, it has however 
thrown few more questions to the debate. What determine the value of auditors’ liability 
in the UK? Is it base on the aggregated defective financial statements for a particular 
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accounting period or base on the legal claim value from plaintiffs?   If 90% target is 
considered achievable, does this means that auditors in the UK will be free from civil 
liability? Can this guarantee the legal existence of the big four audit firms in the UK 
and possibly encourage young talents to develop interest in audit profession? In my 
opinion, I hope the research community will look into these questions objectively in the 
form of studies as it is beyond the scope of this study.  
The second step taken by the UK government towards the strengthening of audited 
financial statements centred on the provision of non-audit service. In order to possibly 
increase the integrity of audited financial statements with reference to auditors’ 
independence, and the need to stimulate competition in the audit market within the 
UK, the FRC has set a new threshold in 2016 to be between 50%-70% (FRC, 2016; 
Crump, 2016; Ball, 2016; ICAEW, 2016; Ritter 2015). For example, the non-audit fees 
from a particular audit client should not exceed 50% of the total revenue generated 
from the audit client for two consecutive accounting periods. Furthermore, non-audit 
fees from a particular audit client should not exceed 70% of the total audit fees 
generated from the same client for three consecutive years (FRC, 2016 and Crump, 
2016). Other accounting services such as tax advice and financial investment strategy 
which auditors in the UK usually render in conjunction with audit assignments have 
been banned completely (Crump, 2016).  
Though the measures adopted in the UK as recommended by the European Union in 
2008 appears to be the right move at the right direction as explained in the preceding 
page, critics could question the reasonableness of the non-audit service cap within the 
UK. For example, can this measure meet its purported aims and objectives in the light 
of auditors’ independence and competition in the audit market within the UK? Is this 
capping policy strong enough to create confidence in the stock market within the UK 
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and enhance financial statements integrity, thereby minimising auditors’ liability in the 
UK? These questions may not find answers in the interim within this study as the 
planned strategies are yet to be measured. 
The next point to be examined being regulatory effort is called going concern 
paragraph within ISA 570. The old ISA 570 states that when a material uncertainty 
exists in company’s financial statements that are prepared on a going concern basis, 
that the external auditor should use matter of emphasis paragraph in highlighting the 
material uncertainty that can invalidate the going concern assumption of the company 
audited. The standard equally mentioned that the audited financial statement should 
remain unmodified if directors make adequate disclosure regarding material 
uncertainty in the financial statements (IFAC, 2016 ). 
However, the revised ISA 570 states that if statutory auditors found material 
uncertainty in the audited financial statements, irrespective of compliance in terms of 
adequate disclosure that the auditors should use a heading tag “material uncertainty” 
in drawing the attention of accounting information users that a severe material 
uncertainty exist regarding the company’s ability to operate as going concern in the 
foreseeable future. The auditor should detail the material uncertainty in terms of 
conditions or events that cast significant doubt on the going concern assumption. The 
material uncertainty heading should precede the basis of opinion paragraph (ACCA, 
2016 and IFAC, 2016). 
The wisdom behind these changes in terms of material uncertainty and adequate 
disclosure is unquestionable. For example, the new term “material uncertainty” is 
expected to arrest the attention of financial statements users. This could in turn 
influence their economic decision in terms of investment or divestment within a 
company. By interpretation, this could as well help to minimise auditors’ liability in the 
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UK as financial statement information users will become information equip. The 
probability that the expected benefits will become a reality or utopia is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
The final point to be examined within this section being regulatory effort from the UK 
government and accountancy professional bodies in the UK  is called opinion 
paragraph as modified within ISA 705 and 706 in the UK.  
As a part of regulatory effort in terms of financial statement integrity enhancement in 
the UK, FRC has modified ISA 705 and 706 respectively. For example, the revised UK 
ISA 705 emphasized on the use of simple language as well as situations or 
circumstances where various and appropriate opinion can be applied. On the other 
hand, the ISA 706 details circumstance where “other matter” paragraph can be used 
in the audited financial statements (ACCA, 2015 and IFAC, 2016)). 
The revised UK ISA 705 requires auditors in the UK to maintain the following standard, 
particularly in the opinion paragraph as follows: “Nature of the Matter”. The new 
standard requires auditors in the UK to state very clearly the nature of the matter they 
encountered in the financial statements that influenced their opinion. For example, 
financial statements are materially misstated, but not pervasive. If this become the 
case, in auditors’ judgement, the financial statement should be qualified, using the 
word “except for” in the opinion paragraph. If the auditors are unable to obtain sufficient 
and appropriate audit evidence, the financial statements should be qualified, using the 
“word” except… in the opinion paragraph. However, if the nature of misstatements in 
the financial statements becomes material and pervasive, the auditor should express 
adverse opinion (FRC, 2012 and IFAC, 2016). This means the audited financial 
statement do not represent a true and fair view of the financial status of the audited 
entity (ACCA, 2015). On the other hand, if the degree of insufficient and inappropriate 
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audit evidence is material and pervasive, the auditor should express disclaimer of 
opinion. This means the auditors are unable to express opinion on the financial 
statements (FRC, 2016 and ACCA, 2015). 
The regulatory effort from UK government through its agency and other professional 
bodies in the UK as evidenced within this section is that both parties are committed to 
enhancing audited financial statement integrity in the UK. The question that remain 
unanswered in the interim though it is beyond the remit of this study is that: can this 
regulatory effort put to an end the defectiveness of audited financial statements in the 
UK? If the answer to this question is yes, then the campaigners for auditors’ liability 
capping in the UK should be advised to remain silent in the interim. If the answer is 
no, one could be tempted to believe that auditors in the UK are not fairly treated when 
it comes to audit reform in the UK. 
Having examined the UK government and accountancy professional bodies’ 
regulatory effort towards audited financial statements’ integrity enhancement, the next 
section will look into stakeholders’ constructs on the research topic. For example, it 
will examine the views of different stakeholders in relation to the study question and 
objectives partially. 
3.10 STAKEHOLDERS CONSTRUCTS  
In order to partly achieve the proposed aims and objectives of this study, the following 
questions from critics in line with the study question and objectives will be examined 
in great details. Thus, proponents of non-capping could claim that auditors’ liabilities 
capping can impact adversely on listed companies’ financial statements’ integrity in 
the UK. 
 As earlier mentioned from the previous chapter within this study, uncertainty and fear 
is looming in the air regarding the impending danger or benefits that auditor liability 
 
Page 53 of 253 
 
capping could bring in the UK in terms of listed companies financial statements 
integrity. However, the recommendations from European Union in 2008 on the topical 
subject area in conjunction with the UK government strategy on the topic has provoked 
divergent opinion (Humphrey & Samsonova, 2014 and Philipsen, 2014). For example, 
studies carried out by London Economics, (2006) find out that auditors’ liability capping 
cannot adversely impact on listed companies’ financial statements integrity in the 
Europe. In the same vein, European Union, (2008) recommended liability capping as 
one of the strategies for European countries in managing the epidemics of civil 
liabilities against auditors in Europe. However, it failed to mention specifically the 
impact such recommendation could have on listed companies’ financial statements, in 
terms of its integrity. One can argue that if its impact could become aversive on 
financial statements integrity, such recommendations would not have been opted. 
Laux, and Newman, (2010); Defond, and Zhand., (2014) argued that the fear of 
unlimited liability and reputation damage from auditors’ perspective can prosper 
financial statement integrity. He et al., (2014)  argued that auditors’ liability capping is 
the solution to the existing problems of civil claim against auditor. Thus, that capping 
can possibly induce auditors to do more in enhancing financial statements’ integrity. 
Belcher argued that medium tier audit firm could be encourage in the market. For 
example, capping can stimulate competition in the audit market that is currently 
monopolised by the big four accounting firm in the UK. This could in return enhance 
financial statements integrity.  
The Association of British Insurers, (2007) argued that it is difficult to reach a 
conclusion on the appropriate strategy of limiting auditor’s liability. In contrast, Aureilia, 
(2012) opined that Liability Limitation Agreement (LLA) might not have adverse effect 
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on audit quality resulting from stringent regulations and sound audit procedures in 
place. 
If the arguments and counterarguments  from this section are presumably valid, is it 
possible for auditors’ liability capping to stimulate competition within the UK audit 
market being a derivative? 
The primary aim of this question is to gain an understanding as to whether audit market 
in the UK is currently uncompetitive, and what must be done to possibly reduce 
oligopoly in the market. London Economics (2006) find out that the European audit 
market is concentrated in the hands of the big four. Namely, (PwC, KPMG, Deloitte, 
and Ernst & Young). The major fact that influenced concentration is due to 
unwillingness of the medium tie audit firm to accept high profile client, resulting from 
fear of unlimited liabilities (Philipsen, 2014). In the same vein, (EC, 2008; EC, 2010 
and Davies, 2015) argued that auditors’ liability issue needs to be addressed in order 
to possibly achieve progress on both the development of the role of the audit and the 
encouragement of greater competition in the audit market. Thus, they stressed on the 
significance of reducing auditors’ liability in order to possibly stimulate competition in 
the market. Belcher, (2006) and Weber et al., (2008) argued that the expected 
competition in the audit market will only become an illusion if auditors’ liability is not 
capped. 
There appear to be a consensus regarding the positive effective of auditor liability 
capping in the UK as evidenced within the preceding paragraph. However, Andrew, 
(1989), London Economics, (2006); Belcher, (2006), EC (2008), FRC (2008), Roach, 
(2010), Shamharir, et al., (2010), Velte, and Stiglbauer, (2012), and Crump, (2016) 
argued that there is a high degree of uncertainty in terms of audit cost and its 
professional existence if the demise of another big accountancy firm should occur in 
 
Page 55 of 253 
 
the future resulting from auditors’ civil liability. Though this statement looked like a 
prima facie case, the strategy of auditor liability limitations has evoked divergent 
opinions in the UK (Humphrey & Samsonova, 2014). 
ICAEW, (2015) reminded its member that irrespective of the professional scepticisms 
they maintain as auditors, that risk cannot be eliminated, but can only be managed. 
One of the methods it recommended to its members was to secure indemnity 
insurance which is currently difficult to secure by the large accounting firms as 
previously discussed within this chapter. 
However, ICAEW recommend to its members to have a minimum insurance cover of 
£100,000 and maximum of £1.5 million (Hammond, 2012). The question that comes 
to mind is what will happen if the medium sized audit firms are unable to meet the 
above recommendation? The answer to this question is simple. Thus, this could mark 
the beginning of exodus of some audit firms leaving the UK audit market. Another 
implication this could have on the audit market could be over concentration or 
uncompetitive audit market. Hammond cautioned that firms are required to take 
reasonable steps that they are able to meet claims arising from professional business 
and this may lead many firms to conclude that they need more protection indemnity 
insurance (PII) than the amount required under the PII Regulations. 
The synopsis of this section based on the available literature is that the audit market 
in the UK is undoubtedly concentrated in the hands of the big four. Furthermore, 
inability of the medium sized audit firms or one of the big four to secure professional 
indemnity insurance resulting from exorbitant premium could further reduce the 
number of participants in the audit market in the UK. The implication of this could lead 
to a further oligopoly in the audit market in the UK and a gradual of audit profession 
extinction in the UK. 
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3.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
A  review of the relevant literature on auditors’ liabilities capping in relation to financial 
statements integrity, the audit market and its profession in the UK has revealed that 
the topic is complex and dynamic in nature. For example, users of audited financial 
statements believed that it is auditors’ responsibility to prevent and detect fraud as 
against SAS 99 and ISA 240 specifications. Legal precedents and judgements on who 
auditors owe duty of care, when and how auditors commit professional negligence has 
become a matter of the presiding judges’ level of erudition, ontology, epistemology, 
and legal stance. 
Literature review also stressed on the need for auditors to maintain a high degree of 
meticulousness in order to possibly avoid negligence and liabilities. It equally 
highlights the fact that auditors are not fairly treated on the prevailing topic, hence the 
debate in the first place. 
To possibly arrive at a deeper understanding or conclusion on whether auditors in the 
UK will maintain a professional scepticism attitude if their liability is capped, and 
whether capping can demonopolize the current UK audit market, and whether audit 
profession can survive and grow in the face of colossal legal claim, empirical research 
was conducted. 
The next chapter in this study will shed light on the research approach adopted. It also 
included the research philosophy, strategy adopted regarding sample selection, data 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapters of this study covered the conceptual framework and literature 
review that guided this study. This chapter takes a further step, by discussing in detail 
regarding the research methodology and methods that was applied in this study within 
the ambit of the study questions, overall aim, and objectives. It also specifically justified 
the study’s chosen methodology and methods, approach and strategy in conjunction 
with the nature of the study. The potential limitations of the chosen strategies in 
conjunction with their benefits are also discussed in this chapter. This is followed by 
chapter summary. 
This study has three objectives within the context of Auditors liability capping in the UK: 
1. To gain an understanding whether auditors in the UK will maintain a 
professional scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped. 
2. To investigate whether auditors’ liability capping can possibly help to 
demonopolize the UK current audit market. 
3. To investigate whether audit profession in the UK can survive and grow 
should the UK chartered Accountants are continuously exposed to unlimited 
liability business risk. 
Significant aspect of this study relates to objective 1 and 2 as mentioned above. Thus, 
following the recommendation of the EU in 2008 regarding the strategies that could 
possibly help to minimise auditors’ liability in Europe, about 33 countries in Europe 
have adopted auditors’ liability capping as a strategy in variegated forms. Eleven 
countries within Europe out of the 33 have adopted statutory cap (Karako-Eyal, 2013; 
Laitinen, 2015). However, the regulatory effort from the UK government and the 
European Union as mentioned above, regarding the appropriate strategy in terms of 
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auditors’ liability limitation has evoked divergent opinions from various stakeholders 
on the subject matter within the UK (Humphrey & Samsonova, 2015; Philipsen, 2014). 
Within the Literature review chapter, objective number 3: To investigate whether audit 
profession in the UK can survive and grow should the UK Chartered Accountants are 
continuously exposed to unlimited liability business risk was covered. In the same vein, 
there was apple evidence within the same chapter that gap existed in relation to 
objective 1 and 2. Thus, the need for empirical research in the form of semi-structured 
interviews and Likert scale type questionnaire become inevitable. For example, the 
collection and analysis of empirical data is expected to possibly help readers to gain 
the constructs auditors in the UK held within the context of the study. Therefore, by 
comparing finding from theory with practice (relevant literature and empirical study) 
through methodological triangulation, a fuller understanding will be hopefully gained 
regarding the issues that surround auditors’ liability in the UK. Thus, it is expected that 
the study will hopefully contribute immensely to the body of knowledge within the 
research topic in the UK.  
4.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The first question that readily comes to mind within this section is: what is research 
methodology and methods? A fuller understanding of these concepts is expected to 
enhance the understanding of readers in relation to reliability. McGregor and 
Murname, (2010) defined methodology as follow: 
“The word methodology comprises two nouns: method and ology, which 
means a branch of knowledge; hence, methodology is a branch of 
knowledge that deals with the general principles or axioms of the generation 
of new knowledge. It refers to the rationale and the philosophical 
assumptions that underlie any natural, social or human science study, 
whether articulated or not”. 
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Bunniss & Kelly, (2010) defined research philosophy to be  the premise, belief, or 
paradigm held by researchers within the research community. 
Based on the above simple definitions of research philosophy, it can be argued, 
understood, or interpreted that various research philosophies exist if it is 
agreeable that research methodology is the philosophical paradigm that 
underpins a study.   
Having presumably gained an understanding in terms of research methodology 
meaning, the chosen research methodology that guide this study and its 
appropriateness in relation to the research topic will be discussed at the later part 
of this chapter. 
Biggam Bryman, (2016, PP. 20-29) opined that the most common research 
philosophies are: positivism, Realism, Pragmatism, and Interpretivism. These 
research philosophies’ characteristics are briefly discussed below. However, 
greater attention is paid to the chosen philosophy and its appropriateness to the 
study within the context of auditor liability capping in the UK.  
Research methods on the other hand simply refer to the tools or techniques used 
by researchers in the process of data collection (Bryman, 2016, P. 40). For 
example, these could include surveys, interviews, photovoice, or participant 
observation. Therefore, it can be interpreted that while research methodology 
elicits the philosophical ideology that underpin a study, research methods show 
how a study is conducted, thereby adding value to the study in the form of validity 
and reliability, as the methods are shaped by methodology. 
4.1.1 POSITIVISM 
The philosophical proposition of positivism is that reality exists independently and 
objectively without human interference, quantifiable and measurable (Orlikowski 
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& Baroudi, 1991; Remenyi et al., 1998). It is mostly applied in natural science 
research, and it is well suited in quantitative studies (Biggam, 2015; Bryman, 
2016). 
Biggam, (2015) and  Bryman, (2016) argued that some of the philosophical proposition 
of positivism should be accepted with caution. They further argued that if the 
underpinning ideology of positivism is correct, the existence of misdiagnosis from 
laboratory specifically within the health sector and the evidence from plane crash 
suggests that the concept of reality measurement in an objective form without human 
interference call for a rethink. 
Bryman, (2016, P.24) argued that the philosophical stance of positivism demands the 
construction of testable hypotheses. It is well suited with deductive approach, thereby 
requiring theoretical framework. Its main objective is to measure reality objectively, 
accept hypotheses and theory or refute them completely, thereby eliciting for new 
theory. 
The characteristics of positivism being a research philosophy as discussed above do 
not fit into the study objectives. Therefore, it is inappropriate to apply this philosophy 
within this study. For example, in terms of approach, this study adopts inductive 
approach without theoretical framework as against the proposition of positivism. The 
objective of the study is partly based on empirical research that requires the 
understanding of qualified and non-qualified Accountants’ constructs on the research 
topic. Though descriptive statistics is partly applied, this is devoid of objectivity 
measurement. The study intends to understand the meaning people attached to 
situation, perceptions as this understanding forms their reality as socially constructed. 
It must be mentioned as well that within this study, hypotheses will not be formulated, 
and theory will not be proved. This further suggests that to possibly avoid the 
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accusation of philosophical and academic miscarriage, the study completely reject 
positivism within the terrain of the research topic. 
The position of the researcher in relation to the constructs held by positivist as a 
research philosophy is that its claim that reality exist independent of human 
interference appear to be inaccurate in absolute terms. As a result, its appropriateness 
within this study become questionable. For example, the process of  measurement, 
recording, analysis and interpretation of reality involves human interference. It can be 
inferred therefore, that reality is socially constructed by human. Based on this and 
other proposition within this section, positivism is deemed as philosophy that is not fit 
for purpose within the ambit of this study. 
4.1.2 REALISM 
Biggam, (2015, P 185) argued that the propositional or philosophical stance of realism 
is simple: that ‘reality is what human take to be true or false’. Thus, social reality exists 
independent of human mind.  By inference, it can be argued that social reality is a 
derivative of human interpretations. 
From intuitive thinking perspective, the philosophical stance of realism appears lacking 
a positive correlation with the objectives of this study. Consequently, it is rejected as 
a research methodology that can possibly guide this study. For example, if the above 
assertion from realist perspective is valid, that ‘reality is what human take to be true’, 
there will be a less need to carry out this study in the first place. Thus, the UK 
government is concerned that auditors in the UK may relax their professional 
scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped.  Base on this understanding, 
the debate lingered for more than a decade. If the proposition of reality is accepted 
within this study, the understanding of the UK government ought to have been 
accepted as the reality or truth from realists’ perspective. 
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The realist’s proposition also argued that reality is independent of human mind as 
quoted. A critical evaluation of this concept by the researcher equally call for the 
rejection of realism philosophical stance within the realm of this study. For example, 
the conceptual framework of this study as encapsulated in chapter two, revealed that 
auditor’s liability in the UK is a function of defective financial statements which are 
humanly window-dressed. In order words, auditors’ liability is human mind made. 
Paradoxically, the ideological stance of realism is not in consonance with this reality 
in terms of auditors’ liability in the UK which is a derivative of defective financial 
statements. 
4.1.3 PRAGMATISM 
 The premise or philosophical stance of pragmatism holds that there are several 
methods of analysing and interpreting data. Thus, the values placed on such data by 
the users of the information play an important role in data analysis (Saunders et al., 
2009, p. 112-119; Yin, 2014). If this proposition or construct is arguably correct, further 
argument could emanate from this ontological assumption. For example, it could be 
argued that research questions and objectives are determined by researchers’ 
ontology, epistemology and axiology. 
This type of philosophy is common in applied research Saunders et al., (2009, p. 112-
119); Yin, (2014). If the second and third ontological assumption of the pragmatist is 
assumed to be correct, it will become a case of prima facie within the ambit of this 
study as this philosophy mismatches the characteristics of the study. Because of this 
inherent limitation, this philosophy is not fit for purpose in relation to the research topic, 
hence it has been rejected in this study. 
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4.1.4 INTERPRETIVISM 
Biggam, (2015, P. 168) argued that the philosophical stance of interpretivism centres 
on human behaviour rather than object. This philosophical paradigm claimed or 
believed that several social realities exist, and that reality is defined by human. It 
further stressed that reality is situational and time contingent (Holden & Lynch, 2004). 
This type of philosophy is commonly used by researchers in social sciences rather 
than natural sciences Biggam, (2015, P. 168). It is not quite surprising that its approach 
in research is not purely scientific in nature. 
The philosophical stance that underpins this study is interpretivism. The rationale for 
the chosen philosophy and its appropriateness in relation to this study is   justified as 
follows: 
The research topic centres on human behaviour rather than object. For example, the 
study has attempted to gain an understanding empirically whether auditors in the UK 
will maintain a professional scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped. 
This forms the fundamental basis of interpretivism (Biggam, 2015, P. 168). 
Interpretivism believes that several social realities exist, and that reality is defined by 
human (Biggam, 2015, P. 168; Holden & Lynch, 2004). Within this study, both the 
advocates and non-advocates of auditors’ liability capping in the UK have different 
realities as defined by them, based on their perceptions in relation to the research 
topic as evidenced within the literature review chapter. 
Furthermore, interpretivism stressed that reality is situational and time contingent 
(Holden & Lynch, 2004). Auditors’ liability in the UK has evolved over time. For 
example, it has shifted from “joint-and-several liability as stated in Company Act 2000 
to liability limitation Agreement (LLA), Limited Liability Corporations (LLC) and 
proportionate liability sharing (PLS) as documented in Company Act 2006 (Time and 
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situation contingent) within the UK. Moreover, the research relies on literature written 
by human beings that have different interpretations to reality at different times and on 
different contexts. 
Interpretivism philosophy maintained that researcher plays an active participant role 
in a study (Creswell, 2015). For example, within this study, the researcher played an 
active participant role in the form of data collections, analysis, and interpretations.  
Finally, interpretivism is commonly applied by researchers in social sciences setting 
rather than natural sciences (Biggam, 2015, P. 168). Interestingly, the nature of this 
study find itself within the ambit of social science. 
The characteristics of this study are in line with interpretivism philosophy as highlighted 
within this section, hence its application within this study is appropriate. For example, 
the described features of interpretivism within this section forms the bedrock of this 
study as they are in consonance with the research questions and its objectives which 
centres on human behaviour. Furthermore, the research involves human 
participations through the administration of questionnaires to possibly gain the 
constructs held by qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK within the 
research topic. 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN: QUALITATIVE  
Having discussed the underpinning philosophical stance of this study within the terrain 
of interpretivism in conjunction with its appropriateness in relation to the study, this 
section considered the meaning of research design and qualitative research as the 
subject matter of this section. It elaborates on what research design is, the chosen 
research design for the study and its appropriateness. This is expected to increase 
the understanding of readers as the term “research design” has been interpreted to 
mean research methods in some literature. 
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Bryman, (2016, P. 39) argued that research design is concerned with the structure of 
enquiry or investigation as determined by research questions or objective. Thus, it is 
not a matter of logistical, but a logical one. In the same vein, (Yin, 2013) used the 
analogy of building structure in explaining what research design entails. For example, 
prior to the commencement of a building project, the architect must determine in 
advance the type of building to be erected.  Questions regarding the nature of the 
building project must be asked and answered in advance. Does the architect intend to 
raise a school building, factory for machinery manufacturing, a residential home or an 
apartment block? When these questions are answered, the material that could 
correctly match the type of building to be erected will be ordered.   
Similarly, social research project needs a structure or design prior to the 
commencement of data collection, analysis, and interpretation. It can be inferred 
therefore, that a research design is not a plan, but a structure that enables a 
researcher to gather valid evidence, answer the research questions as unambiguously 
as possible. However, it must be made clear that obtaining the type of valid evidence 
will require a researcher to specify the type of evidence needed.  
It is presumed that based on the above explanations and analogy regarding what 
research design entails, readers are now in position to gain a fuller understanding 
about research design. Within the borderline of this assumption, the research design 
of this study is qualitative research design. Possible questions that readers could ask 
are: what is qualitative research, and why is it chosen for this study? Answers to these 
questions are provided below.  
Defining and explaining qualitative research within the embers of the study is 
significant as it forms the bedrock of the study. However, (Ritchie, et al., 2013), argued 
that an attempt to define qualitative study will inevitably give a direct invitation to critical 
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evaluation and constructive criticisms that could possibly emanate from scholars.  
Their argument was based on a single premise. Thus, that qualitative research is not 
confined to a theory or paradigm, nor any singular method in its right. The argument 
of Denzin & Lincoln, (2011) corroboratively had a positive correlation with the 
argument of Ritchie, et al., (2013) as mentioned above. For example, Denzin & 
Lincoln, (2011) argued that the term has a connotation of divers or array of methods 
and approaches in relation to different subject of research. It is not quite surprising 
therefore, that from the paragraph below, different school of thoughts or scholars 
define qualitative method distinctively. 
Despite the arguments that an attempt to define qualitative study will invariably 
provoke intellectual criticisms from academic perspective, the researcher deemed it 
expedient in making such attempt. From the researcher’s perspective,  failure to define 
qualitative study as the nervous system within this study could create enormous 
difficulties for readers in gaining understanding in relation to the chosen research 
method. 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 11) opined that qualitative research simply refers to 
any study  
“That produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other 
means of quantification. It can refer to research about persons’ lives, lived 
experiences, behaviours, emotions, and feelings as well as about 
organisational functioning, social movements, cultural phenomena, and 
interactions between nations.” This means that qualitative research is not 
statistical, and it incorporates multiple realities”.  
 
The view or definition of qualitative research by Flick, (2014, p. 542) has some similar 
characteristics with the above definition as provided by Strauss and Corbin, (1990, p. 
11). Flick on the other hand opined that qualitative research is concerned with the 
analysis of subjective meaning, event, social production, and practices, by collecting 
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data that are not standard in their very nature.  Boddy, (2016) in the same vein, 
described Qualitative research as the type of research project that concern itself with 
the development of an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon rather than breadth, 
specifically when a non-positivist paradigm approach is accepted in research. In the 
same vein, Bryman, (2016. P. 374) defined a qualitative research to be the type of 
research whose emphasis is based on words rather than quantification in the collection 
of data and analysis in their natural setting.  Thus, the researcher become an 
instrument during data collection process. Part of the researcher responsibility as an 
instrument is to gather words from participants, analyse the words in common themes, 
describing a process by using both persuasive and expressive language, while 
focusing on meaning that participants gave. In the same vein, Creswell, (2005) defined 
qualitative research as follows:  
 “a type of educational research in which the researcher relies on the view 
of participants, asks broad, general questions, collects data consisting 
largely of words (or texts) from participants, describes and analyses these 
words for themes, and conducts the inquiry in a subjective, biased manner 
(p. 39)”.  
 
From the definitions and explanations of qualitative research as evidenced within this 
section, it is presumably understood that if a researcher must avoid the accusation of 
ecological fallacy, qualitative research should be conducted. Thus, it makes 
researchers and readers to understand humans in their natural setting. Bryman, (2016 
P.322) argued that ecological fallacy will be committed in research if inferences about 
individual are based on aggregate data finding. The point of argument here is that 
individual who are having or have had first-hand experience or feeling about 
phenomenon should be contacted to explore their perceptions or constructs. The best 
research approach that meet this requirement is qualitative research. It is inductively 
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based rather than deductive base. It intends to gain or explore a phenomenon within 
the embers of conceptual framework rather than theoretical framework. 
Having discussed the characteristics of qualitative research in line with the 
epistemological views of some scholars, the next question that will be answered is 
why qualitative approach was chosen for this study. This question is technically asking 
for explanation in relation to the validity of the adopted research approach. 
Qualitative research approach was adopted within the study for several compelling 
reasons.  
Firstly, qualitative research is quite useful if the essence of a study is to understand or 
explore meanings people give to event, experience, and opinions (Creswell, 2005, P. 
39). Secondly, qualitative study allows the researcher to gain an in-depth 
understanding of phenomenon like feeling, assumptions, thoughts, or opinion which 
could be practically difficult to learn through a traditional research approach like 
quantitative (Bryman, 2016, P.322). Thirdly, Bryman, (2016, P.322) noted that 
qualitative study best suit a situation that require the researcher to study a 
phenomenon in their natural settings. Fourthly, qualitative requires a researchers’ 
participant role as determine by the research questions (Biggam, 2015, P. 168). 
My justification for the choice of qualitative study will begin with the fourth premise as 
mentioned above. Thus, the nature of my research approach stems from my research 
questions. The study questions are: 1. Will auditors in the UK maintain a professional 
scepticism attitude If their professional liability is capped? 2. Can auditors’ liability 
capping help to demonopolize the current UK audit market? 3. Can audit profession 
survive and grow in the face of colossal legal claim against them in the UK? 4. What 
are the sources and drivers of auditors’ liability in the UK?  
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The nature of the study question is more of opinion, perceptions, feelings and 
individual’s constructs exploration. The traditional research design like quantitative 
study cannot answer these questions in their natural settings. There is nothing to prove 
here, and there is no hypothesis or theory testing. Its approach is inductive based 
rather than deductive base. While inductive approach elicits theory making to gain an 
understanding, deductive approach elicits theory testing, quantification and 
measurement of reality. Moreover, the study questions are not aiming at causes and 
effect or relationship. Rather it aims to assess plausibility under uncertainty conditions 
as there is no existing probability that can help to measure reality objectively. 
The third rationale for chosen qualitative study with the research topic is based on the 
claim that qualitative study best suits a situation that require the researcher to study a 
phenomenon in their natural settings. Bryman, (2016) described this postulation as 
ecological based study. For example, Bryman substituted the word ecology for natural 
settings. Within this study, the perceptions or opinion of qualified and non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK were explored through semi-structure interview and online 
survey. This is expected to reveal their natural state of mind in relation to the research 
topic. It must be mentioned as well that other research approach like quantitative study 
cannot meet this requirement or characteristics. Quantitative study usually aims to 
accept or reject hypotheses that are formulated by the researcher. In order to 
successfully do this, the researcher would need a large amount of quantifiable data 
that could possibly enhance the possibility of reality measurement. 
Moreover, the research topic is contemporary. The debate in relation to the research 
topic has lasted for than a decade in the UK. It is naturally difficult for any scholar to 
claim absolute right answer as individual opinion on the topic is subject to his or her 
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ontological and epistemological paradigm. This is against the doctrine of quantitative 
study, that reality can be measured objectively without human influence. 
The second rationale for chosen qualitative research design is that qualitative study 
allows the researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of phenomenon like feeling, 
assumptions, thoughts, or opinion which could be practically difficult to learn through 
a traditional research approach like quantitative study. If this premise holds, though in 
my opinion it does within my limited understanding, qualitative study is the answer to 
the research questions as it is fit for purpose. Critics could argue that the application 
of descriptive statistics within the study would have solicited for quantitative study. The 
answer to this piece of argument is that academic fallacy would have been committed 
if quantitative option was accepted within the remit of the research topic. For example, 
the application of a specific research tool alone cannot determine the nature of 
research in its right (Biggam, 2015, p.163). Biggam argued that it is the combination 
of research strategy, research approach, data collection means, and research 
questions that determine the type of research to be conducted. If this point is construed 
to be valid or acceptable by academia, then, the reasonableness of the choice of 
qualitative study within the contemporary research topic becomes justifiable, and 
acceptable. 
Having discussed the rationale for choosing qualitative research design within the 
context of the study, the next section will examine the limitation of qualitative research 
approach. 
4.2.1 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: LIMITATIONS 
The starting point regarding the limitation of qualitative research within this study is 
anchored on the argument of Chandra, and Shang (2017). For example, they argued 
that qualitative research approach sometimes underrates contextualisation 
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sensitivities, thereby focusing on experiences and meanings that participants gave. 
Critics could argue that the view of Chandra, and Shang called for a caution. For 
instance, researchers may have misapplied the doctrine of qualitative study if 
contextualisation was underplayed. If this is the case, it could be argued that this has 
nothing to do with qualitative research method as the act of misapplication rests with 
the researcher. 
Despite the constructive criticisms that Chandra, and Shang’s views have received, 
it must be mentioned that within this study, the researcher remained contextually 
focused. For example, the researcher has made references to auditors’ liability 
capping several times as the contextual settings of the study. 
Smith and McElwee, (2015) argued that qualitative research principally focusses or try 
to understand participants’ experience in order to possibly give a valid interpretation. 
Intuitively speaking, critics could argue that the above-mentioned limitation lacked 
constructive criticism. For example, the essence of qualitative study is to gain an in-
depth understanding of phenomenon. If experience or perception option is not 
empirically explored, one could end up conducting a literature review and not 
qualitative study. 
Furthermore, Boddy, (2016) argued that the use of small sample size in qualitative 
study raises the issue of generalizability. This criticism suggests a lack of 
understanding regarding the terrain of qualitative study. For example, sample size is 
a choice that a researcher should make. The appropriateness and reasonableness of 
the sample in relation to the population would require justification. This has nothing to 
do with qualitative method itself. 
Moreover, the wisdom behind qualitative study is to explore participants’ opinions, 
feeling and experience on contextual basis. The intention to generalise findings do not 
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exist in qualitative study, unless several studies are conducted within the same 
phenomenon (Boddy, 2016; Parker, and Northcott, 2016). 
Sandy and Dumay, (2011) qualitative research method is a long hard road, 
encompassing enormous and elusive data on one side, and other stringent 
requirements in relation to data analysis on another side, within the corridor of data 
interpretation. 
It can be argued that the nature of every research itself is time consuming. If this 
assertion from the researcher become acceptable in the research community, it could 
be inferred that the limitation labelled on qualitative research method on the ground of 
rigour or timeliness lack merit. 
Finally, it is imperative for readers to understand that within this study, the researcher 
do not intend to generalise findings. Thus, opinions of participants in conjunction with 
literature were explored to gain the constructs held by qualified and non-qualified 
Accountants regarding auditors’ liability capping within the ambit of the research topic. 
Having constructively and objectively examined the strengths and limitations of 
qualitative research within this section, the next section within this study will examine 
researcher’s positionality within the frame of qualitative study. For example, it will 
explore the definition of the term “positionality”. Rationale for positionality will be 
discussed briefly, and the researcher’s positionality within the research topic will be 
discussed.  
4.3 THE RESEARCHER’ S POSITIONALITY 
The first question that readily comes to mind whenever “researcher’s positionality” is 
mentioned in the literature has bearing with its meaning. Savin-Baden and Major, 
(2013 p. 71) argued that the term researcher’s positionality describes researcher’s 
worldview and the position they have chosen within the context of their research topic. 
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Within the lens of researchers’ positionality, Creswll, (2015, P.8) argued that each 
researcher has a philosophical, historical, social, racial and political background. He 
further stressed that each of the above characteristics form the ontological and 
epistemological view of researchers including bias: which could be practically 
impossible to bracket out in the field of research. If the premise of Creswell as 
mentioned become acceptable in the research community, another argument could 
erupt. For example, the claim that absolute truth which is devoid of human interference 
exist according to positivists could become questionable. Biggam, (2015, p. 169). 
however, cautioned that the recognition of researcher’s positionality underscores the 
myth or notion that human beings are neutral or unbiased when they participate in 
anything of their interest. Altheide & Johnson, (1994) argued that if it is generally 
acceptable in the field of research that human being are not bias free in anything of 
their interest, it therefore become expedient for researchers to acknowledge those 
limitations or biases and state them explicitly during data collection, analysis, 
interpretation and reporting in their research. This is hoped to help qualitative studies 
readers in evaluating the validity of any conclusion derived or extrapolated from data 
set. 
As it has become a requirement for qualitative researchers to reflect on their research 
process in relation to their positionality to possibly guard against unethical or 
unintentional influence thereby promoting objectivity and the reliability of their 
research, the following discussion reflect on my personal experiences germane to this 
research. 
Having previously worked in the bank as account officer and account assistant for 
about 4 years both in West Africa and in the UK, I had the opportunity to work closely 
with external auditors. For example, they come with the mind of enquiry by testing the 
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internal control mechanism in relation to their efficacy. They ask individual personnel 
in the account department about their role. For example, they would like to establish 
whether the person that is assigned to a specific role is the actual person that is 
performing the role. They asked individual account officers about the system they use 
on daily basis. I have seen the auditors in many occasions, checking the information 
in the audit trail. They usually ask question in relation to the rationale behind any 
cancellation or deleted data in the system. 
Prior to the external auditor arrival, the chief accountant who is the head of internal 
control or finance department will notify all account officers and account assistant 
about the coming of the auditors. Thus, a good sense of decorum will be maintained 
at the highest level when external auditors are around. Within the account department, 
a high degree of meticulousness will be maintained whenever external auditors are 
around. Within the account department, high degree of superiority, respect, and error 
finding are sometimes ascribed to auditors. After the departure of the auditors, you 
could see a sigh of relief from our faces. Some of my colleagues will jokily described 
the auditors as the necessary “devils”. This is because there is always fear of 
uncertainty in the air whenever auditors are around in the building. After the departure 
of the auditors, some of my colleagues could jokily asked others “are you trying to 
audit my professional competence”? The general belief in the department was that 
auditors are professional police when it comes to financial statements integrity 
protection. As individual, this was my position in relation to auditors’ professional 
scepticism attitude. With this mind set, I made up my mind to become an auditor one 
day because they are highly regarded in the society as professionals that hold integrity 
to the extreme. Indeed, I enrolled as ACCA self -study student couple of years ago. 
Currently, I have become ACCA part qualified, having passed thirteen out of fourteen 
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modules as a requirement to become a qualified auditor or accountant. With this little 
practical and heavy theoretical understanding, I could say that I have an idea about 
what audit entails and what auditors can or can’t do. 
However, two factors have changed my positionality in relation to the research topic. 
The first is the position of the UK government who has refused to cap auditors’ liability 
in the UK. The debate to cap auditors’ liability in Europe following the 
recommendations of the EU in 2008 has fallen into deaf ears from the UK government 
perspective. For example, about 33 countries in Europe have adopted auditors’ liability 
capping as a strategy in Europe. Finding from the literature review chapter within this 
study revealed that the UK government is reluctant to cap auditors’ liability because of 
fear of uncertainty. Thus, will auditors maintain a professional scepticism attitude if 
their liability is capped? This very question formed part of my research question. 
The second factor that has changed my positionality within the research topic is based 
on the responses from some audit partners and manager from top audit firms in the 
country. For example, when they were asked during interview phase being method of 
data collection, some of them simply replied by saying “this is a difficult question to 
answer”. Some said that “the future is pregnant and it could be difficult to tell what it 
will give birth to in terms of auditors in the UK professional attitude if their liability is 
capped” Some said it is up to each audit firm to behave differently if auditors’ liability 
in the UK is capped. 
Based on this reality as explained above, currently, my positionality remains indecisive 
or neutral in relation to the research topic within the embers of auditors in the UK 
professional behaviour if professional liability is capped.  
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4.4 RESEARCH MOTHODS: DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
Having presumably gained an understanding about research methods based on 
Bryman’s views as discussed in section 4.1, the research methods or tools that were 
explored within this study principally consist of semi-structure face-face audio 
recorded interviews in conjunction with Likert type scale questionnaire that was 
administered online and the review of pertinent literature. 
The rationale for exploring these sources of information or tools was to gain an 
understanding regarding the constructs held by qualified and non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK within the topic in general terms, and critically appraise their 
views to possibly construct a reasonable recommendation and conclusion. This in 
return helped the researcher to obtain relevant and reliable information that has 
contributed immensely toward the realization of the study objectives. 
The justification for the application of each research instrument specifically as 
mentioned within this section  are discussed below in the light of each instrument’s 
strengths/limitations.  
4.4.1 DATA COLLECTION METHOD JUSTIFICATION: LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the strengths of literature review as a research instrument is that it enables the 
researcher to gain an understanding regarding what has been written about the topic 
under investigation (Buenechea-Elberdin, 2017). Thus, within this study, it has been 
revealed to the researcher the existing knowledge gap within the research topic. 
Buenechea-Elberdin, (2017) argued that the review of literature help researchers to 
critically summarise the current knowledge within the phenomenon being investigated, 
identified strengths and weaknesses in previous studies in relation to the research 
topic. For example, within the context of this study, the review of pertinent literature 
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has helped the researcher to appropriately place the context of the study in relation to 
the previous studies, but within the scope of the research topic. 
Biggam, (2015, P. 110) argued that the review of pertinent literature within a study 
provides an up-to-date understanding of the subject and its significance to the 
researcher. Furthermore, it has also helped researchers to identify the methods used 
in previous studies that connect the current topic under investigation. For example, 
the review of pertinent literature within this study revealed the current debate 
regarding auditors’ liability in the UK. The debate has shifted from “joint and several 
liabilities”, limited liability Corporation, limited liability agreement, to liability statutory 
capping as the current debate. Furthermore, the review of literature within the study 
revealed to the researcher how to answer research questions and indeed, what 
questions need to be asked. 
4.4.2 DATA COLLECTION METHOD: LITERATURE REVIEW LIMITATION 
Biggam, (2015, P. 134) noted that researchers do have their inherent biases whether 
they are explicitly expressed or not. These biases are determined by each 
researcher’s ontological and epistemological views. Therefore, literatures are 
produced or shaped to some extent based on the views of the researchers which are 
not bias free. It can be argued that though this point appeared valid on the surface, 
within this study, the researcher has explicitly expressed his positionality in relation to 
the phenomenon being investigated. Within the ambit of the research topic the 
positionality of the researcher is permitted to be construed by the reader in a 
variegated form as a matter of ontological and epistemological paradigm.  
4.4.3 DATA COLLECTION METHOD JUSTIFICATION: FACE-FACE INTERVIEW 
Rahman, (2016) argued that the use of face-face semi structured interview being a 
research instrument or technique allows the researcher to collect data qualitatively by 
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orchestrating situation (interview) that allows respondents to express their views on 
the research topic. Thus, the interview process is initiated and girded by the 
interviewer, thereby exploring areas of interest during the interview process. This point 
could be argued by critics: that the interviewer might be interpreted to be someone 
who manipulates the interview process towards the objective of the interview. A 
counter argument that could follow is that the primary objective of the interview 
process is to gain the construct held by the interviewee to possibly avoid hasty 
generalisation in relation to behaviour. It must be reiterated at this juncture that the 
central focus of this study is on human behaviour (auditors in the UK) rather than 
object. 
Furthermore, the use of semi-structure questions allows the interviewer to probe 
deeply into area of interest whenever the need arises during the interview process. 
For instance, the interviewer could ask the interviewee (please I need you to elaborate 
on the point you have just raised).   
Moreover, the use of face-face semi-structured interview enabled the researcher to 
build a conversational based rapport that is devoid of mono-directional. For example, 
the researcher asked questions that he deemed appropriate during the interview 
phase. The process accommodates questions that naturally occur during the interview 
process, thereby eliciting flexibility. The interviewee on the other hand is not obliged 
to answer all the questions from the interviewer (researcher). Thus, the interviewee is 
permitted to decline to any question without explaining to the interviewer the reason 
behind such action (freedom).          
Chandra and Shang, (2017) argued that the use of semi-structure interview enhances 
high validity. For example, the interviewee can discuss his or her views in great depth 
or detail. Thus, the meaning or presumed meaning behind an action or in relation to a 
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statement could be explained during the interview phase. At the same time, the facial 
appearance and the intonation of the interviewee could speak volume in gesticulation.  
Finally, the use of semi-structure interview enhances researchers’ knowledge through 
probing during the interview process. For example, the interviewee may suggest an 
idea during the interview process which is not within the understanding of the 
interviewer. Through probing, the knowledge of the interviewer will increase. This 
same advantage simultaneously solves pre-judgement problem before and during the 
interview. For example, researcher or interviewer may decide in advance the type of 
questions that should be asked during the interview phase in relation to their 
importance. The interviewee can break this jinx during the interview phase by raising 
points that can illuminate into dark areas that merits further discussion within the 
research topic. 
4.4.4 DATA COLLECTION METHOD: FACE-FACE INTERVIEW LIMITATION 
Having justified the rationale behind the use of face-face interview as a means of data 
collection in the above section, this section briefly discussed the limitations of face-
face interview in relation to this study. 
The nature of face-face interview demands physical presence of the interviewer and 
the interviewee. The implication of this requirement or necessity is that the interviewer 
needs to agree with the interviewee on the most convenient and appropriate venue of 
the interview as it pleases the interviewee. As a result, the interviewer must travel to 
different locations as proposed by the interviewee. For example, within this study, the 
interviewer (researcher) travelled extensively all over the UK during the face-face 
interview process in attempt to make a successful interview as agreed with the 
interviewee though the venue might not be convenient for the researcher in terms of 
distance. One further implication that is associated with distance as mentioned above 
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is the irrecoverable travelling cost. For example, within this study, the researcher 
travelled to thirty different locations within the UK on different dates and time. It can 
be inferred from the above point that travelling cost can determine the number of 
interviews qualitative researchers can conduct within a study. If this happen within a 
study, the final result may be distorted resulting from the researcher’s inability to collect 
sufficient and appropriate face-face interview because of travelling cost. 
Furthermore, face-face interview as a means of data collection is energy sapping and 
timing consuming. For example, within this study, each interview lasted for a minimum 
of sixty minutes. After the interview have been conducted, the recorded interview in 
the audio tape was transcribed for the first time. Within this process of transcribing, 
large volumes of words were generated. The transcribed words were later sent into 
NVivo, thereby looking for themes as they emerge. 
If any researcher must conduct a qualitative study by using face-face interview as a 
means of data collection, the researcher must naturally possess the skills or 
competency of conducting face-face interview. If the researcher is not endowed with 
this natural capability, the researcher must compulsorily learn those skills within a 
short period. Otherwise, the researcher might be tempted to opt for a method of data 
collection which might not be appropriate for the chosen topic (Nguyen, 2015) 
Finally, the possibility of data saturation occurring during the interview process might 
dissuade researchers from using interview as a means of data collection. The most 
difficult aspect of data saturation is that the interviews must be conducted first. For 
example, if the researcher realises that new information is not emerging during the 
interview process (data saturation), the researcher could assume that data saturation 
has occurred and abruptly stop conducting interviews. 
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4.4.5 DATA COLLECTION METHOD: LIKERT SCALE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Having successfully discussed the limitations of face-face to interview as a means of 
data collection within a qualitative study, this section briefly justified the rationale 
behind the use of Likert scale questionnaire as a means of data collection. In the same 
vein, this section equally discussed the limitations of Likert scale in relation to the 
study. 
The main justification for the use of questionnaire within this study is that they are 
universally acceptable method of data collection in qualitative and quantitative study. 
Thus, they are easily understandable. 
Furthermore, Likert scale questionnaire has quantitative characteristics which could be 
easily expressed in percentages. For example, the quantitative characteristics of Likert 
scale makes it easier for researchers to draw conclusions in a graphical form based on 
the responses from respondents. 
More also, because questions are based on Likert scale format, respondents are not 
forced to express an either-or opinion, rather allowing them to be neutral should they 
so choose. In the same vein, the statistical nature of Likert scale facilitates statistical 
data analysis in research.  
Lastly, it is very quick and easy to run this type of survey, and it can be sent out through 
some important means of communication like text messages and e-mail. 
4.4.6 DATA COLLECTION METHOD: LIKERT SCALE QUESTIONNAIRE LIMITATIONS 
One of the limitations of Likert scale within this study is that it failed to measure 
respondents’ attitudes. Unlike face-face interview process where the researcher could 
read the body language and the attitude of the interviewee in relation to a specific 
question. Furthermore, Likert scale questionnaire is multiple choice based designed 
within the study. This enable respondents to express the level of their agreement, 
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disagreement, or neutrality in relation to a specific question. A peculiar limitation to 
this freedom is that it offers respondents the opportunity to balance their answers, 
particularly, those who try to avoid extremism. 
4.5 SAMPLING 
As a part of data gathering, this study adopts a simple random sampling technique. 
This involves the random selection of samples from the entire population (Biggam, 
2015, P. 164). The compelling rationale for this method of data collection within the 
study are as follows: 
Firstly, the technique is bias free. Thus, the individuals who make up the subset of the 
larger group are chosen at random. Therefore,  each individual in the large population 
set has the same probability of being selected. This creates, in most cases, a balanced 
subset that carries the greatest potential for representing the larger group as a whole 
(Biggam, 2015, P. 164) 
Secondly, random technique is simple. For example, the application of simple random 
sampling is less complicated than other method like stratified random sampling 
(Biggam, 2015, P. 164) 
Furthermore, it was also practically impossible to sample the entire population of 
auditors in the UK within the context of the study and in the light of limited financial 
resources. Consequently, the researcher adopted a simple random sampling technic 
which helped the researcher to overcome the above-mentioned limitations.  
4.6 POPULATION 
The population of qualified Accountants in the UK was 23,013 as at October 2020 
(Register of Auditors, 2020).  
However, the study collected and analysed primary data base on a random sample of 
2000 which comprised Chartered Accountants, top management, Institutional 
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Investors, and Individual investors in the UK. The rationale for the chosen audience is 
that the issue at stake in relation to the research topic is deemed to have impact on 
the chosen audience in practical terms. Therefore, the researcher deemed it expedient 
to understand their feelings, and opinions through semi-structured interviews and 
Likert scale questionnaire. 
On the other hand, the study has national and economic bearing. As a result, 30 
auditors were interviewed specifically in order to possibly gain their constructs in 
practical terms. For the avoidance of bias within this study, other accountants in the 
UK who are not practicing as auditors were also surveyed electronically within the 
2000 sample.  
The questionnaires were developed after face-face interviews have been conducted. 
This enabled the researcher to gain a better understanding about auditors in relation 
to the research topic. As a result, a more meaningful questionnaire that covered the 
research topic holistically was developed. 
The rationale for the chosen method of questionnaire administration is that the method 
can increase respondents’ rate and it is cost free.  
The rationale for the chosen number of interviews are based on the following 
assumptions. Firstly, the number is achievable because individual auditors’ details are 
available online in the auditors’ register within the UK professional body. Secondly, 
the researcher assumed that risk of data saturation will not occur within the chosen 
number. For example, individual auditor’s experience, risk appetite, feeling, and 
awareness within the research topic varied.  
Moreover, the concept and the application of data saturation in qualitative research 
remains problematic and it has been recently scrutinised by scholars (Francis et al., 
2010; O’Reilly and Parker, 2012). 
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Regarding data saturation, O’Reilly and Parker, (2012) noted that the current, 
generally accepted definition of data saturation is not that data collection has to 
conclude because of resource limitations but that no new insights have been 
observed.  O’Reilly and Parker argued that the emphasis on data saturation as a 
criterion in qualitative studies could compel researchers to have a false claim of data 
saturation.  
However, the studies carried out by Guest et al., (2006) finds no convincing evidence 
on how data saturation was reached.  
Another study carried out by Francis et al., (2010), were eighteen published papers 
were reviewed, fifteen claimed to have reached data saturation. However, Francis et 
al., (2010) finds out that though the definition of data saturation was consistent, thus, 
that no new themes, findings, concepts or problems emerging from the data, it 
remained unclear what data saturation means in these research and how it was 
decided upon. Guest et al., (2006) argued that while it could be adequately high to 
conduct 30 in-depth interviews within PhD study, in practical terms, they find out that 
they had data saturation after 12 interviews within the scope of 60 interviews 
conducted, while most of the themes emerged after 6 interviews. Wray et al., (2007) 
argued that the concept of data saturation is defined by individual researcher within 
the scope of each research. They argued that if new themes or findings could not 
emerge after a certain number of interview that this is not sufficient to conclude that 
data saturation has been reached. Thus, that new themes or findings could further 
emerge if additional interviews are conducted based on individual’s idiosyncrasies, 
erudition, education and state of mind at the point of the interview. Corbin and Strauss 
)2009) argued that total saturation could be difficult to claim or achieve, thereby 
corroborating Francis et al.,  (2010) view on data saturation. 
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In the light of these dichotomies amongst scholars regarding data saturation in 
qualitative research, the chosen number at 30 interviews is justified with specific 
reference to the view of Corbin and Strauss, (2009). 
4.7 DATA ANALYSIS METHOD 
The study adopts qualitative contents analysis as data analysis method in conjunction 
with descriptive statistics. Thus, this involves coding, classification, categorisation and 
data cross referencing. The justification for the chosen method is that the qualitative 
data that were collected involved literature review, face-face semi-structured 
interviews and the use of Likert scale questionnaires respectively. By implication, 
information from the above-mentioned sources were qualitatively analysed and 
reported. 
Secondly, primary data were collected from groups of specific stakeholders in relation 
to the study. For example, the audit firms’ staff in the UK. Thus, responses from 
questionnaires were expressed, described and analyse in percentages. On the other 
hand, responses from interviewees, literature review and Likert scale questionnaire 
were articulated, compared for consistency, and analysed separately to forge a 
coherent in-depth analysis and understanding of the research phenomenon. The aim 
is to highlights the significant messages from the multiple sources of data collection 
(methodological triangulation) within the context of the study which in turn permit a 
plausible recommendation or conclusion as a derivative of credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability at the end of the study. It also aimed to enhance 
readers’ understanding in relation to the research topic that has lasted for more than 
a decade in the UK. Thus, professional negligence has become a matter of the 
presiding judges’ level of erudition, ontology, epistemology, and legal stance. The 
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above-mentioned qualities or characteristics were maintained within the study 
resulting from the use of content analysis. 
4.8 DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
Strauss & Corbin, (1994) argued that qualitative studies centre on continuous interplay 
between data collection and data analysis. For example, within this study, transcription 
of audio recorded interview followed immediately after each interview was successfully 
conducted. Transcripts were later uploaded into NVivo, where themes emerged. 
Regarding information from survey, analysis was conducted in stages. Thus, following 
the closure of the online survey that was conducted using Bristol Online Survey (BOS) 
software, statistical information like respondents’ rates, status, gender, qualification 
and  Likert scale results were generated. This information was transposed into SPSS 
for descriptive statistics analysis using  exact significance level at (2-tailed) as the 
basis of comparing the mean ranks values regarding the opinion of qualified and non-
qualified Accountants in the UK as calculated within Mann Whitney U test column. 
Thus, it was construed that less than 5% significance level suggest there is 
significance difference in terms of opinion between qualified and non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK. 
Denzin & Lincoln, (2011) argued that there is no mono methodical process of 
conducting or analysing data within qualitative study. Thus, data analysis is meaning 
making process and not a mechanical process. It is rather an intellectual and creative 
process. In corroboration to the argument of Denzin & Lincoln, (2011), Strauss & 
Corbin (1994) argued that “there is no particular moment when data analysis should 
begin”. Thus, that data analysis simply involves taking things apart objectively. By 
inference, within this study, the researcher does not only essentially gain an 
understanding in relation to how auditors in the UK make meanings from the research 
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question, but also the researcher gained an understanding on how themes emerged 
from the empirical data. 
Within this study, the researcher followed the system of data analysis and coding 
procedures as suggest by Creswell, (2009, P.187), despite the argument of Denzin & 
Lincoln, (2011) as discussed within this section. For example, Creswell encouraged 
qualitative researchers to adopt a traditional data analysis method that allow codes, 
pattern and theme to emerge within the data set. Within this study, the empirical data 
were thoroughly reviewed through an open coding process. Thereafter, the researcher 
reviewed the codes that translate into themes within the data set. 
The adopted six steps of data analysis as prescribed by Creswell are discussed below. 
It must be mentioned that the process is neither static nor in linear order of analysis. 
Step 1: Prepare and organize data for analysis (Creswell, 2009. p. 185). During this 
phase within the study, the researcher transcribed the audio tape from interviews in 
word document. 
Step 2: Thoroughly read the data (Creswell, 2009. p. 185). The essence of this step 
according to Creswell is for the researcher to know the data very well. In line with this 
recommendation, the researcher reread the data that emerged from the interviews, 
thereby reflecting on the meanings and themes as they are conveyed by the 
interviewers. 
Step 3: Start coding process and detailed analysis (Creswell, 2009. p. 185). Within this 
study, the researcher organized data into segments by taking text data as they 
emerged in sentences. These were later named or labelled with terms reflecting the 
actual language of the interviewers.  
Step 4: Use the coding process to generate a description of the setting or people as 
well as categories for these for analysis (Creswell, 2009. p. 185). Within this study, the 
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researcher generates codes as they emerged from the data. These codes were later 
used in description in relation to themes before the commencement of full data 
analysis. 
Step 5: Advance how the description of the themes will be represented in the 
qualitative narrative (Creswell, 2009. p. 185). In applying this step within the study, the 
researcher translates the themes that emerged into narrative passages, thereby 
eliciting findings logically from the participants’ perspective or responses. 
Step 6: Interpret the meaning of the data (Creswell, 2009. p. 185). According to 
Creswell, researchers’ ontological paradigm plays an important role in the process of 
making meaning from data. Within this study, the researchers’ work experience in the 
capacity of account officer and accounts assistant informed his understanding in 
relation to the participants’ responses to questions. 
To convey the perceptions of the interviewee purportedly, the researcher focused on 
what the participants said, how they say it, and the conclusions they have drawn. 
4.8.1 DATA CONDENSATION 
Analysis of data in qualitative studies have two main objectives: (1) to gain 
understanding regarding participants’ constructs or perspective, (2) to give answers to 
the research questions. Marshall and Rossman, (1999) argued that qualitative data 
analysis fosters the opportunity to organise data logically, thereby attributing meanings 
to the data collected. In order to possibly realise the logical and meaning attribute 
based on Marshall and Rossman above, the researcher meticulously followed the 
three phases described by Miles and Huberman, (1994): (1) data condensation, (2) 
data display, and (3) conclusion drawing and verification. 
Miles and Huberman, (1994) argued that data condensation is the first phase of data 
analysis in qualitative study. For example, it involves the process of writing, selecting, 
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modifying through simplification, and the extraction of themes and patterns from 
transcripts, field notes, and other sources of data collection. In line with this 
specification, the researcher re-read transcripts that emerged from the audio recorded 
interview, aiming to find similarities and differences within themes. For example, codes 
were assigned to themes as they emerged from participants’ ideologies, concepts or 
perspectives. The selected themes later transcended in relation to the researcher 
topic. 
4.8.2 Data Display 
Miles and Huberman, (1994) noted that data display are tools used by researchers in 
presenting the results of data condensation. For example, they are used by 
incorporating pieces of information into results in a format that is easily accessible and 
well summarised, thereby promoting conclusion drawing. Data display usually involves 
matrices and network. Matrices formed rows and columns in relation to the data that 
have been extracted from coded transcripts that were organised according to themes 
with appropriate and sufficient quotations, supporting the themes. 
On the other hand, networks are charts that help the researchers to summarise the 
information in a succinct manner, thereby creating a mental picture of reduced data 
on how the information emanated from participants’ constructs within the embers of 
the research topic. The techniques that were adopted within this study were influenced 
by the results data condensation. 
In buttressing the significance of date display, Miles and Huberman, (1994) argued 
that “form follows function”. This means research technique(s) must be influenced or 
dictated by the research questions and the emerging concepts. Immediately the 
appropriate technique was identified within this study, data display was created within 
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each case, thereby eliciting legitimate findings from across all sources of data 
collection. 
4.8.3 CONCLUSION DRAWING AND VERIFICATIONS 
Miles and Huberman, (1994) noted that the final phase of data analysis includes 
drawing tentative conclusion based on cross case data display which helps in 
subjecting the initial conclusion to procedural verifications. The verification exercise 
aims to ensure that findings are appropriate, before they transcend into conclusive 
results. Within qualitative studies, results are construed to be verified and appropriate 
having evaluate its trustworthiness. The next section within this study briefly discuss 
how participants were recruited in the light of ethical dimension in relation to the result 
of this study. 
4.9 PARTICIPANTS RECRUITMENT: SELECTION PROCEDURE AND ETHICS 
DIMENSION 
Prior to the recruitment of participants for the study, an ethics form was completed and 
submitted to Salford business School ethic board for a review. The feedback from the 
Chairman of the ethics board advised that the researcher should be more detailed, 
explicit and specific in relation to how participants will be selected and recruited. He 
also commented that the researcher should improve on his grammatical structure 
which according to him are not good enough within the context of external 
communication. As a result, he emphasised on improvement in those areas: hence 
the ethics application was rejected first time. 
The researcher accepted and worked on the recommendations of the chair. Areas 
were improvement has occurred in relation to the first submission were highlighted in 
yellow colours when the ethics form was resubmitted for the second time. The ethics 
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application was accepted. However, the chair also commented on some grammatical 
error: hence he called for improvement in this area. 
Having successfully gained ethical approval from Salford business School ethics 
board, the researcher accessed chartered accountants and institutional investors 
register in the UK. The researcher randomly selected 30 auditors’ details for face-face 
interview. Profiles of the individual auditors were checked online. For example, the 
researcher used a minimum of ten years working experience as criteria for selecting 
statutory auditors for the interview. The position of each auditor being a criterion was 
adopted during the selection phase. For example, each auditor must have held the 
position of audit partner, manager or a principal auditor in an audit firm. The rationale 
for these criteria was to possibly enhance rich information from experienced auditors 
as the topic debate has lasted more than a decade in the UK. 
When the above criteria were finally met, invitation letters were sent to the selected 
auditors in the UK. A sample of the invitation letter can be found in appendix “A”. 
Having achieved the invitation letter’s aim which had positive responses, conference 
halls, rooms, or receptions halls were arranged by the individual auditor based on their 
convenient dates, time and venue. It was only one auditor who could not make the 
interview as planned because of his overseas engagement. However, he arranged 
with his fellow senior partner in the same company who accepted to participate in the 
interview. Sample of the semi-structured interview questions can be found in appendix 
“B”. The interview was successfully planned and executed at different locations, dates, 
and time across the UK. 
Table 4.1  below shows the participants’ number, names, cities where the interview 
took place, dates and time of the interview. 
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1 Bureaucrat Hull 18/08/2017 14:00 PM 
2 Reserved Leeds 25/08/2017 11:00 AM 
3 Quiet Blackpool  31/08/2017 13:00 PM 
4 Regret London 04/09/2017 14:00 PM 
5 Professional Aberdeen 11/09/2017 14:00 PM 
6 Eloquent Birmingham 19/09/2017 14:00 PM 
7 Trust Manchester 26/09/2017 13:00 PM 
8 Unbelieve Warrington 28/09/2017 12:00 PM 
9 Government Wrexham  05/10/2017 14:00 PM 
10 Unique London 11/10/2017 14:00 PM 
11 Western Bradford 18/10/2017 15:00 PM 
12 amazing Cardiff 23/10/2017 12:00 PM 
13 Surprise London 30/10/2017 14:00 PM 
14 Awareness Oxford 06/11/2017 12:00 PM 
15 Dislike Hull 13/11/2017 15:00 PM 
16 Excellent Bristol 21/11/2017 14:00 PM 
17 Great Manchester 27/11/2017 16:00 PM 
18 Fantastic Oldham 07/12/2017 11:00 AM 
19 Doubtful  Liverpool 13/12/2017 15:00 PM 
20 Beautiful Chester 21/12/2017 16:00 PM 
21 Necessity Belfast 28/12/2017 12:00 PM 
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22 Professor London 05/01/2018 15:00 PM 
23 Experience London 12/01/2018 14:00 PM 
24 Carefulness Bury 22/01/2018 11:00 PM 
25 Integrity Hull 29/01/2018 14:30 PM 
26 Difficult Cardiff 09/02/2018 13:00 PM 
27 Loud Bristol 16/02/2018 11:00 PM 
28 Individual Wigan 22/02/2018 15:00 PM 
29 Opinion London 07/03/2018 12:00 PM 
30 Honesty London 19/03/2018 16:30 PM 
 
The interview was audio recorded. The participants were duly informed in advance 
that the interview will be audio recorded as contained in the invitation letter. How data 
protection act and anonymity status requirement were met are contained in the 
invitation letter that were sent to participants prior to the interview. 
The transcription of the recorded interview followed immediately after each interview. 
The interview started in August 2017 and ended in March 2018. To possibly enhance 
transcripts accuracy, the researcher reviewed the transcribed scripts while listening to 
the audio and compared them for consistencies. Each transcript was sent to 
interviewee, thereby validating the assertion that their interviews were purportedly 
transcribed. 
At the beginning of each interview that was conducted in relation to this study, I 
interacted warmly with participants, iterating that their professional opinions were 
personal and not representative of their companies where they work. This in return 
enabled the participants to speak freely, without the impression that they are being 
investigated. Each profile is a representation of those who participated in the in-depth 
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interviews in relation to the research questions as mentioned above, and the chosen 
names of the individual reflects their personal characteristics, unique style of 
expression and mannerism as perceived by the researcher.   
4.10 PARCITPANTS’ PROFILE  
1. Bureaucrat, 62, has 32 years working experience being auditor in the UK. He 
had his first degree in Industrial Mathematics, Accounting in second degree, and 
PhD in Accounting. Bureaucrat became a qualified auditor in the UK having 
completed his second degree in the UK. He has chaired The Irish Auditing and 
Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA) for five years, ACCA Financial 
Reporting Advisory Committee member for three years. Currently, he is working 
as international senior audit partner in one of the big four audit firms in the UK. 
2. Reserved, 45, has 20 years working experience as auditors. He currently 
worked for one of the big four audit firm in the UK as senior international auditor 
He has held several positions like audit manager and audit partner for many 
years. Reserved studies accounting in his first degree, and finance at master’s 
level before he became a chartered accountant. He frequently travels overseas 
for international engagement in relation to audit assignment.  
3. Quiet, 37, has 10 years working experience as auditor in the UK.  She is 
currently working for one of the top 30 audit firms in the UK being senior audit 
manager. Quiet studied Economics in her first degree, Finance in her second 
degree before she became chartered accountant in the UK. 
4. Regret, 51, has 15 years working experience being auditor in the UK. Regret 
studied business administration in his first degree. He held diploma in 
accounting before he became chartered accountant. Currently, Regret is the 
principal auditor in one of the medium sized audit firm in the UK. 
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5. Professionalism, 49, has 13 years working experience as auditor in the UK. 
Professionalism studied accounting in his first degree and Finance in his second 
degree before he became chartered accountant in the UK. Currently, 
Professionalism woks as senior auditor in one of the top 6 audit firm in the UK. 
6. Eloquent, 53, has 22 years of working experience as auditor in the UK and 
overseas. Eloquent studied Economics in his first degree and Accounting at 
Masters’ level before he became chartered accountant in the UK. He also had 
PhD in accounting at one of the ancient University in the UK. Currently, Eloquent 
works as principal auditor in one of the medium sized audit firm in the UK.  
7. Trust, 47, has 12 years working experience as auditor in the UK. He studied 
business administration in his first degree, and diploma in accounting before he 
qualified as auditor in the UK. Trust currently work as audit manager in one of 
the top ten-audit firm in the UK. 
8. Unbelieve, 45, has 13 years working experience both in the UK and overseas. 
Unbelieve had his first degree in Finance in one of the overseas countries, 
Accounting at Masters’ level before he became qualified auditor in the UK. 
Currently, Unbelieve is working for one of the top five audit firms in the UK as 
senior auditor. 
9. Government, 42, has 11 years working experience in the UK as auditor. 
Government had his first degree in business management before he became 
qualified auditor in the UK. Currently, Government is working with one of the top 
10 audit firms in the country as audit partner. 
10. Unique, 38, has 10 years working experience in the UK and overseas as auditor. 
She started her audit career as an apprentice having had diploma in accounting 
before she finally qualified as auditor in the UK. She also studied Accounting in 
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her first degree. Currently, Unique is working as senior auditor in one of the top 
30 audit firms in the UK. 
11. Western, 46, has 14 years working experience as auditor in the UK. He studied 
Business management in his first degree, Accounting in second degree, and 
Accounting at PhD level in the UK. Currently, Western is working as senior audit 
partner in one of the big four audit firms in the UK. 
12. Amazing, 42, started her accounting career through apprenticeship scheme. 
She studied accounting in her first degree in the UK before she became qualified 
accountant. Amazing has 11 years working experience as senior auditor in one 
of the top 30 audit firm in the UK. 
13. Surprise, 50, started his accounting career through apprenticeship scheme after 
his graduation from the college in the UK. He later studied accounting in the 
University in the UK before he became chartered accountant. Currently, he is 
the principal auditor in one of the medium sized audit firm in the UK with 20 
years. 
14. Awareness, 37, has 10 years working experience as auditor in the UK. 
Awareness studied mathematics in her first degree, finance in her second 
degree, before she became chartered accountant in the UK. Currently, 
Awareness is working in one of top 20 audit firm in the UK as senior auditor. 
15. Dislike, 43, started her accounting career at the age of 17 through 
apprenticeship scheme. She became chartered accountant at the age of 23. 
Dislike studied business administration in her first degree. Currently, she is 
working as auditor in one of the top 15 audit firm in the UK with 10 years working 
experience as auditor. 
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16. Excellent, 46, studied mathematics in his first degree, accounting in second 
degree, before he became chartered accountant. Excellent has 15 years of 
working experience both in the UK and overseas. Currently, he works as audit 
partner in one of the big four audit firm in the UK. 
17. Great, 62, has 30 years of experience as auditor, researcher and author in the 
UK. Great studied Economics in his first degree, accounting in second degree 
and accounting at PhD level. He is also a board member of regulatory body like 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountant (ACCA). Currently, Great work for one of the top 5 audit firm in the 
UK as senior audit partner. 
18. Fantastic, 37, started her accounting career at the age of 18 through 
apprenticeship scheme. She became chartered accountant at the age of 26. 
Fantastic also had her first degree in accounting. Currently, she is working as 
senior auditor in one of medium sized audit firm in the UK with 10 years of 
working experience as auditor. 
19. Doubtful, 52, became chartered accountant at the age of 23. He studied 
mathematics in his first degree, finance in his second degree, and accounting at 
PhD level in the UK. He has served as advisory board member or committee to 
regulatory body like Institute of Chartered Accountant England and Wales 
(ICAEW, ACCA, and FRC). Currently, he is working as senior audit partner in 
one of the big four audit firm in the UK with 29 years of working as auditor in the 
UK. 
20. Beautiful, 43, has 12 years of working experience in the UK as auditor. Beautiful 
studied business management in her first degree and accounting at Masters’ 
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level before she became qualified auditor. Currently, Hope work for one of the 
top 10 audit firm in the UK as audit manager. 
21. Necessity, 53, became chartered accountant at the age of 24. He has 20 years 
of working experience as auditor in the UK. He studied Mathematics in his first 
degree, Accounting in his second degree, and Accounting at PhD level in the 
UK. Necessity has served as board member in relation to financial reporting in 
the UK to regulatory bodies like, Institute of chartered Accountants in Ireland 
(ICAI), and ACCA. Currently, he works as senior audit partner in one of the top 
5 audit firm in the UK. 
22. Professor, 43, studied Econometrics in his first degree, Finance in his degree, 
and Finance at PhD level. Professor became qualified auditor in the UK three 
years after his master’s degree. He has 15 years of working experience being 
auditor in the UK, and he has served as board member (FRC) for five years, 
(ICAEW) for four years. Currently, Professor is working as senior international 
auditor in one of the top 5 audit firm in the UK. 
23. Experience, 40, has 10 years of working experience as auditor. She studied 
Business administration in her first degree, finance in her second degree before 
she became qualified auditor in the UK. Currently, Experience works for one of 
the 20 top audit firm in the UK as auditor. 
24. Carefulness, 41, studied Accounting in her first degree before she became 
qualified auditor in the UK. She has 11 years of working experience as auditor 
in the UK. Currently, she is the principal auditor in one of the medium sized audit 
firm in the UK. 
25. Integrity, 47, has 12 years working experience both in the UK and overseas. 
Integrity studied Economics in his first degree and Accounting in his second 
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degree before he became qualified auditor in the UK. Currently, Integrity works 
as audit manager in one of the top 5 audit firm in the UK. 
26. Difficult, 39, has 10 years working experience as auditor in the UK. Difficult 
studied Mathematics in her first degree and accounting in her second degree 
before she became qualified auditor in the UK. Currently, Difficult works as audit 
partner in one of the top 30 audit firm in the UK. 
27. Loud, 48, has 12 years working experience as auditor both in the UK and 
overseas. Loud studied Accounting in his first degree and Accounting in his 
second degree before he became qualified auditor in the UK. Currently, Loud is 
the principal auditor in one of the medium sized audit firm in the UK. 
28. Individual, 58, has 23 years working experience as auditor both in the UK and 
overseas. Individual studied Economics in his first degree, accounting in his 
second degree, and Accounting at PhD level. He has written books in audit and 
financial accounting. He has served as board member in ACCA for 5 years. 
Currently, Individual is working as international senior audit partner in one of the 
top 5 audit firm in the UK. 
29. Opinion, 40, has 12 years working experience as audit manager in the UK. She 
studied Economics in her first degree, accounting in her second degree before 
she became qualified auditor in the UK. Currently, Opinion works as audit 
partner in one of the medium sized audit firm in the UK. 
30. Honesty, 55, has 25 years working experience as auditor in the UK. Honesty 
studied Accounting in his first degree, Finance in his second degree, and 
Accounting at PhD level. Honesty has served as financial reporting advisory 
committee to FRC for 5 years. He has written books on financial reporting and 
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auditing. Currently, Honesty works as senior audit partner in one of the big four 
audit firm in the UK. 
Table 4.2 below is a summary of participants’ group characteristics. 
Table 4.2 Participants’ Group characteristics 
Participants 
No. 







1 Bureaucrat M 62 32 BSc, MSc, PhD, 
ICAEW 
2 Reserved M 45 20 BSc, MSc, ACC 
3 Quiet F 37 10 BSc, MSc, ACCA 
4 Regret M 51 15 Cert, BSc, ICAEW 
5 Professionalis
m 
M 49 13 BSc, MSc, ICAEW 
6 Eloquent M 53 22 BSc, MSc, PhD, 
ACCA 
7 Trust M 47 12 Cert, BSc, ICAEW 
8 Unbelieve M 45 13 BSc, MSc, ACCA 
9 Government M 42 11 Cert, BSc, ACCA 
10 Unique F 38 10 DiP, BSc, ACCA 
11 Western M 46 14 BSc, MSc, PhD, 
ACCA 
12 Amazing F 42 11 BSc, ICAEW 
13 Surprise M 50 20 BSc, ICAEW 
14 Awareness F 37 10 BSc, MSc, ICAEW 
15 Dislike F 43 10 BSc, ACCA 
16 Excellent M 46 15 BSc, MSc, ACCA 
17 Great M 62 30 BSc, MSc, PhD, 
ICAEW 
18 Fantastic F 37 10 BSc, ICAEW 
19 Doubtful M 52 29 BSc, MSc, PhD, 
ACCA 
20 Beautiful F 43 12 BSc, MSc, ACCA 
21 Necessity M 53 20 BSc, MSc, PhD, 
ACCA. 
22 Professor M 43 15 BSc, MSC, PhD, 
ICAEW 
23 Experience F 40 10 BSc, MSc, ACCA 
24 Carefulness F 41 11 BSc, ACCA 
25 Integrity M 47 12 BSc, MSc, ACCA 
26 Difficult F 39 10 BSc, MSc, ICAEW 
27 Loud M 48 12 BSc, MSc, ICAEW 
28 Individual M 58 23 BSC, MSC, PhD, 
ICAEW. 
29 Opinion F 40 12 BSc, MSc, ACCA. 
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4.11 DESCRIPTIVE THEMES 
Data analysis commenced immediately the interview data was transcribed into text. 
The next procedure was data condensation. This involved reading and re-reading the 
transcribed data, thereby creating opportunity for data familiarisation. What followed 
was data familiarisation process and the emergence of themes. The themes that 
emerged during data transcription process are: (1) Professional Scepticism, Audit 
profession, (3) Unfairness, and (4) Insurance premium. 
In addition to the above-mentioned themes which were discussed and analysed in the 
next chapter, the transcribed data also suggested that the existing constructs of 
auditors in the UK are of twofold: the perception on how auditors in the UK have been 
treated in relation to professional liability, and the future implication of this treatment 
in the UK society and the audit profession. Some of the themes revealed to me how 
disappointed auditors in the UK are. Thus, they found it difficult to understand why the 
UK government as refused to adopt capping strategy even though auditors in the UK 
are stringently regulated by independent professional bodies in addition to the UK 
government oversight body like Financial Reporting Council (FRC). It also revealed to 
me the unique character of each auditor that was interviewed in conjunction with their 
feelings on the research topic. 
Furthermore, the emergence of themes through participants’ voices provided thick 
descriptions of their perceptions and feelings in relation to the research questions. 
4.12 PILOT STUDY 
Prior to face-face interview phase and the administration of questionnaires, five pilot 
interview questions were posted to auditors in the UK. The essence of the five-pilot 
interview questions  as advocated by Bryman, (2016, P. 384) are  as follows: 
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1. it enables participant to understand the basis and structure of the questions that 
they will be asked during the interview. 
2. It often provides the researcher with ideas, approaches, and clues that would  
not have been foreseen before conducting the pilot study and eventually the 
interview. Thus, such ideas and clues increase the chances of getting clearer 
findings in the main study. 
3. It permits a thorough check of the planned statistical and analytical 
procedures, giving the researcher  a chance to evaluate their usefulness for the 
data. Thus, researcher may then be able to make needed alterations in the data 
collecting methods, and therefore, analyse data in the main study more 
efficiently. 
4. It can greatly reduce the number of unanticipated problems because researcher 
will have an opportunity to redesign parts of your study to overcome difficulties 
that the pilot study reveals. 
5. It may save a lot of time and money. The pilot study almost always provides 
enough data for the researcher to decide whether to go ahead with the main 
study. 
Based on the feedback from the pilot study in relation to semi-structure interviews and 
the initial findings from the interviews, questionnaires were restructured and 
administered electronically. 
4.13 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF RESULTS 
Bryman, (2016, P. 384) argued that qualitative study should be evaluated or judged 
based on different criteria. Thus, that it is important to specify terms or established 
ways of assessing the quality of qualitative study being alternative to reliability and 
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validity. Consequently, they proposed method of assessing the quality of qualitative 
study: trustworthiness.  
4.13.1 CREDIBILITY 
Credibility criteria demands that social study should be conducted in consonance with 
the principle of good practice and submitting social research findings to the members 
of the social world (participants) that formed part of the phenomenon being 
investigated. The essence of these criteria is to obtain confirmation that the 
investigator correctly understood that social world, thereby promoting respondent 
validation (Bryman, 2016, P. 384). In line with the above requirements or criteria, the 
researcher has discussed how ethical dimension has been fulfilled in relation to the 
study in the previous sections. The researcher also discussed how members of the 
social world were recruited and how copies of transcripts were sent to them, thereby 
abiding by the principles of good practice; while eliciting respondents’ validation 
simultaneously.  
4.13.2 TRANSFERABILITY 
Transferability can be likened to the concept of external validity in quantitative 
research. However, the concept of transferability in qualitative studies is 
contextualisation and thick description based (Bryman, 2016, P. 384.) For example, 
transferability seeks to understand whether findings from qualitative study relates to 
the phenomenon context or other contexts at the time of the investigation. In other 
words, is the findings from specific qualitative study transferable? Bryman, (2016 P. 
384) argued that thick or rich description account serves as database that enable 
readers to make an informed judgement regarding possible transferability of findings 
to another context. Within this study, the researcher has made rich descriptions on 
how findings were derived within the context of the research topic. For example, the 
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researcher maintained a detailed field log of all activities, contacts, and procedures in 
conjunction with the reflexive journal that was based on his research experience. By 
implication, the researcher has provided readers the opportunity to make their 
judgement whether the findings from the study is contextually transferable or not. 
4.13.3 DEPENDABILITY 
The concept of dependability in qualitative studies is parallel to the concept of reliability 
in quantitative studies (Bryman, 2016, P. 384). In order to established trust worthiness, 
Bryman argued that qualitative researchers should maintained an “audit trail”. Thus, 
records of the research process and phases should be kept. These includes but not 
limited to fieldwork notes, participants’ recruitment procedures, interview transcripts, 
data analysis decision and justification. Peers thereafter act as auditor, evaluating the 
reasonableness of the procedures, strategies, instruments, theories and justifications 
as applied to the study. Within this study, the researcher-maintained audit trail in 
relation to interview questions, designed questionnaire, invitation letter and 
participants’ consent form. These are evident in the appendixes. Moreover, the 
researcher’s peer was granted the opportunity to constructively assess the research 
methods, data analysis methods, data collection methods, process, and procedures 
as applied within this study thereby acting as auditors. 
4.13.4 CONFIRMABILITY 
The central premise of confirmability begins with impossible absolute objectivity in 
social studies. Bryman, (2016, P. 386) argued that while it is practically impossible for 
researchers in social studies to maintain absolute objectivity, social researchers 
should demonstrate that their theoretical inclination, perceptions, and religion (bias) 
do not overtly sway the conduct of their research and findings. It could be argued that 
this is the responsibility of peer view, acting like auditors as previously discussed within 
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the sections above. To enhance confirmability in this study, the researcher stated his 
positionality within the context of the study. The researcher also grants percipients the 
opportunity to read the transcripts based on participants’ request. Thus, confirming 
their perceptions during the interview phase. Finally, the researcher within this study 
also grants peers the opportunity to constructively and objectively criticise the research 
method, data analysis method, data collection methods, initial findings in relation to 
the research topic, question and objectives. 
4.14 REFLEXIVE JOURNAL 
Reflexive journal is a revelation account of records kept throughout a research 
process. The purpose of such journal is to record activities that were undertaken by 
the researcher, ideas and decisions of the researcher, and some demonstrations or 
attitudes that cannot be recorded during the interview phase (body language). The 
researcher begins his journal entries in relation to the empirical aspect of the study 
immediately pilot study was completed. For example, the starting and completion 
dates in conjunction with the feedbacks from the pilot were recorded. During the 
interview phase, the body language of respondents was noted by the researcher in his 
reflexive journal. The researcher also recorded interview dates as agreed with the 
participants on his reflexive journal. The researcher’s journal equally served as 
personal diary and master calendar throughout the research phase. The journal being 
a subjective source of data collection as against objective one enhanced the 
researcher’s capability during the data analysis phase. For example, the facial 
appearance and body language together with rising and falling of participants’ tone 
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4.15 PEER VIEW 
As previously mentioned within this chapter, the purpose of peer view was to x-ray the 
research process and procedures in the light of acceptable practice within the research 
community. My professional colleagues and study partners who have in-depth 
understanding about the research topic were asked to critically appraise the research 
process and procedure. Most of the aspect that were peer viewed includes not limited 
to the following: pilot semi-structure interview, pilot Likert scale questionnaire, 
transcripts, how themes emerged, the congruency between the research initial finding 
and the research topic, objectives and questions. They also peer viewed how the 
participants were recruited, the quality of their individual profiles in relation to their 
experience within the context of the topical research topic. The peer view exercise in 
the researchers’ opinion adds to the trustworthiness of this study. 
4.16 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter discussed the methodology and methods as applied to the 
study. It illuminated into dark areas regarding the distinction between research 
methodology and methods. It justified the philosophical paradigm that underpinned 
the study being interpretivism. The chapter explained the necessity of empirical study 
within the phenomenon that is being investigated and justified the chosen research 
strategy, data collection and analysis methods in the light of fit for purpose. The 
chapter concludes by discussing briefly trustworthiness and its characteristics before 
it finally discussed the role of peer view that acted like auditors during the research 
phase, thereby increasing the propensity of trustworthiness of the study. 
The next chapter presents a qualitative analysis and discussion based on the 
interviews that was conducted in the UK being one of the fundamental basis of 
empirical data exploration within this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  ANAYLSIS AND DISCUSSION OF INTERVIWS FINDINGS 
5.0  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a qualitative analysis and discussion based on the interviews 
that was conducted in the UK being one of the fundamental basis of empirical data 
exploration within this study. Interviews were undertaken in order to gain an 
understanding of the interviewees’ perceptions in relation to the research topic. 
However, at the end of the interviews exercise, it became apparent that survey on the 
phenomenon being investigated is feasible, thereby eliciting methodological 
triangulation.  
In attempt to enhance a robust and unbiased analysis and discussion within this 
chapter, findings from existing literature that corroborate or refute the empirical results 
are quoted directly where they are available, and the interviews only explored the 
opinions of thirty statutory auditors in the UK. 
The chapter is made up of three sections as follows. The first section presents 
participants’ group characteristics.   The second section analyse and discuss findings 
from interviews that was conducted in the UK within the study. Finally, the third section 
contains a summary of the chapter. 
It must be mentioned here clearly that within this chapter, the description, analysis and 
discussion of empirical research findings were done simultaneously as advocated by 
(Biggam, 2015. P.186) 
The primary aim of the study centred on gaining an understanding in relation to 
auditors’ behaviour if their professional liability is capped; whether auditors’ liability 
capping can help to demonopolize the UK current audit market that is dominated by 
the big four audit firms; and whether audit profession in the UK can survive and grow 
in the face of colossal claims against auditors in the UK. To answer the research 
 
Page 108 of 253 
 
questions effectively, the researcher constructed semi-structure interviews among the 
statutory auditors in the UK as mentioned in the preceding chapter. The essence was 
to gain their constructs on the research topic. The interviewees were either audit 
partner, audit managers or audit senior who would be expected to be knowledgeable 
about the addressed research issues. The interviews were recorded and transcribed 
verbatim, thereby reflecting participants’ voices. 
The pages that follow have revealed the major findings that emerged from the 
interviews and they are analysed and discussed in the order of themes. Participants’ 
quotes are written to some degree within the understanding of modern English 
language. Thus, they are written or presented in a style that could enhance readers’ 
understanding about participants’ perceptions and feelings in relation to the research 
questions. 
5.1.  PARTICIPANTS’ AGE, WORK EXPERIENCE AND ACADEMIC PROFILE 
This section presents participants summarised profiles in relation to their age, work 
experience and academic qualifications. The participants’ profile emerged from the 
semi-structured in-depth interviews that was conducted in the UK in relation to the 
research questions. The profiles also aided analysis within this chapter. A summary of 
the UK based participants’ age, work experience and academic qualifications is 
presented in table 5.1 below: 
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From the above table, it could be construed that the participants are knowledgeable in 
relation to their experience and qualifications within the context of the study. For 
example, while 100% of the interviewee had first degree and professional qualification, 
70% had second degree while 30% had PhD qualifications. When it comes to age and 
working experience, 93% of the interviewee age fall into the category of active labour 
force in the UK. Thus, between the age of 37-60. The working experience at average 
of 16 years and this represents 23% of the entire population that was interviewed. 
 If the above analysis is acceptable to the readers of this study and academia, it could 
therefore be inferred that the conclusion or recommendations from this study partly 
based on the participants’ opinion in the course of interview could immensely 
contribute to transferability in this study. 
It must be mentioned clearly in the ephemeral that the above interpretation should be 
regarded at best to be a hypothetical statement whose validity remain unknown. Thus, 
further information is needed in order to possibly draw a plausible conclusion regarding 
the significance of the participants group characteristics as analysed above. 
Having described, analysed, and discussed the participants’ age, work experience and 
academic qualifications with reference to table 5.1 , the next section of this chapter 
will focus on analysis and discussion based on findings from the interviews that was 
conducted in the UK within the study. The analysis and discussion are simultaneously 
done in order of themes emergence during the interviews. 
5.2  PROFESSIONAL SCEPTICISM  
This theme is a derivative of one of the research questions which asked participants 
whether in their opinion auditors in the UK will relax their professional scepticism 
attituded if their professional liability is capped? 
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Most of the responses from participants regarding the above question as summarised 
in table 5.2 below revealed that auditors in the UK will maintain a professional 
scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped. Specifically, 90% of the 
participants strongly agree or agree to this question during the interview process. 
However, 4% strongly disagree or disagree that auditors in the UK would maintain 
their professional scepticism attitude, while 6% remain neutral to the question on 
whether auditors in the UK will relax their professional scepticism attitude if their 
professional liability is capped. 
TABLE: 5.2 
Question: Will auditors in the relax their professional 
scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped 
SA/A  N SD/D 
% 90% 6% 4% 
 
Below are excerpts that revealed individual auditors’ perception in relation to the study 
question number one. 
According to Professor who is currently working as senior international auditor in one 
of the top 5 audit firm in the UK,  
“it is unthinkable to believe that auditors in the UK will relax their 
professional scepticism attitude if their professional liability is 
capped. The reputation of the auditing profession, the 
professional body that each auditor belongs, the reputation of 
each auditing firm is at stake”.  
 
What happened in the US in 2002 during the Enron saga is a strong lesson for auditors 
in the UK. Arthur Andersen, which was the auditing firm to Enron Corporation 
voluntarily surrendered its practicing licenses to Certified Public Accountants in the 
US when the firm was found guilty of criminal charges. Certified Public Accountant is 
a professional body that regulates the behaviour of auditors in the US. This marked 
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the demise of Arthur Andersen as auditing firm, and the big five was reduced to big 
four. Professor lamented that it is shameful that the UK government assumed that 
auditors in the UK will relax their professional scepticism attitude if their liability is 
capped, hence the debate lingered for more than a decade in the UK. 
The perception of Regret who is currently working as the principal auditor in one of the 
medium sized audit firm in the UK is in consonance with the construct and feelings of 
professor. According to Regret, 
 “the believe of the UK government that auditors in the UK could 
relax their professional scepticism attitude if their liability is 
capped do make me regret my decision to become an auditor in 
the UK. Auditors in the UK are assumed to have lacked 
reputation. If this interpretation is incorrect, what is the cause of 
the UK government fear”?  
 
According to Regret, countries like Germany, Belgium, and Greece have adopted 
auditors’ liability capping as a strategy. Does this suggest that the auditors in those 
countries are more reputable than those in the UK?  Has the UK government given a 
consideration to what could happen to audit market in the UK if there is another demise 
of audit firm among the big four? If the UK government do not trust auditors in the UK, 
why are they addressed as professional? As Regret was talking during the interview 
process, I could see the sign of regret on his face being an auditor in the UK, hence 
the name reflects his unique character. 
According to Bureaucrat who is currently working as international senior audit partner 
in one of the big four audit firms in the UK, 
“The UK government lacked reputation; hence the government 
finds it difficult to trust auditors in the UK, believing that auditors 
in the UK could relax their professional scepticism attitude if their 
liability is capped. In my candid opinion, auditors in the UK will 




Page 112 of 253 
 
According to Bureaucrat, the regulation of audit profession in the UK has become 
bureaucratic. For example, the EU recommended capping strategy in 2008 following 
London Economics research findings. Some countries in Europe have adopted 
capping strategy. Yet, the UK government has no regard for the yearnings of the 
public, hence it remains adamant in its decision, Bureaucrat lamented. 
According to Reserved, who is currently working for one of the big four audit firm in 
the UK as senior international auditor, 
“the rejection of capping strategy as recommended by EU in 2008 
by the UK government is a revelation of what the UK government 
has taken the UK auditors to be. Thus, that the auditors in the UK 
lacked reputation or professional scepticism attitude. This believe 
is quite erroneous and unfortunate”.  
 
However, Reserved, believed that auditors in the UK will not relax their professional 
scepticism attitude if their liability is capped. Reserved explained that every individual 
auditor or audit firm belongs to a professional body which has professional ethics that 
must be followed by each auditor being a member. For example, it is against the 
professional ethics of ACCA for any of its member to bring the association into a 
disreputable position. This is a strong point that auditors in the UK cannot joke with, 
hence I believe that auditors in the UK will not relax their professional scepticism 
attitude towards the integrity of financial statements. 
However, the views of Integrity are slightly different compared to professor and other 
interviewees as mentioned above. According to Integrity who is currently working as 
audit manager in one of the top 5 audit firm in the UK. 
“It is difficult for me to say categorically that all the auditors in the 
UK will maintain professional scepticism attitude if their 
professional liabilities are capped if I must be honest with myself”. 
 
Integrity argued that the concept of generalization could question the believe that 
auditors in the UK will maintain their professional scepticism attitude if their 
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professional liability is capped in the absence of empirical findings. Integrity further 
argued that each audit firm has a different motive regarding their legal existence in the 
UK and this motive could serve as a propelling force towards financial statements 
integrity being a product of professional scepticism attitude from auditors’ perspective. 
The construct of Integrity remains unambiguous in relation to how auditors in the UK 
could possibly behave if their professional liability is capped in terms of generalization. 
It could be inferred that Integrity’s argument is based on absolute terms school of 
thought. 
Corroboratively, some of the above findings are in consonance with the arguments of 
Yu, et al., (2013). They argued that despite the claim that the big four dominants the 
audit market, the quality of audit report has improved over the decade in the UK. This 
simply implies that if audit quality has improved over the years in the UK despite the 
claim of audit market monopolisation by the big four audit firms, auditor’s professional 
liability capping could prosper financial statements integrity in the UK hence auditors’ 
liability capping could stimulate a healthy competition in the UK audit market. 
Furthermore, Watts and Zimmermann (1983), Lim and Tan (2008),  Firth 
(1990), Wilson and Grimlund (1990), Weber et al., (2008) argued audit failure do affect 
auditors’ reputation even when there is no legal claim against them as this adversely 
impact on their market share. This point further corroborates other findings within this 
section. If this assertion is assumed to be correct that audit failure does adversely 
affect auditor’s reputation, then, it can be inferred that auditors in the UK will not relax 
their professional scepticism attitude if their liability is capped. 
However, proponents of non-capping can claim that auditors’ liabilities capping can 
impact adversely on listed companies’ financial statements’ integrity in the UK. 
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 As earlier mentioned from the previous chapter within this study, fear of uncertainty is 
looming in the air regarding the impending danger or benefits that auditor liability 
capping could bring in the UK in terms of listed companies financial statements 
integrity. However, the recommendations from European Union in 2008 on the topical 
subject area in conjunction with the UK government strategy on the topic has provoked 
divergent opinion (Humphrey & Samsonova, 2015; Philipsen, 2014). For example, 
studies carried out by London Economics, (2006) find out that auditors’ liability capping 
cannot adversely impact on listed companies’ financial statements integrity in Europe. 
In the same vein, European Union, (2008), recommended liability capping as one of 
the strategies for European countries in managing the epidemics of civil liabilities 
against auditors in Europe. Unfortunately, it failed to mention specifically the impact 
such recommendation could have on listed companies’ financial statements in terms 
of its integrity. One can argue that if its impact could have adverse effect on financial 
statements integrity, such recommendations would not have come forth.  
In the same vein, Laux, and Newman, (2010); Defond, and Zhand, (2014) argued that 
the fear of unlimited liability and reputation damage from auditors’ perspective can 
prosper financial statement integrity. Belcher, (2006) and He, et al., (2014) argued 
auditors’ liabilities is the solution to the existing problems of civil claim against auditors. 
Thus, that capping can possibly induce auditors to do more in enhancing financial 
statements’ integrity. Belcher argued that medium tier audit firm could be encouraged 
in the market. For example, capping can stimulate competition in the audit market that 
is currently monopolised by the big four accounting firms. This could in return enhance 
financial statements integrity. The Association of British Insurers, (2007) argued that  
it is difficult to reach a conclusion on the appropriate strategy of limiting auditors’ 
liability. However, Aureilia, (2012) opined that Liability Limitation Agreement (LLA) 
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might not have adverse effect on audit quality resulting from stringent regulations and 
sound audit procedures in place. 
In summary, based on the interviewee’s opinions in relation to how auditors in the UK 
could behave if their liability is capped, and in conjunction with the corroborative 
evidence from literature, it can be construed that auditors in the UK will maintain their 
professional scepticism attitude as expected if their liability is capped. 
5.3 MONOPOLIZATION 
The concept of monopolization during the interview was based on audit market in the 
UK. Thus, participants were asked whether capping strategy can help to demonopolize 
the current audit market in the UK that is currently dominated by the big four 
accounting firms. 
100% of the participants that were interviewed unequivocally agreed that the audit 
market in the UK is uncompetitive or monopolised, and that capping strategy can 
possibly help to reduce this oligopoly to an acceptable level. 
According to Honesty who is currently working as senior audit partner in one of the big 
four audit firm in the UK,  
“the current UK audit market is dominated by the big four. I will 
prefer to use the word dominated rather than monopoly. This is 
because, the big four are not responsible for this so-called 
dominance, hence I declined to use the word monopoly”. 
 
Honesty further explained that if the so-called dominance in the UK market is an issue, 
the UK government would have done something about it. Thus, it is one thing for the 
public or professional bodies to complain about something, it is another for the 
government to see the reasonableness of any complaints and urgently address the 
issue on ground. In the interim, so long the UK government is reluctant to address the 
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problem of dominance in the UK audit market, it could be expedient for one to say that 
the dominance of the big four in the UK audit market is not an issue. 
According to Eloquent who currently works as principal auditor in one of the medium 
sized audit firm in the UK,  
“you don’t have to be an accountant, academician or an investor 
before you can understand or know that the UK audit market is 
monopolised or uncompetitive. This topic that UK audit market 
lack competitiveness had formed headlines in mass media over 
the years in the UK”.  
 
However, the question that remain unanswered according to Eloquent are: what are 
the factors responsible for this so-called monopoly in the UK audit market? What has 
the UK government done over the years to reduce or minimise this uncompetitive 
industry?  If these questions are addressed, one could begin to have the assurance 
that one day the audit market in the UK could become competitive. 
Eloquent argued that auditors’ liability capping is one of the panaceas that can help to 
reduce the oligopoly the market is currently facing. Eloquent, however lamented that 
the UK government is reluctant to address this very issue. For example, the 
government failed to implement capping strategy to the fullest in the UK. It could argue 
further that other strategies like Liability Limitation Agreement (LLA), Limited Liability 
Partnerships (LLPs) and Proportionate Liability Sharing (PLS) are available. 
The opinion of Quiet who is currently working for one of the top 30 audit firms in the 
UK being senior audit manager in relation to the UK audit market monopolisation is 
corroborative to the opinions of the Honesty and Eloquent as explained above. 
Quiet, opined that it is true that the UK audit market is monopolized by the big four, 
and the UK government is fully aware about this. It is also no news to suggest that 
capping strategy can help to reduce the current monopolisation practice in the UK 
audit market. However, because the UK government has refused to implement 
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capping strategy, it could be inferred that the UK government is not interested in 
solving the uncompetitive current nature of the audit market in the UK. 
Necessity who currently works as senior audit partner in one of the top 5 audit firm in 
the UK commented during the interview as follows: 
“It is once said in military world that immediately an enemy is 
identified is battle front, the war is 50% won. However, the current 
situation in the UK audit market in relation to this adage is 
suggesting that it is either this adage has become outdated, or 
the UK government is not interest in fair solution to the problem 
on ground”. 
 
Necessity opined that “necessity is the mother of invention”. Thus, the UK audit market 
is currently dominated by the big four. Ironically, the UK government has rejected the 
panacea to the problem in the UK audit market. The question that followed is who is 
to be blamed for this unfortunate situation? Is it the big four who are invited to tender 
for the audit engagement assignment; the directors of listed companies that invite the 
big four audit firms; or the UK government that failed to regulate the market and bring 
about competition? Necessity argued further that the UK government appears to be 
playing double standard game in relation to the UK audit dominance. For example, 
there are anti-monopoly legislations in the UK, and there is office of Fair Trading in the 
UK. These oversight bodies work collaboratively to ensuring fair competition in all 
sectors in the UK. The question that could follow in relation to the UK audit market 
dominance is: why is the UK government quiet about this unfortunate situation? This 
question however remained unanswered as it is beyond the scope of this study. 
If the findings within this section are presumably correct, question that could readily 
come to mind is: how probable is it for auditors’ liability capping to stimulate 
competition within the UK audit market? The primary aim of this question is to gain an 
understanding as to whether audit market in the UK is currently uncompetitive, and 
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what must be done to possibly reduce oligopoly in the market. London Economics 
(2006) find out that the UK audit market is concentrated in the hands of the big four. 
Namely, (PwC, KPMG, Deloitte, and Ernst & Young). The major fact that influenced 
concentration was due to unwillingness of the medium tie audit firm to accept high 
profile client, resulting from fear of unlimited liabilities (Philipsen, 2014). In the same 
vein, (EC, 2008; EC, 2010; Davies, 2010) argued that auditors’ liability issue needs to 
be addressed to possibly achieve progress on both the development of the role of the 
audit and the encouragement of greater competition in the audit market. Thus, they 
stressed on the significance of reducing auditors’ liability to possibly stimulate 
competition in the market. Belcher, (2006) and Weber et al., (2008) argued the 
expected competition in the audit market will only become an illusion if auditors’ liability 
is not capped. 
Based on findings, analysis and discussion within this section, it could be inferred that 
the UK audit market is uncompetitive. For example, empirical finding within this section 
and some literature are inconsonance regarding the lack of healthy competition in the 
UK audit market.   
5.4  AUDIT PROFESSION 
The emergence of this theme (audit profession) was contingent upon one of the study 
questions which asked the participants whether audit profession can survive and grow 
in the UK should the profession continue to pay colossal claim resulting from 
professional liability. In response to this question, 90% of the participant agreed that 
the number of registered statutory auditors in the UK will continue to decline over time 
if the issue of auditors’ liability is not addressed. In the same vein, 10% of the 
interviewees agreed that unhealthy competition in the audit market could compel some 
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medium sized audit firms’ staff to change profession thereby relegating capping 
strategy. 
One of the interviewees called Individual who is currently working as international 
senior audit partner in one of the top 5 audit firm in the UK opined that the audit 
profession is already experiencing a decline in relation to the number of registered 
auditors in the UK. This finding also corroborated with the opinion of Western who is 
currently working as senior audit partner in one of the big four audit firms in the UK. 
For example, Western opined that the declining rate in relation to the number of 
registered statutory auditors in the UK year in and out is not surprising. This is simply 
because young talents are fully aware of the danger of becoming an auditor in the UK. 
The risk appears to be higher than the benefits hence the declining rate. 
AccountancyAge, (2017) argued that “the number of registered firms that are sole 
practitioners or corporations also continues to decline, with an almost 37% reduction 
between 2003-2016”. In the same vein, FRC, (2016) reported as follows: 
 “the number of registered audit firms continues to decline 
gradually. The overall number of registered audit firms was 6,331 
as at 31 December 2015, a fall of 304 firms (4.6%) compare to 
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Table  5.3: Number of Firms Registered with the RSBs 
 
Source: Financial Reporting Council, 2016. 
 
Table 5.4: Increase/decrease on the number of registered audit firms in the UK 
between 31st December 2011 to 31st December 2015 








- (1.88%) (3.98%) (4.93%) (4.80%) 
 
Table 5.3 presents the total number of registered auditors among the accountancy 
professional bodies in the UK between 31st December 2011 – 31st December 2015. 
In the same vein, table 5.4 is a derivative of 5.3 and it primarily enhanced the analysis 
of table 5.3 below. 
As evident in table 5.4, the number of registered audit firms in the UK as at 31st 
December 2011 was 7, 375 and as at 31st December 2015 it was 6,331. This 
represents an average decrease of 16.49% between 31st December 2011 to 31st 
December 2015 
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A similar trend is evidenced in table 5.3. For example, the number of registered audit 
firm in the UK between 31st December 2011 and 31st December 2015 is decreasing 
progressively year after year. Though the decreasing rate on the number of registered 
audit firms in the UK is not linear as evidenced in table 5.4, the fact remains that this 
is concerning. Thus, if the expectations of accounting information users must not go 
into abyss regarding financial statement integrity and the current monopoly in the UK 
audit market, the declining rate regarding the number of registered audit firms in the 
UK need to be addressed as a matter of agreeable necessity. 
Table 5.5 below focus on the number of members who hold audit qualification between 
2015 and 2017. This is expedient because it will enable readers to gauge the expected 
number of registered auditors in the future. Thus, the number of members who 
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Table 5.5: Number of Student Registered Auditors 
Source: Financial Reporting Council, 2018. 
 
Table 5.6 below summarised the total number of members that hold audit qualification 
between 2015 – 2017. 
Table 5.6: Total Number of Members that hold Audit Qualification 
 
Year 2015 2016 2017 
Total number of members that hold audit 
qualification  
130,220 129,509 129,229 
Percentage change per year - (0.549%) (0.217%) 
 
As evidenced from table 5.6, the total number of members who hold audit qualification 
in 2015 was 130,220. In 2017, this number declined to 129,220. This represents a 
declined-on average of 0.774% between 2015 – 2017. 
Though the declining rate is not linear in nature as evidenced from tables 5.5 and 5.6, 
the fact remains that the number of members that hold audit qualification in the UK is 
at declining state. As previously explained, if this declining state in relation to the total 
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numbers of accounting professional that hold audit qualifications should continue in 
the UK, the most likely impact are as follows: firstly, the number of registered auditors 
in the UK will decline. Secondly, this could stimulate the level of dominance in the audit 
market among the big four. Thirdly, the true and fair view that is expected from financial 
statements assertions could become a mirage hence the demand for auditors could 
be higher than the number of available auditors in the UK. 
Despite the compelling evidence from the existing empirical data within this section, it 
is expected that proponent of non-capping could argue that the declining rate of 
registered auditors in the UK should not be attributed to their professional liability 
challenge alone. 
Corroboratively, these findings could be interpreted to be a direct manifestation of 
academic prophecy of Bollen et al., (2005). They argued that if infamous accounting 
malpractices continues continue to happen in the UK, that auditors are most likely to 
be sued by various stakeholders. Consequently, the number of registered auditors in 
the UK will continue to shrink. This academic prophesy manifested in the UK 
particularly as the level of civil claim against auditors in the UK increased to a point 
that company’s Act of 2000 was changed in 2006 in attempt to ameliorate auditors’ 
liability by the UK government following its threat to the profession’s existence (Flores, 
2011; Giudici, 2012; Samsonova & Humphrey, 2014). Therefore, the declining rate of 
registered statutory auditors in the UK is a fulfilment of what has been foretold 
academically. 
It can also be construed that if the number of registered auditors in the UK continue to 
shrink resulting arguably  auditors’ professional liability, then it can be easily predicted 
that most listed company’s financial statements in the UK will invariably become 
defective in the future. This is simply because the demand for auditors’ services in the 
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UK could be higher than its supply. Recall that auditors’ professional liability is a 
product of defective financial statements. The implication of this trend could result to 
the following: auditors in the UK could relocate to tax-haven countries. 
Ahmed and Quinn, (2013) find out that more than 40 multinational companies have 
inquired about relocating their headquarters to the UK because of the cuts in 
corporation tax. Wix, ( 2016) ; and Business News, (2016) find out that three-quarters 
of Chief Executive Officers (CEO) in the UK are considering relocating their head 
offices abroad. This includes the big four CEOs. Economia, (2015) cautioned that 
though there could be tax advantage for companies in the UK relocating to abroad, 
the cost of living could have a high cost economic effect.  Report based on the survey 
carried out by KPMG, (2016), the first 100 CEOs That helped their companies to 
generate annual revenue of about £100 million to £1billion are considering relocating 
their head offices to abroad. This equally includes the big four. Robert Walters Practice 
Division, (2016) noted that “Low tax with low- or no-income tax, working offshore can 
be a great opportunity to earn and save a substantial amount of money”. 
It has been established from this section that the big four audit firms in the UK are 
already considering relocating resulting from tax issue. Therefore, it can be construed 
that auditors’ liability problems in the UK could easily fast track this decision to relocate 
amongst the big four. The consequent of the big four relocating abroad could adversely 
promote defective financial statements in the UK. 
The second implication in relation to audit profession in the UK is the profession could 
possibly go into near extinction. Evidence from FRC as displayed in  table 5.5  within 
this section revealed that number of registered auditors in the UK are declining on 
yearly basis. Though this declining rate is not steady or linear, the most important point 
to consider is that the declining rate is not positive. Thus, it is a symptom that audit 
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profession will go into near extinction in the UK if auditors’ liability issue is not urgently 
addressed. 
5.5 UNFAIRNESS 
The emergence of this concept (unfairness) came from the central questions of this 
study during the interview phase. For example, participants were asked whether 
auditors in the UK will relax their professional scepticism attitude if their liability is 
capped. The second question was whether capping strategy can help to demonopolize 
the current audit market in the UK that is dominated by the big four audit firms. The 
third question was whether audit profession in the UK will survive and grow should 
stakeholders in the UK listed companies continue to sue auditor in the UK for colossal 
claims resulting from defective financial statements. Unfairness became a reoccurring 
point during the interview in relation to the study question as mentioned above. For 
example, 98% of the interviewee pointed out that auditors in the UK are not fairly 
treated when it comes to accountability in connection with financial statements 
misstatements. In contrast, 2% of the interviewee opined that though it is reasonable 
on the basis of fairness to wholly and exclusively hold auditors in the UK accountable 
for the defectiveness of financial statements of listed companies in the UK.  They 
argued that auditors in the UK should do more in order to possibly exonerate 
themselves from the blame and punishment that is associated with listed companies’ 
financial statements misstatements in the UK. 
 Doubtful who is currently working as senior audit partner in one of the big four audit 
firm in the UK opined as follows: 
“auditors in the UK cannot be 100% exonerated from the 
misstatement of financial statements in the UK. The UK 
government has acknowledged this; hence legislation has 
changed in relation to company Act has of 2000 and 2006 to 
possibly lessen the burden of auditors’ liability in the UK. 
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However, it is unfair based on the current practice in the UK that 
auditors are wholly and exclusively held accountable for the 
misstatement of financial statements in the UK”. 
 
Doubtful argued that it is unreasonable to single out auditors in the UK and hold them 
accountable for the defectiveness of financial statements while other parties like 
company directors, company’s audit committee and company’s chief accountants who 
oversees internal control mechanism efficacy are not punished. 
In the same vein, the argument of Great who currently work for one of the top 5 audit 
firm in the UK corroborates the point Doubtful. Thus, Great opined that 
“because the UK government has refused to punish fairly all the 
parties that are arguably responsible for the defectiveness of 
financial statements in the UK, this action can be construed to 
mean unfair treatment of auditors in the UK”. 
 
Great further argued and referred to the current practice in the US following the Enron 
scandal between 2000 and 2002. According to Great, both finance directors and chief 
executive officers of listed companies in the US risk jail terms if they purportedly 
window-dress financial statements, or they were fully aware that financial statements 
do not represent the true and fair view of the companies’ affairs and conceal the 
information that they have acknowledged. In the UK, reverse is the case as auditors 
in the UK are single-handedly held accountable and punished for the defectiveness of 
financial statements. Thus, this current practice in the UK further reveal the extent that 
auditors in the UK are unfairly treated in relation to auditors’ liability according to Great. 
In the same vein, Professionalism who currently work as senior auditor in one of the 
top 6 audit firm in the UK noted as follows: 
“it is shameful to see that auditors in the UK are overtly unfairly 
treated by the UK government in relation to financial statements 
defectiveness. For example, the UK government has blatantly 
refused to ask simple questions and tackle financial statements 
failure from the main source of the problems”. 
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Based on the opinion of Professionalism, auditors in the UK will not relax their 
professional scepticism attitude if their liability is capped. However, the UK 
government is fully aware that the defectiveness of financial statements in the UK is 
not an accident or mistakes, rather a deceitful and unprofessional act. One could 
expect the UK government to ask why financial statements are becoming defective in 
the UK in the first place and what must be done to tackle the problem. For example, 
directors are responsible for the preparation and presentation of financial statements. 
It is the duty of auditors on the other hand to assess whether the financial statements 
are duly prepared in consonance with necessary financial reporting requirements in 
the UK. Whenever audit risk become crystalized, it is only the auditors in the UK that 
are punished. This is the unfair treatment from auditors in the UK perspective that the 
government has refused to consider. 
The finding within the preceding page agreed with some existing studies. For example, 
ACCA, (2013) noted that the unfair terms of contract as encapsulated in 1977 Act is 
still in vogue till date in the UK. For example, the Act prevented auditors from 
negotiating their liability limitation with their audit clients. It could be argued that other 
forms of liabilities limitations are available in the UK. For example, Liability Limitation 
Agreement (LLA). Thus, auditors in the UK can reached an agreement with their audit 
clients, subject to the approval of shareholders in the Annual General Meeting (AGM). 
On the other hand, this is far from what the audit profession expected in the form of 
capping. Finley, (2015) argued that the practicable existence of “Joint and several 
liabilities in the UK is an evidence of auditors’ unfair treatment. It could be argued also 
that joint and several liabilities law has been abolished in the UK.  Therefore, auditors 
in the UK are fairly treated. 
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Zubli, (2007); and Europa.eu, (2012) argued that the current debate on the best 
strategy to limit auditors’ liabilities in the UK is a revelation of the unfair treatment the 
profession has faced for decades. In the same vein, EC, (2008) recommended a cap 
as one of the strategies of managing auditors’ liabilities in Europe. By inference, the 
recommendation suggests that auditors are not fairly treated, hence the need to adopt 
a change in the form of capping was recommended.  
The study carried out by Action, (2013) find out that some Judges’ pronouncements 
regarding auditors’ liabilities cases were incongruous or inconsistent. This further 
suggests unfair treatment from auditors’ perspective by simple interpretation. 
Humphrey, and Samsonova, (2010). Lamented that  
“the subject of auditor liability and the need for its limitation has 
been associated with a diversity of often conflicting, attitudes, and 
views expressed by the regulatory community, users of audit 
reports, and the audit profession”.  
 
This further suggests that the need to limit auditors’ liability is overdue and 
unquestionable. If this is the case, this could be interpreted that auditors in the UK are 
not fairly treated when it comes to civil liability. Therefore, the need to limit the 
profession’s liability becomes significant. 
Although the reviewed literature regarding this section being the theme that emerged 
from interview appears unquestionable, the empirical finding within the embers of 
unfairness as a theme in relation to auditors in the UK treatment also corroborate 
findings from literature as evidenced within this section. To possibly avoid paralysis by 
analysis owing to the dynamism of this section, the next theme that has bearing with 
auditors’ insurance premium in the UK will be considered. 
5.6 INSURANCE PREMIUM 
During the interview phase, the theme (insurance premium) became a derivative. For 
example, participants were asked whether capping strategy can help to demonopolize 
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the current UK audit market. In response 82% of the interviewee said that although 
capping strategy can stimulate a healthy competition in the UK audit market, they 
however argued that the increase in insurance premium in current terms in the UK 
could negate the expected efficacy of capping strategy. In the same vein, 18% of the 
participants opined that if the issue of unhealthy competition in the UK audit market 
must be addressed, that the starting point will be the capping of insurance premium in 
the UK. 
While answering this question of capping strategy impact on the UK audit market, 
participants discussed another advantage of capping in relation to audit premium. 
Fantastic, who is currently working as senior auditor in one of the medium sized audit 
firm in the UK with 10 years of working experience as auditor opined as follows: 
“in addition to demonopolizing the current audit market in the UK, 
professional indemnity insurance which is paid by auditors in the 
will become cheaper”. 
 
Fantastic further explained that insurance companies are concerned with high cost of 
claims against auditors in the UK. As result, professional indemnity insurance premium 
paid by auditors in the UK has increased over the years. 
Based on the studies carried out by Philipsen, (2014), professional indemnity 
insurance cover is increasingly becoming expensive for auditors. This is due to the 
unwillingness of the insurance companies to provide a cover for the large accountancy 
firms. Moizer attributed this unwillingness attitude from insurance companies’ 
perspective to the relative frequency of occurrence of major pay-outs for auditor 
liability. Studies carried out by Financial Conduct Authority, (2016) tends to have a 
positive correlation with the above claim. For example,  this study finds out that  it is 
only about 30 insurance companies that are active in the market in relative to 
accepting insurance cover from large accountancy firm.  
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Furthermore, the study carried out by Oxera, (2006) find out that as follows:  
“view expressed by some interviewees is that the capital markets 
are currently vulnerable, given the concern that, at some juncture, 
one of the Big Four may exit the market”.   
 
A similar study carried out by London Economics,( 2006) find out that the 
       “specific    circumstances of each of the Big-4 networks vary. 
Thus, the only lead reinsurer with an established audit 
liability re-insurance program, the commercial re-insurance 
cover available is less than 5% of some of the mega-claims 
currently outstanding against some of the Big-4 firms. In 
other words, the commercial re-insurance cover available to 
the captives of the Big-4 networks is very limited and has 
fallen in recent years”. 
 
Clyde, (2013) noted that tax and financial planning claims against auditors has 
changed the traditional dynamics of audit and due diligence in the recent years. 
ICAEW, (2008) cautioned that auditors in the UK are gradually finding it impossible to 
secure indemnity insurance. They cautioned that everyone in the UK society will 
directly or indirectly pay for this strange attitude. For example, audit fees could 
increase, some companies could find it impossible to secure the services of large audit 
firm, the audit market in the UK could become more concentrated or an extinction of 
a large accounting firm in the market. 
ICAEW, (2016) reminded its member that irrespective of the professional scepticisms 
they maintain as auditors, that risk cannot be eliminated, but can only be managed. 
One of the methods it recommended to its members was to secure indemnity 
insurance which is currently difficult to secure by the large accounting firms according 
to the above studies. 
Hammond, (2012) noted that ICAEW recommend to its members to have a minimum 
insurance cover of £100,000 and maximum of £1.5 million. The question that comes 
to mind is what will happen if the medium sized audit firms are unable to meet this 
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recommendation? The answer to this question is simple. Thus, this could mark the 
beginning of exodus, some audit firms leaving the UK audit market. Another 
implication this could have on the audit market could be over concentration or 
uncompetitive audit market.  Hammond noted that the recommendation of ICAEW is 
not adequate. Hammond cautioned that firms are required to take reasonable steps 
that they are able to meet claims arising from professional business and this may lead 
many firms to conclude that they need more protection indemnity insurance, 
Personally, identifiable information (PII) than the amount required under the PII 
Regulations. 
The synopsis of this section based on the available literature and the empirical findings 
as evidenced within this section is that capping strategy can encourage insurance 
companies to protect more audit firms in the UK as the value of legal claims against 
auditors in the UK will become known in advance, thereby eliminating uncertainty in 
terms of claims.  Furthermore, the inability of the medium sized audit firms or one of 
the big four to secure professional indemnity insurance resulting from exorbitant 
premium could further reduce the number of participants in the audit market in the UK. 
The implication of this could lead to a further oligopoly in the audit market in the UK 
and a gradual decrease of audit profession in the UK. 
5.7   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter presents empirical findings based on the semi-structure 
interview that was conducted in the UK. However, quotations were taking from 
available literature in order to possibly enhanced unbiased analysis and discussion 
within the chapter. Participants profiles were also presented in order to enhance 
readers’ understanding about the background of each participants and their unique 
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character as they participate in the study. Themes were analysed and discussed as 
they emerged during data condensation.  
Empirical findings in conjunction with some literature within this chapter revealed that 
auditors’ liability capping can prosper financial statements integrity in the UK. It also 
revealed that auditor professional liability capping could provoke a positive impact on 
the UK audit market. Thus, young talents could be encouraged to venture into audit 
profession. This could in turn create healthy competition in the audit market and 
possibly cause a reduction in the audit fees.  
Findings from this chapter equally stressed that non capping strategy in the UK could 
provoke some large accounting firms including the big four to relocate their head 
offices to other tax-haven countries. This could have adverse effect on the UK GDP. 
Moreover, the advantages of capping as mentioned within this chapter could become 
a mirage. 
Finally, the conclusion reached within the context of this chapter in relation to the study 
questions is that capping can possibly bring about the realisation of financial 
statements objective, which is to show the true and fair view of company’s affairs. It 
can also create audit fees cost effectiveness and efficiency thereby promoting a 
healthy competition in the UK audit market that is currently dominated by the big four.  
Having analysed and discussed empirical data that emanated from interview that was 
conducted in the UK as evidenced in this chapter, the next chapter will present 
analysis and discussion based on findings from survey that was conducted in the UK 
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Chapter Six: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF SURVEY FINDINGS  
6.0 INTRODUCTION  
          This chapter reveals findings from the survey as described in research methods 
chapter within this study. Thus, empirical data were collected through the 
administration of online questionnaires. These data were analysed using descriptive 
statistics in relation to the research questions.   
The data collected focused on four groups of stakeholders in the UK: Chartered 
Accountants, Senior management, Institutional investors, and Individual investors.  
Regarding the chapter structure, this chapter constitutes four sections. Thus, section 
one analyses and discuss respondents’ information and presents a summary of   
grouped variables from survey. Section two analyses and discuss exhaustively survey 
findings. Section three links findings from interviews to survey findings that was 
conducted in the UK within the lens of the study questions. Finally, section four 
contains a summary of the chapter. 
The chapter analysis and discussion are structured in line with tables and figures 
presentation. Regarding the administered questionnaire, sample of it can be found in 
appendix . 
6.1 RESPONSE RATE 
The sample was in the categories of senior and junior staff in terms of their 
employment status in the UK as a representative of the entire UK qualified 
Accountants’ population that was 23,013 as at October 2020 (Register of Auditors, 
2020).  
The administered questionnaire sample was 2000. However, it was only an average 
of 544 questionnaires that were collectively retrieved, resulting from respondents not 
accounting for the remaining 1,456.  
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The 544 questionnaires that were returned constitute 27% of the initial sample of 2000, 
while the unreturned questionnaires constituted 72.8% of the same sample size as 
demonstrated in table 6.1 below. 
























2000 544 1456 27% 72.8% 100 
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2 DEMOGRAPHY BY AGE 
Figure 6.1 below revealed the age group of the sampled population. The age group of 
36-45, had the highest number of responses at 386, representing 71% of the sample 
size. The age group of 66 and above had the lowest responses at 2, representing 0.4% 
of the sample size. The young age group between18-35 had 46 responses (2+44). 
This represents 8.5% (0.4%+8.1%). 
The percentage of young age group as revealed in figure 6.1 below suggests that if 
young talents are discouraged from venturing into audit profession resulting from 
arguably legal liabilities as stressed in the literature, the active age group of 36-55 
which represents 88.5% (71%+17.5%) will be saddled with additional responsibilities. 
This could possibly increase pressure on the part of auditors in the UK. In return, this 
pressure could metamorphosized into mistakes. The end products of the expected 
mistakes could result into audit failure from the part of auditors which could in turn 
increase the rate of auditors’ legal liabilities in the future. 
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Finally, the factors as highlighted above could possibly invalidate the need for auditors’ 
liability capping in the UK if this aged-long debate lingers without a lasting panacea. 
The age group result as depict in figure 6.1 below was derived from question number 
two from the administered questionnaire. For example, respondents were asked to 
click one of the following to indicate their age group 
 
 
FIGURE 6. 1 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY AGE 
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019. 
6.3 DEMOGRAPHY BY SEX 
Figure 6.2 below depict the sex group of respondents regarding their gender (male or 
female).  As revealed below, male staff had total respondents of approximately 342, 
representing 63.1% of the sampled population. In the same veil, female staff had total 
respondents of approximately 200, representing 36.9% of the sampled population. 
As evident from figure 6.2 below, male staff dominant the sampled population with 
approximately a spread of 142 respondents, representing approximately 26.10%. 
Though this study is not concerned with why this is the case, a further study within the 
research community can take a dynamic step in investigating this uneven spread 
within the stakeholders’ group that was sampled. 
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It must be however stressed that the high degree of variance found in terms of 
demography by sex is not expected to impact on the survey findings as the study is 
not concerned with gender issues. 
The respondents’ demographic information as evident from figure 6.2 below was 
derived from survey question number one which asked respondents to click one of the 
following to indicate their gender. 
 
FIGURE 6. 2 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY SEX 
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.4 RESPONDENTS STATUS 
From figure 6.3 below, the total responses from senior staff within the context of the 
administered questionnaires were approximately 503. This represents 93.3 % of the 
legitimate sample size. On the other hand, the responses from junior staff were 
approximately 36, and this represents 6.7% of the sampled population. Thus, the 
spread between the two groups of respondents in terms of responses were 
approximately 467. This represents about 85.85% of the sampled population. 
In order to possibly avoid a drift, the researcher decided not to make a further analysis 
on cadre level as this is expected not to have any impact on the quality of responses 
received from them. 
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The respondents’ status information as evident from the figure 6.3 below was derived 
from survey question number three which asked respondents to click one of the 
following to indicate their status. 
 
FIGURE 6. 3 RESPONDENTS STATUS 
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.5 RESPONDENTS EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION 
As depict in Figure 6.4 below, the number of respondents that had first degree 
qualification was the highest at approximately 520, representing approximately 96.3% 
of the sampled population. The number of respondents that had GCSE qualification 
were the lowest at approximately 2, representing approximately 0.4% of the sampled 
population. 
From the above information about respondent’s qualification, it can be inferred that the 
respondents are expected to be knowledgeable within the context of the research 
questions based on their level of education, thereby enhancing the quality of plausible 
recommendation and conclusion within the study. 
However, critics could question the reasonableness of the above assumed knowledge 
from respondents in respect of their subject area. For example, critics could ask what 
the respondents studied in their first degree? Do they have second degree or 
professional qualifications in the field of accounting? If the answer to these questions 
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are yes, what was the level of their experience? The next two figures within this section 
have provided answers to these questions regarding respondents’ educational 
qualification and their subject area of expertise thereby reaffirming the assumed 
knowledge as claimed from the respondents.  
The respondents’ educational information as evidenced from figure 6.4 below was 
derived from survey question number four which asked respondents to click one of the 
following to indicate their educational qualification status. 
  
FIGURE 6. 4 RESPONDENTS EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION 
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.6 RESPONDENTS PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION 
As evidenced in figure 6.5 below, the number of respondents who are not 
professionally qualified were 302. This represents 55.6% of the legitimate sampled 
population. On the other hand, the number of respondents that had professional 
qualification were 241. This represents approximately 44.4% of the legitimate sampled 
population. The spread between the respondents that had professional qualification 
and those who do not have was 61. This represents approximately 11.2% of the 
legitimate population that was sampled. 
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From the above description regarding respondents’ qualifications, it can be argued 
subjectively that the variance between the respondents that had professional 
qualification and those who do not have are not significant at 11.2%. It can also be 
construed that other stakeholders’ group like top management, institutional and 
individual investors are expected to be knowledgeable about the research topic as it 
affects them in practical terms. If this assumed knowledge is accepted by critics in 
absolute terms, the question of knowledge as asked in the previous section will be 
deemed answered. 
The respondents’ professional qualification information as evidenced from figure 6.5 
below was derived from survey question number five which asked respondents to click 
one of the following to indicate their professional qualification status. 
  
FIGURE 6. 5 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION 
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.7 RESPONDENTS PROFESSIONAL SERVICE 
As evidenced in figure 6.6 below, on aggregate, the total number that rendered 
professional service were 316. This represents approximately 58.1% of the legitimate 
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sampled population. This percentage is unarguably significant. For example, the 
number represents more than half of the entire legitimate population that was sampled. 
A careful observation from figure 6.6 below also revealed that while the aggregated 
number that rendered professional service were 316, the number of statutory auditors 
in the UK within those number were 52. This produced a spread of 264 which further 
represents 83.5% in statistical terms. In the same vein, the total of auditors in the UK 
within the survey which was 52 only represents approximately 16.5% out of the total 
number that rendered professional service in the UK. By implication, responses from 
statutory auditors in the UK within the survey are not enough to bialy influence the 
finding from the survey as the opinion of divert stakeholders within the group were 
explored. 
If the above interpretation is construed to be acceptable by readers of this study, this 
could further add to the voices of those who are yearning for auditor’s professional 
liability capping in the UK. 
The statistical information as evidenced in figure 6.6 below was derived from question 
number six within the questionnaire which asked respondents to please click one of 
the following to indicate their current professional service. 
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FIGURE 6. 6 PROFESSIONAL SERVICE 
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
Table 6.2: Decription of Categories 
Categories 






303 55.7 55.7 55.7 
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 241 44.3 44.3 100.0 
Total 544 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
As evident in table 6.2, respondents were of two categories, namely non-qualified and 
qualified accountants. The non-qualified accountant had a total population of 303 and 
this represents 55.7% of the population sampled. On the other hand, the qualified 
accountants had a total population of 241 and this represents 44.3% of the population 
sampled. A comparison of these two categories in terms of population found a spread 
of 62 and this represents 11.40% of the total population sampled. By implication, the 
non-qualified accountants dominate the survey that was conducted in the UK within 
the study. Therefore, it can be construed that because of the significant difference in 
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spread in terms of population between the two categories, it could be practically 
difficult for the qualified accountants to influence the results of the survey because the 
study affects them in practical terms. 
6.8 DECRIPTION OF GROUPED VARIABLES 
Table 6.3 below is a summary of all the responses obtained from administered 
questionnaires. Thus, it reveals the extent at which each respondent strongly 
agree/agree (SA/A), or strongly disagree/disagree (SD/D) within the context of the 
questionnaires administered. These are expressed in figures and in percentages (%) 
as evident in the table below.  


























8 540 1 0 541 99.8% 0.2% 0% 100
% 
9 539 3 2 544 90% 0.6% 0.4% 100
% 
10 541 3 0 544 99.4% 0.6% 0% 100
% 
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14 541 2 1 544 99.4% 0.4% 0.2% 100
% 
15 538 1 2 541 99.4% 0.2% 0.4% 100
% 
16 541 1 2 544 99.4% 0.2% 0.4% 100
% 
17 540 1 3 544 99.2% 0.2% 0.6% 100
% 
18 528 9 5 544 97.4% 1,7% 0.9% 100
% 




20 540 2 2 542 99.6% 0% 0.4% 100
% 






22 538 1 3 542 99.2% 0.2% 0.6% 100
% 
23 541 1 0 542 99.8% 0.2% 0% 100
% 
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24 539 0 4 543 99.3% 0% 0.7% 100
% 
25 54o 1 1 542 99.6% 1% 1% 100
% 
26 539 1 1 541 99.6% 0.2% 0.2% 100
% 
27 539 1 2 542 99.4% 0.2% 0.4% 100
% 
28 542 1 0 543 99.8% 0,2% 0% 100
% 
29 239 294 11 544 43.9% 54% 2.0% 100
% 
30 239 297 4 540 44.3% 55% 0.7% 100
% 




32 539 0 1 540 99.8% 0% 0.2% 100
% 
33 542 0 0 542 100% 0% 0% 100
% 
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.0 PROFESSIONAL SCEPTICISM ATTITUDE 
The statistical information as evidenced in table 6.4. below was derived from question 
number seven within the questionnaire which asked respondents to what  
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extent they agree or disagree with the believe that statutory auditors in the UK will 
relax their professional scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped. It 
must be mentioned clearly here that this very question formed the bedrock of this study 
being one of the research questions. 
 As a response to this very specific question, 193 strongly disagree, while 99 
respondents disagree to this statement among the non-qualified accountants in the 
UK. A combination of these two figures give a total of 292 that strongly 
disagree/disagree with the above statement. This figure represents 96.7% as 
evidenced in table 6.4 below in relation to the population of non-qualified accountants 
at 302 within question number seven. 
On the other hand, while 144 respondents strongly disagree among the qualified 
accountants in the UK, 82 respondents disagree among the qualified accountants in 
the UK. The combination of those who strongly disagree/disagree among the qualified 
accountants in the were 226 and this represents 94.6% in relation to the valid 
population of qualified accountants in the UK as evidenced in table 6.4 below. 
Table.6.4: Respondents’ frequency on question number seven 
Q7 









193 63.7 63.9 63.9 
Disagree 99 32.7 32.8 96.7 
Neutral 5 1.7 1.7 98.3 
AGREE 3 1.0 1.0 99.3 
Strongly 
AGREE 
2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0 











144 59.8 60.3 60.3 
Disagree 82 34.0 34.3 94.6 
Neutral 3 1.2 1.3 95.8 
AGREE 10 4.1 4.2 100.0 
Total 239 99.2 100.0  
Missing System 2 .8   
Total 241 100.0   
 
A comparison of the respondents’ rate who strongly disagree/disagree among the non-
qualified accountants in the UK within question number seven produced a mean of 
1.41 and standard deviation of 0.64. In the same vein, a similar result was found  
among the qualified Accountants in the UK. For example, while a mean of 1.49 was 
found, standard deviation of 0.72 was calculated as evidenced in table 6.5 below Table 
Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics. 
Statistics 




Valid 302 302 303 303 303 303 303 
Missi
ng 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 1.4172 4.6656 4.7228 4.6601 1.3366 4.6805 1.3168 




Valid 239 239 241 241 241 241 241 
Missi
ng 
2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 1.4937 4.7406 4.6639 4.4979 4.7220 1.3168 4.5187 
Std. Deviation .72686 .43923 .48208 .57100 .56411 .53853 .5 
 




Valid 303 302 303 302 303 302 303 




4.5248 4.6291 4.4026 1.9702 4.6469 
 














Valid 241 239 241 241 239 239 236 




















Valid 302 302 302 303 302 302 302 
Missing 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Mean 4.6788 4.7252 4.6424 4.7525 4.7152 4.6391 4.7384 




Valid 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Missing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mean 4.7292 4.7208 4.5583 4.7375 4.7625 4.5625 4.6958 
Std. Deviation .49852 .49388 .52224 .46852 .45492 .52971 .49599 
 
Statistics 




Valid 303 303 301 303 302 303 
Missing 0 0       0 0 1 0 
Mean 4.5743 1.3168 1.2574 1.3250 4.6159 4.6601 




Valid 240 241 241 240 240 238 
Missing 1 0 0 1 1 3 
Mean 4.5125 4.7344 4.7261 4.3685 4.7417 4.7689 
Std. Deviation .52535 .47873 .53977 .52681 .43863 .42242 
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Table 6.6: Test  Statistics. 
Test Statistics 
 
Question number  Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 
Mann-Whitney U 34528.500 33589.500 34391.500 31346.000 290.000 549.500 216.000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .308 .082 .151 .077 .000 .000 .000 
Question number 
Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 
Mann-Whitney U 35887.500 32704.000 34525.500 35467.500 34456.500 31540.000 33713.000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .675 .024 .165 .551 .266 .168 .183 
Question number 
Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 
Mann-Whitney U 33997.500 36005.000 33442.000 36069.000 34360.500 33809.000 34986.500 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .123 .861 .070 .843 .187 .113 .360 
Question number 
Q28 Q29 Q30 Q31 Q32 Q33 
Mann-Whitney U 32538.000 53.000 286.500 110.500 33861.000 34237.500 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .451 .000 .000 .000 .095 .181 
 
Critics could question the reasonableness of table 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6  despite their 
compelling statistical information that they have provided. Thus, critics could question 
the differences or similarities that was found within the standard deviations between 
non-qualified and qualified Accountants in the UK in terms of their responses as 
evidenced in table 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. The answers to this vital but expected question is 
found in table 6.6 below. For example, within table 6.6, Mann Whitney U test of 0.31 
was calculated with reference to Q7. This indicates that there is no significant 
difference in terms of opinion within the numbers of qualified Accountants and non-
qualified Accountants in their responses on Q7. This further implied that almost all the 
qualified and non-qualified Accountants opted for disagree and strongly disagree 
within the ambit of Q7. This also implies that the fear that auditors in the UK will relax 
their professional scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped has been 
rejected unanimously by the qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK. 
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Table 6.7: Summary of respondents’ rates 






























     
1                
2                
3                
4                
5                
6                
7 10 0 3 82 1
4
4 







1.42 .646 .308 
8 177 62 0 0 0 203 98 0 1 0 4.74 .43
9 
4.47 .493 .082 
9 181 79 1 0 0 220 82 1 0 0 4.66 .48
2 
4.72 .456 .151 
10 126 11
2 
0 3 0 200 10
3 
0 0 0 4.50 .57
1 
4.66 .474 .077 







1.34 .520 .000 







1.32 .539 .000 
13 127 11
3 







1.31 532 .000 
14 165 73 1 2 0 201 10
2 
0 0 0 4.66 .53
1 
4.66 .473 .675 
15 140 96 2 1 0 204 98 0 0 0 4.57 .53
7 
4.68 .469 .024 




4.52 .891 .165 
17 159 80 2 0 0 191 11
0 
1 0 0 4.65 .49
5 
4.63 .491 .551 
18 90 14
5 
4 0 0 129 16
9 
3 2 0 4.36 .51
5 
4.40 .549 .266 












1.97 .1.23 .168 
20 140 95 1 0 0 197 10
5 
1 0 0 4.59 .50
1 
4.65 .486 .183 
21 179 59 0 2 0 206 95 1 0 0 4.73 .49
9 
4.68 .475 .123 
22 177 60 2 1 0 220 81 1 0 0 4.72 .49
4 
4.73 .455 .861 
23 136 10
3 
0 1 0 194 10
8 
0 0 0 4.56 .52
2 
4.64 .480 .070 
24 180 57 3 0 0 229 73 1 0 0 4.74 .46
9 
4.75 .440 .843 
25 185 54 0 1 0 217 84 1 0 0 4.76 .45
5 
4.72 .459 .187 
26 130 10
0 
1 1 0 193 10
9 
0 0 0 4.56 .53
0 
4.64 .481 .113 
27 170 68 1 1 0 224 77 1 0 0 4.70 .94
6 
4.74 .448 .360 
 








4.57 .668 .451 









1.31 .532 .000 







1.26 .495 .000 
31 129 11
1 






4.53 .52 1.30 .502 .000 




4.62 .666 .095 




4.66 .651 .181 
Note:  The 5-point Likert scale Strongly Agree =5, Agree  = 4, Neutral =3, Disagree =2 and Strongly Disagree =1 
 
When the specific finding with reference to Q7 is compared to the finding from semi-
structured interview that was conducted in the UK within this study, thus, whether 
auditors in the UK will maintain a professional scepticism attitude if their professional 
liability is capped,  a positive correlation was found. For example, most of the 
responses from participants regarding Q7 revealed that auditors in the UK will maintain 
a professional scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped. Specifically, 
90% of the participants voiced this opinion during the interview process. However, 4% 
opined that auditors in the UK would relax their professional attitude, while 6% 
declined to the question on whether auditors in the UK will relax their professional 
scepticism attitude if their liability is capped. 
In the same veil, the above findings are in consonance with the arguments Yu, et al., 
(2013). They argued that despite the claim that the big four dominants the audit 
market, the quality of audit report has improved over the decade in the UK. This simply 
implies that if audit quality has improved over the years in the UK despite the claim of 
audit market monopolisation by the big four audit firms, auditor’s professional liability 
capping could prosper financial statements integrity in the UK hence auditors’ liability 
capping could stimulate a healthy competition in the UK audit market. 
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A systematic triangulation as evidenced above has influenced a positive interpretation. 
Thus, empirical findings suggest that auditors in the UK will maintain a professional 
scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped hence, they corroborate each 
other. Therefore, within the context of this study with reference to the empirical and 
theoretical findings in this study, the interpretation is that auditors in the UK will not 
relax their professional scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped. 
6.2. FEAR OF LOSING PRACTICING LICENSE   
The empirical findings as evidenced in table 6.7 below was imbedded in question 
number eight within the questionnaire. Thus, respondents were asked about their level 
of agreement/disagreement within the assertion that the fear of losing practicing 
certificate could motivate statutory auditors in the UK to maintain their professional 
attitude if their liability is capped? This was a probing question in relation to Q7 as 
previously analysed above. The essence was to gauge the understanding the 
respondents have in relation to question number eight, thereby ex-raying their 
responses in question number nine with the lens of consistency.  
Within this probing question, the respondents’ rate that strongly agree/agree on 
aggregate was 540 and this represent 99.8% of the legitimate population on 
aggregate. On the other hand, those who strongly disagree/ disagree was 1 and this 
represent 0.2% of the legitimate sampled population as evidenced in table 6.7 below. 
Consequently, a variance of 539 was found between those who strongly agree/agree 
and those who strongly disagree/disagree.  This represents 99.1% of the legitimate 
population.  
In the same vein, the total number of respondents that strongly agree/agree among 
the non-qualified Accountants in the UK was 301 and this represents 55.74% of the 
valid sampled population. On the other hand, the total number of qualified Accountants 
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in the UK that strongly agree/agree to the above assertion was 239 and this represents 
44.26% of the valid sampled population. 
When the above finding within question number eight is compared as evidenced in 
table 6.6 above, the non-qualified Accountants had a calculated mean value of 4.66 
and a standard deviation of 0.49. In the same table, the qualified Accountants in the 
UK responses was calculated with a mean value of 4.74 and a standard deviation of 
0.43. When these descriptive statistics were further analysed in table 6.6 within Man 
Whitney column, it produced 0.08. By interpretation, Mann Whitney U test calculated 
at 0.08 indicate that there is no significant difference in the numbers of qualified 
Accountants and non-qualified Accountants in their responses within Q8. This means 
that most of the qualified and non-qualified Accountants opted for strongly agree and 
agree within Q8. This further implies that the fear of losing practicing certificate within 
Q8 has been accepted by both qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK 
without much difference in terms of opinion. 
This specific finding fairly suggest that the respondents understand the question very 
well. Thus, a positive correlation was found between finding from question seven and 
eight as evidenced in table 6.6 above. 
A similar finding was made from the semi-structure interview that was conducted in 
the UK regarding the same question. Specifically, according to Professor who is 
currently working as senior international auditor in one of the top 5 audit firm in the 
UK,  
“it is unthinkable to believe that auditors in the UK will relax their 
professional scepticism attitude if their professional liability is 
capped. The reputation of the auditing profession, the 
professional body that each auditor belongs, the reputation of 
each auditing firm is at stake”.  
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What happened in the US in 2002 during the Enron saga is a strong lesson for auditors 
in the UK. Arthur Andersen, which was the auditing firm to Enron Corporation 
voluntarily, surrendered its practicing licenses to Certified Public Accountants in the 
US when the firm was found guilty of criminal charges. Certified Public Accountant is 
a professional body that regulates the behaviour of auditors in the US. This marked 
the demise of Arthur Andersen as auditing firm, and the big five was reduced to big 
four.  
In the same veil, according to Watts and Zimmermann (1983), Lim and Tan 
(2008),  Firth (1990), Wilson and Grimlund (1990), Weber et al., (2008) audit failure 
do affect auditors’ reputation even when there is no legal claim against them as this 
adversely impact on their market share. This point further corroborates other findings 
from the above. Thus, it suggests that apart from the fear of losing practicing 
certificate, the fear of reputation damage could propel statutory auditors in the UK in 
working hard towards the enhancement of listed companies’ financial statements in 
the UK. If this assertion is assumed to be correct that audit failure does adversely 
affect auditor’s reputation, then, it can be inferred that auditors in the UK will not relax 
their professional scepticism attitude if their liability is capped. 
Table  6.8: Respondents’ frequency on question number eight 
Q8 







Disagree 1 .3 .3 .3 
AGREE 98 32.3 32.5 32.8 
Strongly AGREE 203 67.0 67.2 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
Valid AGREE 62 25.7 25.9 25.9 
 




Strongly AGREE 177 73.4 74.1 100.0 
Total 239 99.2 100.0  
Missing System 2 .8   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.1  WHETHER CAPPING CAN ENHANCE FINANCIAL STATEMENT INTEGRITY  
The finding from table 6.8 below was derived from one of the probing questions within 
the survey in relation to question number seven as previously analysed. Thus, this 
very question come from question number nine in the survey. For example, 
respondents were asked “to what extent do you agree with the opinion that a capping 
strategy can encourage external auditors to do more in enhancing financial statement 
integrity in the UK?” In response to this question as evidenced in table 6.8 below, on 
aggregate, the total number that strongly agree/agree were 542. This represents 
99.62% of the legitimate sample. Specifically, while 302 non-qualified Accountants in 
the UK strongly agree/agree as evidenced in table 6.8 below, 240 qualified 
Accountants in the UK strongly agree/agree to this assertion. Within this question, the 
responses of the non-qualified Accountants that strongly agree/agree constituted 
55.51% in relation to the valid population at 544. On the other hand, the responses of 
the qualified Accountants in the UK that strongly agree/agree to this question 
constituted 44.49% 
A further analysis within question number nine from the survey as evidenced in table 
6.7 above revealed that while the calculated mean and standard deviation of the non-
qualified Accountants in the UK were 4.72 and 0.45 respectively, the mean and 
standard deviation of the qualified Accountants in the UK were 4.66 and 0.48 
respectively. In order to possibly arrive at plausible interpretation or conclusion within 
this question, Mann Whitney U test was calculated in table 6.6 above with specific 
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reference to question number nine. Thus, Mann Whitney U test calculated at 0.15 
indicates that there is no significant difference in the numbers of Qualified Accountants 
and Non-qualified Accountants in their responses on Q9. This means that most of the 
Qualified and Non-qualified Accountants opted for Strongly Agree and Agree on Q9. 
This further implies that the claim that capping that can possibly enhance financial 
statements’ integrity in the UK as encapsulated in Q9 has been unanimously accepted 
by both the qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK 
By way of cross referencing, the finding from this specific empirical question 
corroborates the findings from question number seven and eight from the survey. It 
also corroborates some of the findings from semi-structured interview that was 
conducted in the UK in conjunction with some findings from relevant literature. Based 
on these findings, the conclusion that can be reached within this question is that 
capping strategy can possibly help to enhance financial statement integrity in the UK 
if it is implemented. 
Table 6.9: Respondents’ frequency on question number nine 
Q9 







Neutral 1 .3 .3 .3 
AGREE 82 27.1 27.1 27.4 
Strongly AGREE 220 72.6 72.6 100.0 




Neutral 1 .4 .4 .4 
AGREE 79 32.8 32.8 33.2 
Strongly AGREE 161 66.8 66.8 100.0 
Total 241 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
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6.2.2  WHETHER THE UK SHOULD ADOPT STATUTORY AUDITORS’ LIABILITY CAPPING 
The statistical information as depict in table 6.9 below was derived from question 
number ten within the questionnaire which asked respondents that “countries such as 
Germany, Greece and Belgium have adopted statutory auditors’ liability capping. To 
what extent do you agree that it is wise for the UK to adopt a similar policy.” This is 
another probing question in relation to question number seven that has been analysed 
above. The essence was to test the degree of corroboration or inconsistencies in 
relation to the respondent’s rates in question seven, eight, nine and ten. 
In response to this specific question as evidenced in table 6.9 below, on aggregate, 
the total number that strongly agree/agree were 541. This represents 99.4% of the 
legitimate sample. However, the total number of respondents that strongly 
disagree/disagree were 3 and this represents 0.6% of the legitimate sample. 
Therefore, the spread that was found between those respondents that strongly 
agree/agree and those that strongly disagree/disagree was 538.   This significantly 
represents approximately 98.9% of the legitimate sampled population. 
Specifically, while the total responses from non-qualified Accountants in the UK that 
strongly agree/agree was 303, that of qualified Accountant was 238. In the vein, the 
responses of the non-qualified Accountants in the UK constitute 56.01% in relation the 
strongly agree/agree within Q10. On the other hand, the responses of the qualified 
Accountants in the UK with reference to strongly agree/agree within Q10 was 43.99%. 
A further analysis in the form of calculated mean and standard deviation in relation to 
the responses of the qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK as evidenced 
in table 6.6 above revealed the following: While the calculated mean and standard 
deviation of non-qualified Accountants in the UK was 4.66 and 0.47 respectively, that 
of qualified Accountants in the UK was 4.49 and 0.57 respectively. What does this 
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mean? The answer to this question is found in table 6.6 above within Mann Whitney 
column with specific reference to Q10. Thus, a calculated Mann Whitney U test at 0.77 
suggests that there is no significant difference in the numbers of qualified Accountants 
and non-qualified Accountants in their responses on Q10. This means that qualified 
and non-qualified Accountants opted for Strongly agree/agree on Q10. This also 
implies that both the qualified and the non-qualified Accountants in the UK have 
unanimously agreed that it is expedient for a similar capping policy to be adopted in 
the UK. 
By way of cross referencing, the finding from this specific empirical question 
corroborates the findings from Q8. Q9, and Q10 from the survey. Thus, these findings 
advocate for capping strategy in the UK based on the notion that capping can 
positively enhance listed companies’ financial statements integrity in the UK. 
Critics could as well question the reasonableness of this specific finding. Thus, they 
can argue that though capping strategy appears to be successful in countries like 
Germany, Belgium and Greece, they could argue that the political, economic and 
foreign policies of those countries might have contributed to the success of capping 
strategy in those countries in conjunction with their indigenous culture. This could 
further provoke a counter argument. For example, proponents of capping strategy in 
the UK could argue that the economic, political, foreign policy and indigenous culture 
of the UK are one of the best in the world hence they are ranked as the 5th largest 
economy in the world (Statisticstimes, 2019). 
From democratic principles or majority concept, it can be concluded within the context 
of this specific question that it wise for the UK to adopt a similar capping strategy just 
like other countries like Germany, Belgium and Greece. For example, the percentages 
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of respondents that support this policy between question number seven, eight, nine 
and ten are more than 50%, each being probing question. 
Table 6.10: Respondents’ frequency on question number ten 
Q10 







AGREE 103 34.0 34.0 34.0 
Strongly 
AGREE 
200 66.0 66.0 100.0 




Disagree 3 1.2 1.2 1.2 
AGREE 112 46.5 46.5 47.7 
Strongly 
AGREE 
126 52.3 52.3 100.0 
Total 241 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.3 AUDITORS  ACCOUNTABLE FOR AVOIDABLE NEGLIGENCE 
The finding from table 10 below is a probing question, connecting Q 12 and 13 from 
the survey. Thus, within this question, respondents were asked the following question.  
“Within the context of the UK, to what extent do you agree the external auditors should 
only be held accountable for avoidable negligence?” This question is number eleven 
in the survey questions and it is a derivative of one of the themes that emerged during 
semi-structured interview that was conducted in the UK within the study. During the 
interview, most of the interviewee voiced it that statutory auditors in the UK are not 
fairly treated compared to their professional colleagues in the US. 
In response to the above question within this section on aggregate, the total number 
that strongly agree/agree were 235. This represents 43.2% of the legitimate sample. 
However, the total number of respondents that strongly disagree/disagree were 300 
and this represents 55.1% of the legitimate sample. Therefore, the spread that was 
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found between those respondents that strongly agree/agree and those that strongly 
disagree/disagree was 65.   This significantly represents approximately 11.9% of the 
legitimate sampled population. 
While the percentage of those who strongly/agree among the non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK was 0.2% with reference to Q11 in the survey that was 
conducted in the UK, the percentage of the qualified Accountants in the UK that opted 
for strongly agree/agree within the same question was 44.3%. A further analysis in the 
form of categories mean and standard deviation within the same question revealed 
the following: As evidenced in table 6.6 above, while the mean and standard deviation 
of non-qualified Accountants in the UK were 1.34 and 0.52 respectively, the mean and 
standard deviation of the qualified Accountants in the UK with the same table above 
was 4.72 and 0.56 respectively. A comparison of these statistical information as 
encapsulated in 6.6 within Mann Whitney column but with specific reference to Q11 
revealed that there was significant difference in terms of opinion between the non-
qualified and the qualified Accountants in the UK as this was calculated at 0.00. By 
simple interpretation, this simply means that qualified and non-qualified Accountants 
in the UK disagreed with other  within Q11, thereby revealing the high degree of 
dichotomy within this question among the qualified and non-qualified Accountants in 
the UK. 
A similar finding was revealed during the interview that was conducted in the UK within 
the context of this study. Thus, unfairness became a reoccurring point during the 
interview in relation to the question as mentioned above. For example, during the 
interview, 98% of the interviewee pointed out that auditors in the UK are not fairly 
treated when it comes to accountability in connection with financial statements 
misstatements. In contrast, 2% of the interviewee opined that though it is 
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unreasonable on the basis of fairness to wholly and exclusively hold auditors in the 
UK accountable for the defectiveness of financial statements of listed companies in 
the UK, they argued that auditors in the UK should do more in order to possibly 
exonerate themselves from the blame and punishment that is associated with listed 
companies financial statements misstatements in the UK. 
According to Doubtful who is currently working as senior audit partner in one of the big 
four audit firm in the UK,  
“auditors in the UK cannot be 100% exonerated from the 
misstatement of financial statements in the UK. The UK 
government has acknowledged this; hence legislation has 
changed in relation to company Act has of 2000 and 2006 to 
possibly lessen the burden of auditors’ liability in the UK. 
However, it is unfair based on the current practice in the UK that 
auditors are wholly and exclusively held accountable for the 
misstatement of financial statements in the UK”. 
 
Although the finding from the survey within this specific question do not correlate 
positively with the finding from interview within the sphere of the same question being 
unfairness, the researcher has decided not to make any remark about these findings 
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Table 6.11: Respondents’ frequency on question number eleven 
Q11 
Categories Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Qualified Accountants Valid Strongly Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
Disagree 1 .4 .4 .8 
Neutral 5 2.1 2.1 2.9 
Agree 50 20.7 20.7 23.7 
Strongly Agree 184 76.3 76.3 100.0 
Total 241 100.0 100.0  
Non-Qualified 
Accountants 
Valid Strongly Disagree 207 68.3 68.3 68.3 
Disagree 91 30.0 30.0 98.3 
Neutral 4 1.3 1.3 99.7 
Agree 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.4 WHO SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR  MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS  
The empirical findings as evidenced in table 6.11 below was imbedded in Q12 within 
the questionnaire. Thus, respondents were asked about their level of 
agreement/disagreement based on the assertion that “within the UK context, to what 
extent do you agree that Chief Executive Officers, Audit Committee and Chief 
Accountants should be jointly held accountable for any material misstatement in listed 
companies’ financial statements?”.  
This was another probing question in relation to Q12. The essence was to gauge the 
understanding the respondents have in relation to Q12 and Q13, thereby evaluating 
their responses in Q13 with the lens of consistency and variance. 
Within this question, the respondents’ rate that strongly agree/agree on aggregate was 
238 and this represent 43.75% of the legitimate population on aggregate. On the other 
hand, those who strongly disagree/ disagree was 300 and those that stayed neutral 
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were 6 these represent 55.1% and 1.10% respectively of the legitimate sampled 
population as evidenced in table 6.11 below. Based on this statistical information, a 
variance of 62 was found between those who strongly agree/agree and those who 
strongly disagree/disagree.  This represents approximately 11.40% of the legitimate 
population.  
While the total number of non-qualified Accountants in the UK that opted for strongly 
agree/agree within this question was 2, the population of the qualified Accountants 
with reference to the same question was 236. Therefore, the expression of the non-
qualified Accountants in the UK represents 3.80%, why that of the qualified 
Accountants in the UK represents 43.75%. Furthermore, a comparison of categories 
in the form of respondents’ rates in relation to their means and standard deviation was 
calculated as evidenced in table 6.6 above. Thus, while the non-qualified Accountants 
in the UK had a calculated mean of 1.32 and standard deviation of 0.54, the qualified 
Accountants in the UK had a calculated mean of 4.68 and standard deviation of 0.61. 
In order to possibly have a plausible remark within Q13 as previously explained above, 
a Mann Whitney U test was calculated at 0.00 as evidenced in table 6.6 above with 
reference to Q12. The Mann Whitney U test calculation suggests that there is 
significant difference in the numbers of qualified Accountants and non-qualified 
Accountants in their responses within Q12 in relation to their opinion.  
Th synopsis of this finding fairly suggest that the respondents understand the question 
very well. Thus, a negative correlation was found between Q11, and Q12 as evidenced 
in table 6.6 above. 
A similar non-corroborative  information was also found from the semi-structure 
interview that was conducted in the UK regarding the same question that cantered on 
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unfairness from UK auditors’ perspective. According to Doubtful who is currently 
working as senior audit partner in one of the big four audit firm in the UK,  
“auditors in the UK cannot be 100% exonerated from the 
misstatement of financial statements in the UK. The UK 
government has acknowledged this; hence legislation has 
changed in relation to company Act has of 2000 and 2006 to 
possibly lessen the burden of auditors’ liability in the UK. 
However, it is unfair based on the current practice in the UK that 
auditors are wholly and exclusively held accountable for the 
misstatement of financial statements in the UK”. 
 
Doubtful argued that it is unreasonable to single out auditors in the UK and hold them 
accountable for the defectiveness of financial statements while other parties like 
company directors, company’s audit committee and company’s chief accountant who 
oversees internal control mechanism efficacy are not punished. 
Although there is element of consistency between the findings that emerged from Q11 
– Q12 within the survey, the research has decided not to express his interpretation on 
these finding until Q13 from the survey is fully analysed.  Thus, findings from Q11 – 
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Table 6.12: Respondents’ frequency on question number twelve 
Q12 
Categories Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Qualified Accountants Valid Strongly Disagree 2 .8 .8 .8 
Disagree 2 .8 .8 1.7 
Neutral 1 .4 .4 2.1 
Agree 61 25.3 25.3 27.4 
Strongly Agree 175 72.6 72.6 100.0 
Total 241 100.0 100.0  
Non-Qualified 
Accountants 
Valid Strongly Disagree 216 71.3 71.3 71.3 
Disagree 80 26.4 26.4 97.7 
Neutral 5 1.7 1.7 99.3 
Agree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.5  TOP MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABLE FOR MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS  
The empirical findings as depict in table 6.12 below was one of the probing questions 
as imbedded in Q13 within the questionnaire. For example, respondents were asked 
about their level of agreement/disagreement based on the above assertion. 
As previously mentioned in the above paragraph, this was another probing question 
in relation to Q13. The principal motive behind this question was to gauge the 
understanding the respondents have in relation to Q11, Q12 and Q13, thereby 
evaluating their responses in Q13 with the lens of consistency and variance. 
It was also mentioned within Q12 from the questionnaire analysis that there will be no 
detailed analysis in the absence of respondent’s rate from Q13 from the questionnaire.  
Having obtained responses from Q13, a plausible attempt will be made regarding 
detailed analysis within Q11, Q12 and Q13 within the questionnaire. This is expected 
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to reveal the degree of understanding the respondents had regarding the questions 
asked, in conjunction with their corroboration and variances if any. 
Within Q13, the number of respondents that strongly agree/agree on aggregate was 
243 and this represent 44.67% of the legitimate population. On the other hand, those 
who strongly disagree/ disagree were 300 and those that stayed neutral was 1 and 
these represent 57% and 0.2% respectively of the legitimate sampled population as 
evidenced in table 6.12 below. 
From the above statistical information, a variance of 57 was found between those who 
strongly agree/agree and those who strongly disagree/disagree.  This represents 
approximately 10.48% of the legitimate population. In the same vein, a variance of 242 
was found between those who strongly agree/agree and those who stayed neutral. 
This represents 44.49% of the legitimate sample. 
The population of non-qualified Accountants in the UK that strongly agree/agree was 
3 and this represents 1.23% in relation to strongly agree/agree option. In the same 
vein, the population of the qualified Accountants in the UK that strongly agree/agree 
to this assertion was 240 and this represents 44.12% in relation to the total population 
that opted for strongly agree/agree within this question. 
A similar dichotomy was found within each category response in relation to their mean 
and standard deviation as evidenced in table 6.6 above. Thus, while a mean of 4.52 
and standard deviation of 0.52 was calculated with Q13 for qualified Accountants in 
the UK as evidenced in table above, mean of 1.32 and standard deviation of 0.53 was 
calculated respectively for non-qualified Accountant in the UK in the same table. A 
further comparison in relation to Mann Whitney U test as evidenced in table 6.6 
revealed that there is significant difference in terms of opinion between the qualified 
and non-qualified Accountants in the UK. Thus, Mann Whitney U test at 0.00 suggests 
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that both Qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK disagree with each other 
within Q13.  
In addition to those negative correlations as analysed above, the views of an 
interviewee called Beautiful during semi-structure interview in the UK also disagree 
with the findings from Q11, Q12 and Q13 from the questionnaire. According to 
Beautiful who is currently an audit manager in the UK, 
(…the fact that auditors’ liability capping has lasted more than a 
decade in the UK suggests the unfair treatment of statutory 
auditors in the UK. Thus, listed companies’ chairman, audit 
committee and the executive officers should be jointly held 
accountable for any misstatements in the financial statements…) 
 
By way of cross referencing through methodological triangulation, this specific finding 
fairly suggests that the respondents understand the question very well. Thus, a 
negative correlation was found between finding from Q11, Q12 and Q13 within the 
survey. 
Recall that a similar non-corroborative evidence was found from the semi-structure 
interview that was conducted in the UK regarding the same question that cantered on 
unfairness from UK auditors’ perspective. This was categorically voiced by an 
interviewee named Doubtful as previously quoted directly and analysed within this 
section. 
Based on the finding from semi-structure interview that was conducted in the UK in 
conjunction with the findings from questionnaire regarding  Q11, Q12, and Q13, within 
the questionnaire, it has pragmatically become difficult for the researcher to make 
unbiased remark. Thus, the qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK 
disagree with each other within Q11, Q12 and Q13, thereby revealing the high degree 
of dichotomy that is associated to the research topic. 
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Table 6.13: Respondents’ frequency on question number thirteen 
Q13 
Categories Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Qualified Accountants Valid Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
Agree 113 46.9 46.9 47.3 
Strongly Agree 127 52.7 52.7 100.0 





214 70.6 70.6 70.6 
Disagree 85 28.1 28.1 98.7 
Neutral 1 .3 .3 99.0 
Agree 3 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.6 WHETHER THE UK AUDIT MARKET IS CURRENTLY UNCOMPETITIVE 
The empirical finding from this section as depicted in table 6.13below, being is a 
derivative of question number fourteen from the questionnaire that was administered. 
For example, respondents were asked “to what extent do you agree with the opinion 
that the UK audit market is currently uncompetitive”? In response to this specific 
question as evidenced in table 6.13 below, the number of respondent that strongly 
agree/agree was 541. This represents 99.5% of the legitimate population that was 
sampled. In the same vein, the total number of respondents that strongly 
disagree/disagree was 2. This represents 0.4% of the legitimate population that was 
sampled. Consequently, 539 was found to be a spread between those who strongly 
agree/ agree and those who strongly disagree/disagree. This represent 99.1% 
The number of non-qualified Accountants in the UK that opted for strongly agree/agree 
within this question was 303 and this represent 56% in relation the entire population 
that strongly agree/agree. On the other hand, the population of the qualified 
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Accountants in the UK that opted for strongly agree/agree within the same question 
was 238 and this represents 44% of the entire population that strongly agree/agree. 
As evidenced in table 6.3 above, the mean and standard deviation of non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK was 4.66 and 0.47 respectively that of qualified Accountants in 
the UK was 4.66 and 0.53 respectively. In the same vein, Mann Whitney U test was 
calculated to be 0.66 as evidenced in table 6.6 above. By interpretation, this means 
that there is no significant difference in the numbers of Qualified Accountants and Non-
qualified Accountants in their responses to Q14. 
Recall that one of the study questions centred on gaining an understanding in relation 
to auditors’ behaviour if their professional liability is capped; whether auditors’ liability 
capping can help to demonopolize the UK current audit market that is dominated by 
the big four audit firms. This further justified the necessity or significance of this 
question as it featured in semi-structured interview that was conducted in the UK at 
the same time in the questionnaire that was administered in the UK. 
According to findings from the semi-structured interview in the UK in relation to this 
specific question, 100% of the interviewee agreed that the UK audit market is currently 
dominated by the big four accounting firms in the UK. Among the interviewee that 
voiced this view are: Necessity, Eloquent, and Honesty and their views have been 
quoted directly in the preceding chapter. 
Furthermore, a similar corroborative trend was found in some literature in line with this 
same question. For example, according to Directorate General for Internal Market and 
Services (2007), the big four control 90% of the audit market within the EU. (Karim, 
and Hasan, 2012) corroborated the above assertion in their report by saying that “the 
so-called Big Four firms dominate the audit market. (Carstensen, 2013; Agnew, 2014) 
lamented that there is competition issue in the audit market. Consequently, as from 
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2016, shareholders in the UK will be compelled to change their audit firms after 10 
years of service. 
One of the major issues at stake according to Bush, et al., (2007) is that if auditors’ 
liability is officially capped, it is possible that the big four could raise the cap ceiling 
themselves because of their financial muscles to flex. If this happens, the audit market 
in the UK particularly could further become monopolise by the big four, thereby 
discouraging competition in the market (Carstensen, 2013; Agnew, 2014).  
By interpretation, both empirical and literature findings suggest that the above claim is 
true as they corroborate each other. Thus, that the UK audit market is currently 
uncompetitive. Therefore, the recommendation within the context of this specific 
question is that the UK government should urgently address this issue in order to 
possibly stimulate a healthy competition in the UK audit market 
Table 6.14: Respondents’ frequency on question number fourteen  
Q14 







AGREE 102 33.7 33.7 33.7 
Strongly AGREE 201 66.3 66.3 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT Valid 
Disagree 2 .8 .8 .8 
Neutral 1 .4 .4 1.2 
AGREE 73 30.3 30.3 31.5 
Strongly AGREE 165 68.5 68.5 100.0 
Total 241 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.7  AUDITORS’ LIABILITY CAPPING AND COMPETITION IN THE UK AUDIT MARKET 
Empirical findings and some literature review in relation to question number fourteen 
from the questionnaire revealed that the UK audit market is currently uncompetitive. 
Therefore, the next question which is question number fifteen intends to find out 
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whether capping strategy can help to stimulate a healthy competition within the UK 
audit market. Based on this understanding respondent were asked the following 
question as evidenced in questionnaire sample number fifteen. Thus, “to what extent 
do you agree that auditors’ liability capping can stimulate competition in the audit 
market in the UK.” In response to this question as evidenced in table 16.14 below, 538 
respondents strongly agree/agree. This represents 99.4% within the context of the 
legitimate population. In the same vein, the number of respondent that strongly 
disagree/disagree was 1 while those that stayed neutral were 2. The responses from 
those who strongly disagree/disagree constitute 0.2% of the legitimate sample, while 
the percentage of those that stayed neutral were 0.4%. When the responses from 
those who agree were compared with those who disagree, a spread of 537 was found 
and this represents 98.7% of the population sampled. 
Within this same question, the number of non-qualified Accountants in the UK that 
opted for strongly agree/agree was 302 and this represents 56% of the population that 
opted for strongly agree/agree within the same question. On the other, 236 qualified 
Accountants in the UK opted for strongly agree/agree within the same question and 
this represents 44% in relation to the total number of strongly agree/agree within the 
same Q15. 
As evidenced in table 6.6 above, the mean and standard deviation of non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK in relation to responses from Q15 was 4.68 and 0.47 
respectively. On the other hand, the mean and standard deviation of qualified 
Accountants in the UK in terms of their responses to Q15 as evidenced in table 6.3 
was 4.66 and 0.53 respectively. When the opinions of qualified and non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK were compared as evidenced in table 6.4 above within Mann 
Whitney column, Mann Whitney U test was calculated to be 0.24. By interpretation, 
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this calculation simply means that there is no significant difference in the numbers of 
Qualified Accountants and non-qualified Accountants in terms of their responses on 
Q15. This also means that most of the qualified and non-qualified Accountants opted 
for strongly agree/agree in Q15. In summary, this finding within Q15 suggests that 
both the qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK agreed that capping can 
stimulate a healthy competition in the UK audit market that is currently dominated by 
the big four. 
Recall that 100% of the interviewee agreed that the UK audit market is currently 
uncompetitive. However, when the same interviewees were asked whether capping 
strategy can stimulate competition in the UK audit market, it was only 90% of the 
interviewee that agreed to this question.  
A similar compelling evidence were found in the literature within the same question. 
For example, according to London Economics (2006), the UK audit market is 
concentrated in the hands of the big four. Namely, (PwC, KPMG, Deloitte, and Ernst 
& Young). The major fact that influenced concentration according to Philipsen, (2014), 
was due to unwillingness of the medium tie audit firm to accept high profile client, 
resulting from fear of unlimited liabilities. In the same vein, (EC, 2008; EC, 2010; 
Davies, 2015) argued that auditors’ liability issue needs to be addressed to possibly 
achieve progress on both the development of the role of the audit and the 
encouragement of greater competition in the audit market. Thus, they stressed on the 
significance of reducing auditors’ liability to possibly stimulate competition in the 
market. According to Belcher, (2006) and Walter et al., (2008), the expected 
competition in the audit market will only become an illusion if auditors’ liability is not 
capped. 
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If the above findings are presumably correct from methodological triangulation 
perspective, by interpretation, capping strategy can stimulate a health competition in 
the UK audit market. 
Table 6.15: Respondents’ frequency on question number fifteen 
Q15 







AGREE 98 32.3 32.5 32.5 
Strongly AGREE 204 67.3 67.5 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
Neutral 2 .8 .8 1.3 
AGREE 96 39.8 40.2 41.4 
Strongly AGREE 140 58.1 58.6 100.0 
Total 239 99.2 100.0  
Missing System 2 .8   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.8  AUDITTORS’ LIABILITY DISCOURAGING YOUNG TALENTS 
The statistical information as depict in table 6.15 below was derived from question 
number sixteen within the questionnaire which asked respondents “to what extent do 
you agree that young talent could be discouraged form venturing into the audit 
profession due to large legal claims that could put personal assets at risk?” 
This is a stone alone question as it does not connect with other questions directly. 
However, this question indirectly linked one of the research questions which tends to 
understand whether the audit profession in the UK will survive and grow should the 
UK auditors continue to pay large legal claims. 
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In response to this specific question as evidenced in table 6.15 below, on aggregate, 
the total number that strongly agree/agree were 514. This represents 94.49% of the 
legitimate sample. However, the total number of respondents that strongly 
disagree/disagree was 28 and this represents 5.15% of the legitimate sample. 
Therefore, the spread that was found between those respondents that strongly 
agree/agree and those that strongly disagree/disagree was 486.   This significantly 
represents approximately 89.34% of the legitimate sampled population. Within this 
same question, the number of qualified Accountants in the UK that opted for strongly 
agree/agree was 239 and this represents 43.93% of the legitimate population. On the 
other hand, the number of non-qualified Accountants that opted for strongly 
agree/agree within Q16 was 275 and this represents 55.07% of the legitimate 
population. A further analysis in the form of mean and standard deviation of each 
category revealed that while the mean and standard deviation of non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK was 4.52 and 0.89 respectively as evidenced in table 6.6 above 
within Q16 column, the mean and standard deviation of the qualified Accountants in 
the UK within the same Q16 was 4.73 and 0.48 respectively. In order to possibly gain 
a fuller understanding about the above statistical information, a comparison of opinion 
between the qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK was done within Q16 
as evidenced in table 6.6 above. Thus, Mann Whitney U test was calculated to be 
0.17. This calculated result simply suggests that there is no significant difference in 
the numbers of Qualified Accountants and Non-qualified Accountants in their 
responses on Q16.   
The limited interpretation or conclusion that can be reached within the context of this 
question based on the available evidence from the survey is that young talents in the 
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UK could be discouraged from venturing into audit profession in the UK resulting from 
legal liabilities that could put their personal assets at risk. 
Table 6.16: Respondents’ frequency on question number sixteen 
Q16 







Disagree 27 8.9 8.9 8.9 
Neutral 1 .3 .3 9.2 
AGREE 61 20.1 20.1 29.4 
Strongly AGREE 214 70.6 70.6 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT Valid 
Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
Neutral 1 .4 .4 .8 
AGREE 61 25.3 25.3 26.1 
Strongly AGREE 178 73.9 73.9 100.0 
Total 241 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.9 LIABIILITY CAPPING CAN DEMONOPOLIZE THE UK CURRENT AUDIT MARKET 
The statistical information as depict in table 6.16 below is a probing question, 
connecting question number fourteen and fifteen from the survey. For example, the 
empirical and literature findings within the context of question fourteen from the survey 
revealed that the current UK audit market is uncompetitive. In the same vein, both 
empirical and literature findings in relation to question number fifteen revealed that 
capping can stimulate competition into the current UK audit market that is dominated 
by the big four. Therefore, question number seventeen from the survey is another 
probing question within the context of UK audit market. The essence was to gauge the 
respondents understanding in relation to the questions that they have been asked in 
order to possibly gain an understanding regarding the degree of consistency or 
variance. For example, respondents were asked “to what extent do you agree that 
external auditors’ liability capping can help to demonopolize the current audit market 
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in the UK? As you can observe from this question, the word demonopolize was used 
as against stimulation within question number fifteen in the survey. In response to this 
specific probing question, the number of respondents that strongly agree/agree 
culminated into 540. This represents 99.2% of the legitimate population that was 
sampled. On the other hand, the total number of respondents that strongly 
disagree/disagree was 1. This represents 0.2% of the legitimate sample. Based on 
simple comparison between the respondents that strongly agree/agree and those that 
strongly disagree/disagree, a spread of 539 was found. This further represents 99.1% 
of the legitimate sample. 
Within the same Q17, 239 qualified Accountants in the UK strongly agree/agree to this 
question and this represent 44.26% in relation to the total respondents that strongly 
agree/agree to Q17. A similar trend was found with non-qualified Accountants in the 
UK within Q17. Thus, 301 of them strongly agree/agree and this represents 55.74% 
in relation to the 540 respondents that strongly agree/agree to this question. 
As evidenced in table 6.3 above, while the calculated mean and standard deviation of 
non-qualified Accountants in the UK was 4.63 and 0.49 respectively within Q17, the 
mean and standard deviation of qualified Accountants in the UK was 4.65 and 0.49 
respectively. In order to possibly arrive at a plausible conclusion within this question, 
Mann Whitney U test was calculated as evidenced in table 6.6 above. Thus, within 
Q17, Mann Whitney U test was calculated to be 0.55. What does this mean?  This 
simply suggests that there is no significant difference in the numbers of Qualified 
Accountants and Non-qualified Accountants in their responses on Q17. This also 
means that Qualified and Non-qualified Accountants opted for strongly agree /agree 
on Q17.  
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From the above descriptive statistics, it can be observed or interpreted that the 
respondents are knowledgeable because there is consistency in their responses 
within question number fourteen, fifteen and seventeen from the survey. 
The final interpretation that can be reached within this question in conjunction with 
empirical and literature findings that corroborate this specific finding from question 
number seventeen within the survey is that auditors’ liability capping can help to 
demonopolize the UK current audit market that is dominated by the big four. 
Table 6.17: Respondents’ frequency on question number seventeen 
Q17 







Neutral 1 .3 .3 .3 
AGREE 110 36.3 36.4 36.8 
Strongly AGREE 191 63.0 63.2 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT Valid 
Neutral 2 .8 .8 .8 
AGREE 80 33.2 33.2 34.0 
Strongly AGREE 159 66.0 66.0 100.0 
Total 241 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.10  CAPPING EFFECT ON YOUNG TALENTS’ INTEREST IN AUDIT PROFESSION  
The statistical information as depict in table 17 below was derived from question 
number eighteen within the questionnaire which asked respondents “To what extent 
do you agree that a capping strategy can stimulate young talents’ interest into audit 
profession in the UK?” 
Recall that question number sixteen from the survey was a stand-alone question as it 
does not connect to other questions directly. However, it was mentioned that the 
question itself indirectly linked one of the research questions which tends to 
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understand whether the audit profession in the UK will survive and grow should the 
UK auditors continue to pay large legal claims. This is the basis of question number 
eighteen being a probing question. Thus, within the embers of question number 
sixteen from the survey, the finding was that large legal claims against auditors in the 
UK can discourage young talents from venturing into audit profession in the UK. 
Therefore, the essence of question number eighteen is to gain an understanding 
regarding consistency or variance which could in turn reveal the understanding of the 
respondents in relation to the questions they were asked. 
In response to this specific question as evidenced in table 6.17 below, on aggregate, 
the total number that strongly agree/agree were 533. This represents 97.98% of the 
legitimate sample. However, the total number of respondents that strongly 
disagree/disagree were 2 and this represents 0.37% of the legitimate sample. 
Therefore, the spread that was found between those respondents that strongly 
agree/agree and those that strongly disagree/disagree was 531.   This significantly 
represents approximately 97.61% of the legitimate sampled population. 
Within the same Q18, while the mean and standard deviation of qualified Accountants 
in the UK was calculated to be 4.36 and 0.51 respectively, that of non-qualified 
Accountants was 4.40 and 0.55 as evidenced in table 6.6 above. A similar statistical 
result was calculated within the same Q18 as evidenced in table 6.6 above. Thus, 
within Mann Whitney column but with reference to Q18, Mann Whitney U test was 
calculated to be 0.27. This statistical fairly suggests that there is no significant 
difference in the numbers of qualified Accountants and non-qualified Accountants in 
their responses on Q18. This means that qualified and non-qualified Accountants 
opted for strongly agree/agree on Q18.  
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The interpretation or conclusion that can be reached within the context of this question 
based on the available evidence from the survey is that capping strategy can stimulate 
young talents into audit profession in the UK as they will be relieved off the risk that is 
associated to the loss of personal assets resulting from professional liability. 
Table 6.18: Respondents’ frequency on question number eighteen 
Q18 







Disagree 2 .7 .7 .7 
Neutral 3 1.0 1.0 1.7 
AGREE 169 55.8 55.8 57.4 
Strongly AGREE 129 42.6 42.6 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Neutral 4 1.7 1.7 1.7 
AGREE 145 60.2 60.7 62.3 
Strongly AGREE 90 37.3 37.7 100.0 
Total 239 99.2 100.0  
Missing System 2 .8   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.13 THE UK AUDIT MARKET AND CAPPING STRATEGY 
The descriptive statistical information as depict in table 6.18 below was derived from 
question number nineteen within the questionnaire which asked respondents “to what 
extent do you agree with the opinion that the audit market in the UK will remain 
uncompetitive despite capping?” 
Recall that finding from question number fourteen from the survey revealed that the 
UK audit market is currently uncompetitive. In the same vein, the finding from question 
number fifteen from the same survey revealed that capping strategy can stimulate a 
healthy competition into the UK current audit market that is not competitive. Within 
question number seventeen in the survey, I found out that capping can demonopolize 
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the current UK audit market that is currently dominated by the big four. Therefore, 
question number nineteen from the survey is another imperative probing question 
within the context of the UK audit market. One of the aims of this probing question was 
to find out whether respondents will maintain the degree of consistency or variance as 
I have found out in question fourteen, fifteen and seventeen as analysed above. 
In response to this very question as evidenced in table 6.18 below, on aggregate, the 
total number that strongly disagree/disagree that the UK audit market will remain 
uncompetitive despite capping were 463. This represents 85.11% of the legitimate 
sample. However, the total number of respondents that strongly agree/agree was 81 
and this represents 14.89% of the legitimate sample. Therefore, the spread that was 
found between those respondents that strongly agree/agree and those that strongly 
disagree/disagree was 382.   This significantly represents approximately 70.22% of 
the legitimate sampled population. 
As evidenced in table 6.18 below, 256 respondents among the non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK strongly disagree/disagree and this represent 55.29% in 
relation to the total of respondents that strongly disagree/disagree. In the same vein, 
207 respondents among the qualified Accountants in the UK strongly 
disagree/disagree and this represents 44.71% in relation to the total respondents that 
strongly disagree/disagree. Within table 6.3 above, mean and standard deviation of 
qualified Accountants in the UK within Q19 column was calculated to be 2.06 and 1.05 
respectively while that of non-qualified Accountants were 1.97 and 1.23 respectively. 
A comparison of these statistical information as evidenced in table 6.4 above revealed 
Mann Whitney U test value to be 0.17 within Q19 row. What does these descriptive 
statistics reveal? Firstly, it revealed that respondents maintained a high degree of 
consistency as evidenced in their responses between Q14 – Q19 from the survey that 
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was conducted in the UK. This level of consistency from respondents also suggest 
that their responses were not just a mere academic guess, rather it was knowledge-
based answers. Secondly, the calculated Mann Whitney also reveal there is no significant 
difference in the numbers of qualified Accountants and non-qualified Accountants in 
their responses to Q19. This means that qualified and non-qualified Accountants opted 
for strongly disagree/disagree on Q19.  
The interpretation that can be reached from the above analysis within the context of 
this question based on the available evidence from the survey is that capping strategy 
if implemented in the UK will positively stimulate competition in the UK audit market. 
Table 6.19: Respondents’ frequency on question number nineteen 
Q19 







Strongly Disagree 128 42.2 42.4 42.4 
Disagree 128 42.2 42.4 84.8 
Neutral 5 1.7 1.7 86.4 
AGREE 9 3.0 3.0 89.4 
Strongly AGREE 32 10.6 10.6 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Strongly Disagree 62 25.7 25.9 25.9 
Disagree 145 60.2 60.7 86.6 
Neutral 5 2.1 2.1 88.7 
AGREE 9 3.7 3.8 92.5 
Strongly AGREE 18 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 239 99.2 100.0  
Missing System 2 .8   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
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6.2.14 NUMBER OF REGISTERED AUDITORS IN THE UK WITHOUT CAPPING 
The descriptive statistical information as depict in table 6.19 below was derived from 
question number twenty within the questionnaire which asked respondents “to what 
extent do you agree that the number of registered auditors in the UK will continue to 
decrease if auditors’ liability capping is not resolved?” 
Recall that finding from question number sixteen from the survey revealed that 
auditors’ liability can discourage young talent from venturing into audit profession in 
the UK. By implication, the number of register auditors in the UK will continue to decline 
if liability problem is not resolved.  In the same vein, the finding from table 4 as 
evidenced in the preceding chapter revealed that the number of registered audit firms 
in the UK is decreasing on annual basis. A similar trend was found in table 5 within 
the preceding chapter. Thus, the number of individuals that hold audit qualification is 
decreasing on annual basis. Recall that the number of registered auditors in the UK is 
a function of the number of individuals that hold audit qualifications. By inference, if 
the number of individuals that hold audit qualification in the UK are decreasing on 
annual basis, it could be interpreted that the number of registered auditors in the UK 
will continue to decrease soon. However, in the interim, these findings are regarded 
to be a hypothetical one before the analysis from the survey within the same question. 
In response to this very question as evidenced in table 6.19 below, on aggregate, the 
total number that strongly agree/agree that the number of registered auditors in the 
UK will continue to decrease if liability problem is not resolve was 537. This represents 
98.71% of the legitimate sample. However, the total number of respondents that 
strongly disagree/disagree was 0. On the other hand, the total number that stayed 
neutral to this question was 2. The number of respondents that stayed neutral are 
ignored because their neutral position wouldn’t aid the analysis.   
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Within the same Q20, 302 non-qualified Accountants strongly agree/agree, and this 
represents 56.24% in relation to the 537 respondents that strongly agree/agree to this 
question. In the same vein, 235 qualified Accountants in the UK strongly agree/agree 
to Q20, and this represents 43.76%. A similar statistical calculation as evidenced in 
table 6.3 above reveal that the calculated mean and standard deviation of qualified 
Accountants in the UK was 4.59 and 0.50 respectively, while that of non-qualified was 
4.65 and 0.49 respectively. In the same vein, Mann Whitney U test calculated at 0.18 
as evidenced in table 6.6 above suggest that there was no variance between the 
respondents that strongly agree/agree and those that strongly disagree/disagree. The 
interpretation that can be reached from the above analysis within the context of this 
question is that the number of registered auditors in the UK will continue to decline if 
their professional liability issues is not resolved. 
Table 6.20: Respondents’ frequency on question number twenty 
Q20 







Neutral 1 .3 .3 .3 
AGREE 105 34.7 34.7 35.0 
Strongly AGREE 197 65.0 65.0 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Neutral 1 .4 .4 .4 
AGREE 95 39.4 40.3 40.7 
Strongly AGREE 140 58.1 59.3 100.0 
Total 236 97.9 100.0  
Missing System 5 2.1   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.15  NUMBER OF REGISTERED AUDITORS IN THE UK AND LARGE LEGAL LIABILITY 
The available evidence within Q20 from the survey revealed that the number of 
registered auditors in the UK will continue to decline if auditor’s liability issues is not 
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resolved. Therefore, Q21 from the survey becomes a derivative based on the following 
question that the respondents were asked. Thus, “to what extent do you agree that 
the decrease in the number of registered auditors in the UK is due to large legal claims 
against auditors?” The essence of this question was to enable readers to gain a better 
understanding regarding the functional relationship that could exist between the 
number of registered auditors in the UK and large legal claims against auditors in the 
UK. 
In response to this specific question as evidenced in table 6.20 below, on aggregate, 
the total number that strongly agree/agree were 536. This represents 98.71% of the 
legitimate sample. However, the total number of respondents that strongly 
disagree/disagree were 2 and this represents 0.37% of the legitimate sample. 
Therefore, the spread that was found between those respondents that strongly 
agree/agree and those that strongly disagree/disagree was 534.   This significantly 
represents approximately 98.34% of the legitimate sampled population. 
Within table 6.6 above, while the mean and standard deviation of qualified 
Accountants were calculated to be 4.73 and 0.49 respectively, that of non-qualified 
Accountants were calculated to be 4.68 and 0.45 respectively. When these descriptive 
statistical results were compared in table 6.6 above within Q21, Mann Whitney U test 
was calculated to be 0.12. This suggest that there is no significant difference in the 
numbers of qualified Accountants and non-qualified Accountants in their responses to 
Q21. This means that almost all the qualified and non-qualified Accountants opted for 
strongly agree/agree on Q21.  
From the above descriptive statistical information, it can be deduced that the finding 
from Q20 from the survey is corroborating indirectly the finding from Q21 from the 
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same survey. Thus, that the consistent decrease in the number of auditors in the UK 
on annual basis is contingent upon auditors in the UK professional large legal liability 
The limited interpretation or conclusion that can be reached within the context of this 
question based on the available evidence from the survey is that the decrease in the 
number of registered statutory auditors in the UK on annual basis has bearing with 
large legal claims against auditors in the UK.  
Table 6.21: Respondents’ frequency on question number twenty-one 
Q21 







Neutral 1 .3 .3 .3 
AGREE 95 31.4 31.5 31.8 
Strongly AGREE 206 68.0 68.2 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Disagree 2 .8 .8 .8 
AGREE 59 24.5 24.6 25.4 
Strongly AGREE 179 74.3 74.6 100.0 
Total 240 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.16  REGISTERED AUDITORS IN THE UK COULD  DECLINE FURTHER  
Within the context of Q20 in the survey, I found out that the number of registered 
statutory auditors are decreasing on annual basis. Q21 from the same survey find out 
that the decrease number of registered external auditors in the UK has bearing with 
large legal liability claims against them. Therefore, Q22 from the same survey is 
deriving its value or position based on the following assertion or statement. Thus, “the 
number of registered external auditors in the UK could further decline in the future if 
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their professional liability problem is not solved. To what extent do you agree with the 
above statement?” The essence of this question is to gain an understanding and 
compare the finding from question number twenty to the finding from Q22 from the 
same survey. This is expected to reveal how knowledgeable the respondents were 
and the degree of corroboration and variance that could be find within these two similar 
questions. 
As evidenced in table 6.21 below regarding responses to the above-mentioned 
assertion, 538 respondents strongly agree/agree to this statement. This represents 
99.26% of the legitimate population.  On the other hand, the number of respondents 
that strongly disagree/disagree to the same statement was 1. This represents 0.2% of 
the population sampled. Based on these responses, a variance of 537 was found 
between those respondents that strongly agree/agree and those that strongly 
disagree/disagree, and this represents approximate 99.2% of the legitimate sample.  
Within table 6.6 above, mean and standard deviation of qualified Accountants in the 
UK in relation to their responses from Q22 were 4.72 and 0.52 respectively, while that 
of non-qualified Accountants were 4.73 and 0.45 respectively. A comparison of these 
statistical results as evidenced in table 6.6 above within the same question, Mann 
Whitney U was calculated to be 0.86. This means that there is no significant difference 
in the numbers of Qualified Accountants and Non-qualified Accountants in their 
responses on Q22. Thus, that most of the Qualified and Non-qualified Accountants 
opted for strongly agree/agree on Q22.  
A simple comparison of the respondents’ rate within question number twenty and 
twenty-two in the survey suggest that the respondents understand the question 
despite the difference is phrases within each question. Another finding is that the 
respondents’ rate within number twenty-one and twenty-two from the survey 
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corroborate each other. By interpretation within the context and findings from Q21 and 
Q22 from the survey, it can be reasonably concluded that the number of registered 
statutory auditors in the UK will continue to decline in the future if their liability issue is 
not resolved. 
Table 6.22: Respondents’ frequency on question number twenty-two 
Q22 







Neutral 1 .3 .3 .3 
AGREE 81 26.7 26.8 27.2 
Strongly AGREE 220 72.6 72.8 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
Neutral 2 .8 .8 1.3 
AGREE 60 24.9 25.0 26.3 
Strongly AGREE 177 73.4 73.8 100.0 
Total 240 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.17 RISK OF OLIGOPOLY BE PROMOTED IN THE UK AUDIT MARKET  
Within the ambit of question number twenty from the survey that was conducted in the 
UK, I found out that the number of registered statutory auditors in the UK will continue 
to decrease in the future if their professional liability problem is not resolved. Q21 from 
the same survey was constructed in order to possibly understand whether the 
decrease in the number of registered auditors in the UK has a bearing with their 
professional liability issue. I find out within this specific question that the decrease in 
the number of registered auditors in the UK has a positive correlation with auditors’ 
liability issues in the UK. A similar finding was made within Q22 from the same survey. 
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Thus, that the number of registered statutory auditors in the UK could further decline 
in the future if their liability issue is not resolved. 
The findings from Q21 – Q22 revealed that the respondents understand the questions 
they were asked. Thus, the responses from those questions positively corroborate 
each other.  Therefore, the emergence of Q23 from the same survey is a derivative, 
attempting to further probe respondents understanding and consistency as mentioned 
above by asking “to what extent do you agree that oligopoly could be promoted in the 
UK market if the number of registered external auditors continue to decline”? 
In response to the above question, 541 respondents strongly agree/agree to this 
question as revealed in table 6.22 below. This represents 99.8% of the legitimate 
population that was sampled. On the other hand, the number of respondent that 
strongly disagree/disagree with the above statement was only 1 and this represents 
0.2% of the population that was sampled. This resulted to a variance of 540 in relation 
to the legitimate sample. The calculated variance as mentioned above represents 
approximately 99.6% of the legitimate sample. While 239 qualified Accountants in the 
UK strongly agree/agree to this question, 302 non-qualified Accountants strongly 
agree/agree to this question. Within the same question, the mean and standard 
deviation of the qualified Accountants were calculated to be 4.56 and 0.52 while that 
of non-qualified Accountants were calculated to be 4.64 and 0.48 respectively as 
evidenced in table 6.6 above. When this statistical information was compared in table 
6.4 above within the same question, Mann Whitney U test was calculated to be 0.07. 
This simply implies that there is no significant difference in the numbers of Qualified 
Accountants and Non-qualified Accountants in their responses on Q23. This also 
means that almost all the Qualified and Non-qualified Accountants opted for strongly 
agree/agree on Q23.  
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The findings from question number twenty – twenty-three revealed a positive 
correlation as they corroborate each other and maintain a high degree of responses 
as evidenced within the study.   
Within the boundary of these findings within this study, it could be interpreted that 
oligopoly could be promoted in the UK audit market should the number of registered 
auditors continue to decline.  
Table 6.23: Respondents’ frequency on question number twenty-three 
Q23 







AGREE 108 35.6 35.8 35.8 
Strongly AGREE 194 64.0 64.2 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
AGREE 103 42.7 42.9 43.3 
Strongly AGREE 136 56.4 56.7 100.0 
Total 240 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.18 FUTURE DEMAND AND SUPPLY  FOR EXTERNAL AUDITORS IN THE UK 
As evidenced in question number Q23 from the survey that was conducted in the UK, 
I found out that oligopoly could be promoted in the UK audit market if liability issue is 
not resolved. If this become the case in the UK audit market, the number of available 
auditors in the UK could potentially have adverse impact on the entire market and the 
integrity of financial statements in the future. Within this mind set, Q24 was constructed 
in order to possibly determine whether a degree of consistency will be maintained by 
the respondents hence Q24 was constructed as follows: “to what extent do you agree 
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that demand for external auditors in the UK could become higher than their supply in 
the future if the liability issue is not resolved”? 
In response to the above question as evidenced in table 23 below, 539 respondents 
strongly agree/agree to this question. This represents approximately 99.3% of the 
legitimate population that was sampled. On the other hand, the number of respondents 
that strongly disagree/disagree with the above statement were zero and there was no 
variance found between the respondents that strongly agree/agree and those that 
strongly disagree/disagree. 
However, the number of respondents that stayed neutral to this specific question were 
as previously mentioned within this chapter, the researcher deemed it inexpedient to 
analyse respondents’ rates that stayed neutral since their neutral position cannot aid 
the expected analysis within the study.  
Within the same question, 237 qualified Accountants strongly agree/agree, while 302 
non-qualified Accountants strongly agree/agree to the same question. A further 
analysis in the form of mean and standard deviation as evidenced in table 6.6 above 
revealed that while the mean and standard deviation of qualified Accountants were 
4.74 and 0.47, that of non-qualified Accountants were 4.75 and 0.44 respectively. 
Comparison of these descriptive statistics resulted to Mann Whitney calculation of 0.84 
as evidenced in table 6.6 above within the same question. This calculation fairly 
suggests that there is no significant difference in the numbers of Qualified and Non-
qualified Accountants in their responses on Q24. Thus, that Qualified and Non-
qualified Accountants in the UK opted for strongly agree/agree on Q24.  
From the above descriptive analysis within Q23 and Q24 in the survey, it can be 
construed that the respondents maintained a high degree of consistency as the 
findings from both questions corroborate each other. If this wasn’t the case, it would 
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have become apparent that the respondents do not understand the questions they 
were asked. Alternatively, it could have been interpreted that the respondents were 
not knowledgeable within the premise of the questions that they were asked. 
The conclusion that have been reached within the finding from this specific question 
in conjunction within the finding from the preceding question is that the demand for 
statutory auditors in the UK could become higher in the future compared to their supply 
if their liability issue is not resolved. 
Table 6.24: Respondents’ frequency on question number twenty-four 
Q24 







Neutral 1 .3 .3 .3 
AGREE 73 24.1 24.1 24.4 
Strongly AGREE 229 75.6 75.6 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Neutral 3 1.2 1.3 1.3 
AGREE 57 23.7 23.8 25.0 
Strongly AGREE 180 74.7 75.0 100.0 
Total 240 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.19 COMPANIES’ FINANCIAL STATEMENT INTEGRITY BE AT RISK IN THE UK  
Some of the findings within this chapter revealed that the number of registered 
statutory auditors in the UK are declining on annual basis and that this will continue in 
the foreseeable future if their liability issue is not resolved. Therefore, the primary 
objective of this question is to find out whether the declining rate of auditors in the UK 
could possibly impact on listed companies’ financial statements integrity in the UK by 
asking the following question; “to what extent do you agree that listed companies’ 
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financial statements’ integrity could be at risk if the number of registered auditors in 
the UK continue to decline”? 
Recall that the core research question intends to understand how capping strategy if 
implemented could impact on listed companies’ financial statements integrity in the 
UK. The inverse of this question formed the basis of Q25 within the survey that was 
conducted in the UK. 
Finding from this specific question is expected to corroborate other findings as 
mentioned or refute them. If the finding from this question has a positive correlation 
with other findings within this section, it could be inferred that the respondents 
understand the questions, or they have a good knowledge about the questions they 
were asked thereby enhancing reliability of the study on the basis of consistency. 
However, if reverse becomes the case, thus that the finding from this specific question 
do not corroborate the findings from question number Q24 within the survey, critics 
could raise reliability question. 
As a direct response to the above specific question, the number of respondents that 
strongly agree/agree was 540 and this represents 99.6% of the sampled population. 
However, the total number of respondent that strongly disagree/disagree were 1 and 
this represent 0.2% of the legitimate population. Consequently, a spread of 539 was 
found between those respondents that strongly agree/agree and those that strongly 
disagree/disagree. This represents approximately 99.5% of the legitimate sample. 
While 239 qualified Accountants strongly agree/agree, 301 non-qualified Accountants 
in the UK strongly agree/agree to this question. With table 6.6 above, mean and 
standard deviation of qualified Accountants were calculated to be 4.76 and 0.45. while 
that of non-qualified Accountants were 4.64 and 0.48 respectively. A further analysis 
in the form of comparison between the response of qualified and non-qualified 
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Accountants in the UK resulted to Mann Whitney calculation of 0.19 as evidenced in 
table 6.6 above. By interpretation, this means that there is no significant difference in 
the numbers of qualified and non-qualified Accountants in their responses to Q25. For 
example, both qualified and non-qualified Accountants opted for Strongly Agree and 
Agree on Q25.  
It can be observed from the above descriptive statistics information as derived from 
table 6.6 and 6.19 that the specific finding from this question is having a positive 
correlation with the findings from Q20 – Q24 within the survey. Therefore, the expected 
reliability question from critics have been avoided in the ephemeral. 
The conclusion that can be reached based on the finding from this question in 
conjunction with other findings from the preceding five questions from the survey as 
previously analysed within this study is that the financial statements integrity of listed 
companies’ in the UK could be at risk in the future should the number of registered 
statutory auditors continue to decline in the UK. 
Table 6.25: Respondents’ frequency on question number twenty-five 
Q25 







Neutral 1 .3 .3 .3 
AGREE 84 27.7 27.8 28.1 
Strongly AGREE 217 71.6 71.9 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
AGREE 54 22.4 22.5 22.9 
Strongly AGREE 185 76.8 77.1 100.0 
Total 240 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 241 100.0   
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Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.20 CAPPING INCREASING THE NUMBER OF REGISTERED EXTERNAL AUDITORS 
Within the realm of  Q25 being the preceding Q26 from the survey that was conducted 
in the UK, I found out that listed companies’ financial statements integrity could be at 
risk in the future if the number of registered external auditors in the UK continue to 
decline. The essence of Q26 from the survey was to understand whether the findings 
from these two questions could have a positive or negative correlation. Thus, if a 
positive correlation is found, the issue of reliability with this specific question could 
possibly go into abyss. On the other hand, any incongruity found could potentially 
question the understanding of the respondents in relation to Q25 – Q26 within the 
survey. For example, Q26 from the survey make the following assertion and ask 
respondents to express their opinion on the assertion made. Thus,  “a capping 
strategy can help to increase the number of registered external auditors in the UK and 
enhance financial statements’ integrity. To what extent do you agree with the above 
statement”? 
In response to the above assertion, the number of respondents that strongly 
agree/agree were 540 and this represents 99.63% of the sampled population. In the 
vein, the total number of respondent that strongly disagree/disagree was 1 and this 
represents 0.18% of the legitimate population. Consequently, a spread of 539 was 
found between those respondents that strongly agree/agree and those that strongly 
disagree/disagree. This represents approximately 99.45% of the legitimate sample. 
Furthermore, while 238 qualified Accountants strongly agree/agree to this question, 
302 non-qualified Accountants strongly agree/agree to the same question. A similar 
calculation was made in table 6.6 above. Thus, while the mean and standard deviation 
of qualified Accountants in the UK was calculated to be 4.56 and 0.53, that of non-
 
Page 194 of 253 
 
qualified Accountants was calculated to be 4.64 and 0.48 respectively. What does this 
mean? The answer to this question can be found in table 6.6 above within the same 
question but with reference to Mann Whitney column. Thus, Mann Whitney was 
calculated to be 0.11. By interpretation, this means that there is no significant 
difference in the numbers of qualified and non-qualified Accountants in their responses 
on Q26. This also means that qualified and non-qualified Accountants opted for 
Strongly Agree and Agree on Q26. 
By inference it can be concluded that the respondents understand the questions they 
were asked as a positive correlation was found between question number Q25 and 
Q26 from the survey as evidenced on in table 6.6. Based on this finding, it can also 
be construed that the expected reliability question from critics within this specific 
question has been dismissed without doubt. 
The conclusion that can be reached based on the finding from this question in 
conjunction with the finding from the preceding questions from the survey as 
previously analysed within this study is that the financial statements integrity of listed 
companies’ in the UK could be at risk in the future should the number of registered 
statutory auditors continue to decline in the UK and that a capping strategy could be 
a panacea to the aforementioned problem. 
Table 6.26: Respondents’ frequency on question number twenty-six 
Q26 







AGREE 109 36.0 36.1 36.1 
Strongly AGREE 193 63.7 63.9 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT Valid Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
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Neutral 1 .4 .4 .8 
AGREE 100 41.5 41.7 42.5 
Strongly AGREE 138 57.3 57.5 100.0 
Total 240 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.21 AUDIT PROFESSION IN THE UK NOT GROWING WITHOUT CAPPING  
The descriptive statistical information as depict in table 6.26 below was derived from 
Q27 within the questionnaire which asked respondents “to what extent do you agree 
with the opinion that the audit profession in the UK may not grow if auditors’ liability is 
not capped”? 
Recall that finding from table 4 within the preceding chapter revealed that the number 
of registered auditors in the UK is decreasing on annual basis. A similar finding was 
made in table 6 within the same chapter. Thus, the number that hold audit qualification 
in the UK is decreasing on annual basis. It was also expressed within the chapter that 
the number of available auditors in the UK is contingent upon the number that hold 
audit qualification in the UK. In question number twenty from the survey, I found out 
that listed companies’ financial statements could be at risk in the future should the 
number of registered auditors in the UK continue to decline.  
The finding from Q26 from the survey tends to find a solution to the risk factor as 
highlighted in Q25 from the survey by concluding that a capping strategy can help in 
enhancing listed companies’ financial statements integrity in the UK. 
Based on the findings within the preceding chapter, thus that the number that hold 
audit qualifications and auditors are declining in the UK, one could have reasonably 
concluded that audit profession in the UK may not grow if this become the case in the 
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future. However, this should be accepted to be a hypothetical finding until finding from 
table 6.26 below is fully analysed. 
In response to this very question as evidenced in table 6.26 below, on aggregate, the 
total number that strongly agree/agree that audit profession in the UK may not grow 
without capping strategy were 539. This represents 99.4% of the legitimate sample. 
However, the total number of respondents that strongly disagree/disagree was 1 and 
this represents 0.2% of the legitimate sample. 
Based on comparison between the respondents that agree/disagree with the above 
assertion, a spread of 538 was found and this represents approximately 99.3% of the 
legitimate sample. In the same vein, mean and standard deviation of qualified 
Accountants in the UK with reference to Q27 was 4.69 and0.49 while that of non-
qualified Accountants was 4.73 and0.44 respectively as evidenced in table 6.6 above. 
A further analysis as evidenced in table 6.4 above resulted to Mann Whitney 
calculation of 0.36 with reference to Q27. This has been interpreted to mean that there 
is no significant difference in the numbers of qualified and non-qualified Accountants 
in their responses on Q27. This also means that both qualified and non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK opted for Strongly Agree and Agree on Q27.  
From the descriptive statistical information as evidenced in table 6.6 and 6.26, the 
specific finding within Q27 from the survey corroborate other findings within this 
chapter as previously mentioned. Therefore, the veil of hypothetical finding as 
mentioned above is now lifted considering the fact that the specific finding from 
question number twenty-seven has a positive correlation with other findings within this 
chapter. Therefore, the interpretation that can be reached from the above analysis 
within the context of this question is that audit profession in the UK may not grow 
without a capping strategy. 
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Table 6.27: Respondents’ frequency on question number twenty-seven 
Q27 







Neutral 1 .3 .3 .3 
AGREE 77 25.4 25.5 25.8 
Strongly AGREE 224 73.9 74.2 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
Neutral 1 .4 .4 .8 
AGREE 68 28.2 28.3 29.2 
Strongly AGREE 170 70.5 70.8 100.0 
Total 240 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2018 
6.2.22 AMBIQUITY IN  DEFINITION OF AUDITORS’ DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The descriptive statistical information as evidenced in table 6.27 below was derived 
from Q28 within the questionnaire which asked respondents “to what extent do you 
agree that the definition of auditors’ duties and responsibilities in the UK is subject to 
presiding judges’ legal opinion or erudition”? This is a stand-alone question as it 
doesn’t derive its value from other questions from the survey. 
The starting point within this analysis is from court verdicts of London and General 
Bank (1895) and Cotton Mill (1896) (Pallisserry, 2012; ACCA,2013; Collings, 2014). 
The antecedent that surrounded the first case concerned the adequacy of security on 
bank loans and the degree of professional scepticism maintained by the auditors. 
Thus, the auditors (Mr. Pickering and Mr. Peasegood), recognised bank loans as 
assets as reported in the financial statements of the bank, which were prepared and 
presented by the company’s directors. Upon this understanding, the auditors issued 
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unqualified audit report. The report stated that the financial statements of the bank 
represented a “true and fair view” of the company’s financial status. Consequently, 
dividend was declared and paid. (BPP Learning Media, 2016; Pallisserry, 2012; 
Collings, 2014).    
It later emerged that dividend was paid out of the capital of the company. 
Consequently, the auditors were sued by the shareholders. The presiding Judge in 
the lower court found the auditor guilty of negligence. (Pallisserry, 2012) 
However, in the Appeal Court, Lindley LJ who was the presiding Judge overturned the 
previous court's decision and his opinion on the auditor's duty is as follows: 
the duty of an auditor is to convey information, not to arouse 
inquiry and although an auditor might infer from an unusual 
statement that something was seriously wrong, it by no means 
followed that ordinary people would have their suspicions 
aroused. It is not the auditor's duty to guarantee the books 
showing the true position of the company's affairs or to guarantee 
that the balance-sheet was accurate. 
 
In the case of Kingston Cotton Mill (No 2) [ 1895], the auditors (Messrs Pickering & 
Peasegood) relied on the inventory certificate as presented by the company’s director. 
The auditor relied on the certificate without conducting a physical inventory count. 
Therefore, the auditor issued unqualified audit report. Thus, that the financial 
statements of the company represented a true and fair view of the company’s financial 
position. Based on this, dividend was declared and paid. It later emerged that the 
dividend paid was from the working capital of the company as the reported inventory 
values were inflated by the company’s director for personal aggrandisement motive. 
Consequently, the presiding Judge Vaughan Williams J found the auditor guilty of 
negligence. That the auditor ought to have taken reasonable step in validating the 
accuracy of the inventory report as presented by the company’s director.  
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However, Justice Lopes L.J who was the presiding Judge in the Appeal Court 
overturned the decision in his famous judgement as follows: 
It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to 
perform that skill, care and caution which a reasonably 
competent, careful and cautious auditor would use. What is 
reasonable skill, care and caution must depend on the particular 
circumstances of each case. An auditor is not bound to be a 
detective or as was said to approach his work with suspicion or 
with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is 
a watchdog but not a bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried 
servants of the company in whom confidence is placed by the 
company. (BPP Learning Media, 2016; Pallisserry, 2012; 
ACCA,2013; Collings, 2014).   
   
It is apparent from the above paragraphs that the duties and responsibilities of auditors 
in the UK is subject to the presiding Judge’s legal stance or erudition. However, the 
essence of this question is to find out whether empirical evidence will support the 
above claim from literature in order to possibly provide a plausible recommendation. 
In response to this very question as evidenced in table 6.27 below, on aggregate, the 
total number that strongly agree/agree that the definition of auditors’ duties and 
responsibilities in the UK were subject to the presiding Judge legal stance or erudition 
were 532. This represents 97.79% of the legitimate sample. However, the total number 
of respondents that strongly disagree/disagree were 1 and this represents 0.02% of 
the legitimate sample. 
Based on comparison between the respondents that agree/disagree with the above 
assertion, a spread of 531 was found and this represents approximately 97.61% of the 
legitimate sample. 
Within table 6.6 above, while the mean and standard deviation of qualified 
Accountants in relation to their responses to Q28 were 4.51 and 0.53, and that of non-
qualified Accountants in the UK were 4.57 and 0.67 respectively. A statistical 
comparison in relation to these finding as evidenced in table 6.4 revealed Mann 
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Whitney test value at 0.45. This simply mean that there is no significant difference in 
the numbers of qualified and non-qualified Accountants in their responses on Q28. 
Thus, that most of the qualified and non-qualified Accountants opted for strongly 
agree/ agree on Q28. 
From the descriptive statistical information, the specific finding within question number 
twenty-eight from the survey corroborate other findings from literature as previously 
mentioned. Therefore, the interpretation that can be reached from the above analysis 
within the context of this question are of two folds: firstly, that there is an issue in the 
form of auditors’ duties and responsibilities definition in the UK as incongruous verdicts 
have been found among the presiding Judges. Secondly that the improper definition 
of auditors’ duties and responsibilities in the UK will continue to impact on statutory 
auditors’ liability in the UK.  
Finally, both empirical and literature suggest that the above claim is true as they 
corroborate each other. Thus, that the duties and responsibilities of auditors in the UK 
is subject to presiding Judge legal stance or erudition. 
Table 6.28: Respondents’ frequency on question number twenty-eight 
Q28 







Disagree 10 3.3 3.3 3.3 
AGREE 99 32.7 32.7 36.0 
Strongly AGREE 194 64.0 64.0 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
AGREE 114 47.3 47.5 47.9 
Strongly AGREE 125 51.9 52.1 100.0 
Total 240 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
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6.2.23 AUDITORS’ LIABILITY  AND NEGLIGENCE LEVEL 
Within the ambit of question number Q28 being the preceding Q29 from the survey 
that was conducted in the UK, I found out that the duties and responsibilities of auditors 
in the UK lacked the quality of indisputable definition hence Judges pronounced 
incongruous judgements in their verdicts. It was also mentioned that an auditor is a 
“watchdog but not a bloodhound” According to the learned Judge Lopes, an auditor is 
appointed by the shareholders of a limited liability company. Therefore, he is expected 
to play the key role of a watchdog, thereby representing the best interest of the 
shareholders. Thus, unlike a bloodhound whose duty is that of a detective. 
The essence of this question therefore is to find out whether empirical finding within 
Q29 could corroborate or refute finding from existing literature as mentioned above by 
asking the following question; “to what extent do you agree that auditors’ liability 
should be based on the level of auditors’ negligence and not auditors’ inability to detect 
concealed information” 
In response to the above assertion, the number of respondents that strongly 
agree/agree were 239 and this represents 43.93% of the sampled population. In the 
vein, the total number of respondent that strongly disagree/disagree were 294 and this 
represent 54.04% of the legitimate population. Consequently, a spread of 55 was 
found between those respondents that strongly agree/agree and those that strongly 
disagree/disagree. This represents 10.11% of the legitimate sample. 
As evidenced in table 6.6 above, while the mean and standard deviation of qualified 
Accountants in the UK in relation to their response in Q29 were 4.73 and 0.48, that of 
non-qualified Accountants were 1.32 and 0.53. In the same vein, Mann Whitney U test 
as evidenced in table 6.9 above within the same question was calculated to be 0.00. 
What does this statistical information mean? By interpretation, this means that there 
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is significant difference in the numbers of qualified and non-qualified Accountants in 
their responses on Q29.  
Based on available evidence from empirical findings, it has become practically difficult 
to have unbiased interpretation. Therefore, the conclusion  that can be reached from 
the above analysis within the context of Q29 is indecisive. 
Table 6.29: Respondents’ frequency on question number twenty-nine 
Q29 





Valid Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
Neutral 1 .4 .4 .8 
Agree 59 24.5 24.5 25.3 
Strongly Agree 180 74.7 74.7 100.0 
Total 241 100.0 100.0  
Non-Qualified 
Accountants 
Valid Strongly Disagree 217 71.6 71.6 71.6 
Disagree 76 25.1 25.1 96.7 
Neutral 10 3.3 3.3 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.24 COLOSSAL CLAIMS AGAINST AUDITORS IN THE UK 
Empirical finding regarding Q29 from the survey that was conducted in the UK 
revealed that there is significant difference between the qualified and non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK in terms of opinion, thereby reflecting the controversial concept 
of a watchdog and bloodhound. However, there is more to know about large legal 
claims against auditors in the UK, hence the emergence of Q30 which asked 
respondents “to what extent do you agree that colossal claims are made against 
auditors in the UK based on their affordability (deep pockets)”? 
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In response to the above assertion as evidenced in table 6.29 below, the number of 
respondents that strongly agree/agree were 237 and this represents approximately 
43.57% of the sampled population. In the vein, the total number of respondent that 
strongly disagree/disagree were 391. Consequently, there was a spread 154  between 
those respondents that strongly agree/agree and those that strongly 
disagree/disagree, and this represents 28.31% of the legitimate sample. 
 While 237 qualified Accountants strongly agree/agree to this question, only 2 non-
qualified Accountants strongly agree/agree to this s same question. 
As evidenced in table 6.6 above, the mean and standard deviation of qualified 
Accountants in relation to their responses were 4.73 and 0.54, while that of non-
qualified Accountants were 1.26 and 0.49 respectively. When this statistical 
information was compared in table 6.6 above, Mann Whitney U test was calculated at 
0.00. This has been construed to mean that there is significant difference in the 
numbers of qualified and non-qualified Accountants in their responses on Q30.  
According to (Davies, 2010) the bases of listed companies’ directors’ exoneration from 
legal claims have been on the ground of unaffordability. Thus, that shareholders sue 
the external auditors because the external auditors do have the financial muscles to 
flex (deep pockets) in terms of legal settlement or fine which the individual directors 
may not be able to afford, even the audit committee.  
It is apparent from the above finding within the literature that colossal legal claims 
against auditors in the UK is because of auditors’ affordability and not on the degree 
of their professional negligence although survey finding does not agree with this.  If 
this trend should continue in the UK, the interpretation that can be reach is simple. 
Thus, listed companies’ financial statements will continue to be defective as those who 
are responsible for the financial statements’ massaging are not punished. If this 
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become the case, the primary objective of financial statements which is to reveal the 
true and fair view of companies’ affairs will become a mirage to the detriment of 
investors and statutory auditors in the UK. 
Table 6.30: Respondents’ frequency on question number thirty 
Q30 





Valid Strongly Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
Disagree 1 .4 .4 .8 
Neutral 2 .8 .8 1.7 
Agree 55 22.8 22.8 24.5 
Strongly Agree 182 75.5 75.5 100.0 




Valid Strongly Disagree 231 76.2 76.2 76.2 
Disagree 68 22.4 22.4 98.7 
Neutral 2 .7 .7 99.3 
Agree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.25 LEGAL CLAIMS AGAINST STATUTORY AUDITORS AND FAIR PENALTY 
Finding in the form of empirical within the preceding question revealed that there is 
significant difference in terms of opinion between the qualified and non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK. It can be inferred that there is more to know about penalty from 
auditor’s perspective. Therefore, the essence of Q30 from the survey is to shed more 
light into this dark area by asking respondents the following question: “to what extent 
do you agree with the opinion that legal claims against external auditors in the UK by 
shareholders is not a fair penalty”? 
In response to the above assertion as evidenced in table 6.30 below, the number of 
respondents that strongly agree/agree were 241 and this represents 44.30% of the 
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sampled population. In the same vein, the total number of respondent that strongly 
disagree/disagree was 302 and this represents 55.51% of the sampled population 
Consequently, a spread of 61 was found between those respondents that strongly 
agree/agree and those that strongly disagree/disagree, and this represent 11.21% of 
the legitimate sample. 
The mean and standard deviation of qualified Accountants in the UK in relation to their 
responses within Q31 were 4.50 and 0.52 while that of non-qualified Accountants were 
1.30 and 0.50 respectively. Within table 6.6 above, Mann Whitney U test was 
calculated to be 0.00. This fairly suggest there is  significant difference in the numbers 
of qualified Accountants and non-qualified Accountants in their responses on Q31. 
Thus, that both qualified and non-qualified Accountants disagree on Q31.  
Recall that according to European Union, (2008); Davies, (2010); and Arthur, et al., 
(1992) the above-mentioned treatment is unfair from the external auditors’ 
perspective. They argued that it is not the external auditor that usually create the 
defectiveness of financial statements. Therefore, it is unfair for the external auditors to 
pay for the wrongdoing of other (scapegoating). In the same vein, empirical finding 
within the context of Q31 corroborates the above literature view. The conclusion that 
can be reached within the context of Q31 is that legal claims against auditors by 
shareholders in the UK in not a fair punishment for wrongdoing between directors and 
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Table 6.31: Respondents’ frequency on question number thirty-one 
Q31 





Valid Disagree 1 .4 .4 .4 
Agree 111 46.1 46.1 46.5 
Strongly Agree 129 53.5 53.5 100.0 
Total 241 100.0 100.0  
Non-Qualified 
Accountants 
Valid Strongly Disagree 195 64.4 64.4 64.4 
Disagree 106 35.0 35.0 99.3 
Neutral 1 .3 .3 99.7 
Agree 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.26 AUDITORS ACCOUNTABLE FOR MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS  
Based on empirical finding within Q31 from the survey, it was established that the large 
legal claims against auditors in the UK has been deemed to be unfair penalty. This is 
where Q32 from the same survey stands by asking respondents the following 
question: “to what extent do you agree that it is unfair to wholly and exclusively hold 
only the auditors responsible for any material misstatements in the financial 
statements in the UK”?  
In response to the above assertion as evidenced in table 6.31 below, the number of 
respondents that strongly agree/agree were 531 and this represents 97.78% of the 
sampled population. In the same vein, the total number of respondent that strongly 
disagree/disagree was 10 and this represents 1.84 of the legitimate sample. 
Consequently, a variance of 521 was found between those respondents that strongly 
agree/agree and those that strongly disagree/disagree, and this represents 95.95% of 
the legitimate sample. 
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Within table 6.6 above, the mean and standard deviation of qualified Accountants in 
the UK in relation to their response within Q32 were 4.74 and 0.44 and that of non-
qualified Accountants were 4.62 and 0.67 respectively. A comparison of these 
information as revealed in table 6.4 above revealed a calculated Mann Whitney U test 
of 0.95 The interpretation to these statistical calculations is that there is no significant 
difference in the numbers of qualified Accountants and non-qualified Accountants in 
their responses on Q32. This further mean that both qualified and non-qualified 
Accountants opted for Strongly Agree and Agree on Q32.  
A similar finding was made during the semi-interview that was conducted in the UK. 
For example, according to Doubtful who is currently working as senior audit partner in 
one of the big four audit firm in the UK,  
“auditors in the UK cannot be 100% exonerated from the 
misstatement of financial statements in the UK. The UK 
government has acknowledged this; hence legislation has 
changed in relation to company Act of 2000 and 2006 to possibly 
lessen the burden of auditors’ liability in the UK. However, it is 
unfair based on the current practice in the UK that auditors are 
wholly and exclusively held accountable for the misstatement of 
financial statements in the UK”. 
 
Doubtful argued that it is unreasonable to single out auditors in the UK and hold them 
accountable for the defectiveness of financial statements while other parties like 
company directors, company’s audit committee and company’s chief accountant who 
oversees internal control mechanism efficacy are not punished. 
In the same vein, the argument of Great who currently work for one of the top 5 audit 
firm in the UK corroborates the point Doubtful raised above. According to Great, 
“because the UK government is reluctant to punish fairly all the 
parties that are arguably responsible for the defectiveness of 
financial statements in the UK, this action can be construed to 
mean unfair treatment of auditors in the UK”. 
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Based on the available evidence from empirical findings as evidenced within this 
section, it can be construed that it is unfair to holistically held auditors in the UK 
liable for listed companies’ financial statements misstatement. If this 
interpretation is deemed acceptable by critics, then the need to cap auditors’ 
liability in the UK could be deemed justified. 
Table 6.32: Respondents’ frequency on question number thirty-two 
Q32 







Disagree 10 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Neutral 1 .3 .3 3.6 
AGREE 84 27.7 27.8 31.5 
Strongly AGREE 207 68.3 68.5 100.0 
Total 302 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 .3   
Total 303 100.0   
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
AGREE 62 25.7 25.8 25.8 
Strongly AGREE 178 73.9 74.2 100.0 
Total 240 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.2.27 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITY OF AUDITORS IN THE UK  
Recall that empirical finding within Q28 revealed that the duties and responsibilities of 
auditors in the UK are not properly defined hence incongruous verdicts were found in 
Judges’ pronouncements based on their legal stance or erudition. Thus, to gain further 
understanding regarding the duties and responsibilities of auditors in the UK in relation 
to legal definition. To possibly establish this understanding, the following question was 
asked: “to what extent do you agree that the duties and responsibility of auditors in the 
UK should be redefined in law without ambiguity”?  
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In response to the above assertion as evidenced in table 6.32 below, the number of 
respondents that strongly agree/agree were 531 and this represents 97.61% of the 
sampled population. In the same vein, the total number of respondent that strongly 
disagree/disagree were 10 and this represents 1.84% of the legitimate sample. 
Consequently, a variance of 521 between those respondents that strongly 
agree/agree and those that strongly disagree/disagree, and this represents 95.77% of 
the legitimate population. In the same vein, within table 6.6 above, mean and standard 
deviation of qualified Accountants in the UK in relation to their responses within Q33 
were 4.74 and 0.422 while that of non-qualified Accountants were 4.66 and 0.65. A 
comparison of these calculations as evidenced in table 6.4 above revealed a 
calculated Mann Whitney U test of 0.18. By interpretation, this simply mean that there 
is no significant difference in the numbers of qualified Accountants and non-qualified 
Accountants in their responses on Q33. Thus, that both qualified and non-qualified 
Accountants opted for Strongly Agree and Agree on Q33.  
It can be observed that the finding from this specific question correlates positively with 
the finding from Q28 from the survey. In the absence of dichotomies in terms of 
respondents’ views on this specific assertion as mentioned above, interpretation of 
these findings could take the following forms: firstly, it could be interpreted based on 
the number of respondents that agreed with the above assertion. Thus, if the total 
percentages of those who agreed to the above statement is used as a parameter for 
measuring the validity of this specific assertion in consonance with the corroborations 
that was found above, the final interpretation that could be reached is that it is true that 
the duties and responsibilities of auditors in the UK need to be redefined without 
ambiguity as a matter of law. 
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Table 6.33: Respondents’ frequency on question number thirty-three 
Q33 







Disagree 10 3.3 3.3 3.3 
AGREE 73 24.1 24.1 27.4 
Strongly AGREE 220 72.6 72.6 100.0 
Total 303 100.0 100.0  
QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANT 
Valid 
AGREE 55 22.8 23.1 23.1 
Strongly AGREE 183 75.9 76.9 100.0 
Total 238 98.8 100.0  
Missing System 3 1.2   
Total 241 100.0   
Source: field work compiled from questionnaire 2019 
6.3 Further Discussion 
This section elucidates the connections between some of the findings within the 
previous chapter being the semi-structured interview that was conducted in the UK 
and relevant literature, thereby highlighting how the research questions were 
answered, the significance of the study in the form of unexpected or expected findings. 
Recall that the purpose of this study was to gain understanding in the light of the 
following research questions. RQ1: Will auditors in the UK maintain a professional 
scepticism attitude If their professional liabilities are capped? RQ2: Can auditors’ 
liability capping help to demonopolize the current UK audit market? RQ3: Can audit 
profession in the UK survive and grow should the UK Chartered Accountants are 
continuously exposed to unlimited liability business risk. RQ4: What are the sources 
and drivers of auditors’ liability in the UK? 
In order to possibly answer the above research questions the study was conducted 
empirically through semi-structured face-to face interviews with thirty statutory 
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auditors in the UK, online survey and the review of relevant literature as discussed 
below. 
6.3.1 Whether auditors in the UK maintain a professional scepticism attitude  
Precisely, findings from semi-structured interview and the online survey that was 
conducted in the UK within the study revealed unequivocal findings. Thus, that 
auditors in the UK will maintain a professional scepticism attitude if their professional 
liability is capped. For example, in specific terms, 90% of the participants voiced this 
opinion during the interview process. However, 4% opined that auditors in the UK 
would relax their professional attitude, while 6% declined to the question on whether 
auditors in the UK will relax their professional scepticism attitude if their liability is 
capped.  
However, within the context of the online survey that was conducted in the UK in 
relation to the study as evidence in table 6.2 above, 96.7% of non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK strongly disagree/disagree, while 60.3% of the qualified 
Accountants in the UK strongly disagree/disagree that Auditors in the UK  will relax 
their professional scepticism attitude if their professional liability is capped. These 
findings are in conformity with London Economics (2006) finding. It can be argued that 
London Economies finding was specifically European based and not the UK alone. In 
the same veil, it can be argued further that the above findings are in consonance with 
the arguments of (Zang, et al., 2010; Yu, et al., 2013). They argued that despite the 
claim that the big four dominants the audit market, the quality of audit report has 
improved over the decade in the UK. This simply implies that if audit quality has 
improved over the years in the UK despite the claim of audit market monopolisation 
by the big four audit firms, auditor’s professional liability capping could prosper 
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financial statements integrity in the UK because auditors’ liability capping could 
stimulate a healthy competition in the UK audit market. 
The uniqueness of the above findings is of threefold: firstly, the study uses triangulation 
(the exploration of various data sources in order to possibly form a solid validity (semi-
structure interview, online survey and relevant literature) thereby creating a better 
understanding within the context of the study questions. Secondly, the study 
principally focused on the UK economy, thereby illuminating into the dark area which 
has formed a knowledge gap in the accounting literature. Thirdly the criticism that was 
levelled against London Economics finding that principally focused on European 
economy holistically was avoided completely. 
The unexpected finding in this study within the ambit of RQ1 was the high degree of 
disagreement that was reached between the qualified and non-qualified Accountant 
in the UK. I expected a significant variance within the responses from qualified and 
non-qualified Accountants in the UK in relation the RQ1. In contrast, as evidenced in 
table 6.4 within this chapter, Mann Whitney U test of .308 was calculated. What does 
this mean? Firstly, it can be construed that the qualified Accountants in the UK were 
not bias in response to their questions. Secondly, this means that there was no 
significant difference in terms of opinion between the quailed and non-qualified 
Accountants in the UK. 
Though the above findings appear to be proclamatory, critics could ponder to 
understand why auditor’s professional liability has not been capped in the UK just as 
it is in Germany, Belgium and Greece? The answer to this question is of twofold: firstly, 
the question is beyond the objective of the study. Secondly, the question is simply 
suggesting that there is need for further study within this tropical topic. 
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6.3.2 Whether capping can demonopolize the current UK audit market  
Findings from semi-structure interview and online survey that was conducted in the 
UK within the study corroboratively revealed that capping can help to reduce monopoly 
in the UK audit market. While 100% of the interviewee in the UK expressed this opinion 
as evidenced in chapter five of this study, 99.2% respondents regarding the online 
survey that was conducted in the UK within the study strongly agree/agree that 
capping can help to demonopolize the UK current audit market that is dominated by 
the big four. Within the sphere of RQ2, regarding the online survey that was conducted 
in the UK, there were series of probing questions as evidenced in chapter five of this 
thesis. For instance, Q14, Q15, and Q17 were probing questions. The essence was 
to gauge the respondents understanding in relation to the questions that they have 
been asked in order to possibly gain an in-dept understanding regarding the degree 
of consistency or variance in their responses. Surprisingly, respondents maintained a 
high degree of positive consistencies in their answers. This further revealed that 
respondents understand the question they were asked. 
Furthermore, both empirical findings within this study are in consonance with some 
literature. Thus, according to London Economics (2006), the UK audit market is 
concentrated in the hands of the big four. Namely, (PwC, KPMG, Deloitte, and Ernst 
& Young). The major factor that influenced concentration according to Philipsen, 
(2014), was due to unwillingness of the medium tie audit firm to accept high profile 
client, resulting from fear of unlimited liabilities. In the same vein, (EC, 2008; EC, 2010; 
Davies, 2015) argued that auditors’ liability issue needs in to be addressed to possibly 
achieve progress on both the development of the role of the audit and the 
encouragement of greater competition in the audit market. Thus, they stressed on the 
significance of reducing auditors’ liability to possibly stimulate competition in the 
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market. According to Belcher, (2006) and Walter et al., (2008), the expected 
competition in the audit market will only become an illusion if auditors’ liability is not 
addressed. 
One of the significant of this study as revealed in this chapter is its conformity or 
corroboration to what is already known in accounting literature within RQ2. Thus, that 
the UK audit market is currently uncompetitive. Secondly it also revealed that capping 
is the panacea to the unhealthy competition in the UK audit market. 
6.3.3 Whether audit profession in the UK can survive and grow 
Both empirical findings emphatically revealed that audit profession in the UK cannot 
survive and grow if their professional liability issue is not resolved. For instance, 90% 
of the interviewee agreed that the number of registered statutory auditors in the UK 
will continue to decline over time if the issue of auditors’ liability is not addressed as 
evidenced in chapter five of the study. In the same vein, Q6, Q18, Q19, Q20 and Q21 
within the online survey that was conducted in the UK asked similar questions in 
variegated forms. While Q6 was a stand-alone question, other questions as mentioned 
above were the probing type in relation to the study Q3. Within this study, it was also 
revealed that the number of registered auditors in the UK are decreasing on annual 
basis and it will decrease further in the future if their professional liability issue is not 
resolve. Thus, that the decrease in the number of registered auditors in the UK as 
evidenced in table 4 and 6 within the preceding chapter has bearing with auditors’ 
professional liability. This finding has significantly contributed to the development of 
accounting literature by revealing the unknown. For instance, what was known in 
accounting literature prior to this study was that the number of registered auditors in 
the UK are decreasing on annual basis. However, this decrease wasn’t linear in 
nature. But what remained unknown that has been revealed by this study is that the 
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decrease was as a result of auditors’ legal liability and the nature of their uncompetitive 
market in the UK thereby uncovering knowledge gap in accounting literature. The 
study also revealed within this chapter that young talents are reluctant to venture into 
audit profession in the UK resulting from business risk that could endanger their 
personal assets in the event of audit failure. 
Therefore, the interpretation that has been reached from the above analysis and 
discussion within the context of this question is that audit profession in the UK may 
not grow without a capping strategy. 
6.3.4  What are the sources or drivers of auditors’ liability in the UK 
Empirical result from semi-structured interview and online survey that was conducted 
in the UK within the quest of gaining an understanding regarding the sources or drivers 
of auditors’ liability in the UK revealed that there are several factors for this. Among 
them are unfairness, deep pockets and ambiguity regarding the definition of auditors’ 
duties and responsibility. For instance, unfairness became a reoccurring point during 
the interview in relation to the study question as mentioned above. Thus, 98% of the 
interviewee pointed out that auditors in the UK are not fairly treated when it comes to 
accountability in connection with financial statements misstatements.  
According to Doubtful who is currently working as senior audit partner in one of the big 
four audit firm in the UK,  
“auditors in the UK cannot be 100% exonerated from the 
misstatement of financial statements in the UK. The UK 
government has acknowledged this; hence legislation has 
changed in relation to company Act has of 2000 and 2006 to 
possibly lessen the burden of auditors’ liability in the UK. 
However, it is unfair based on the current practice in the UK that 
auditors are wholly and exclusively held accountable for the 
misstatement of financial statements in the UK”. 
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Doubtful argued that it is unreasonable to single out auditors in the UK and hold them 
accountable for the defectiveness of financial statements while other parties like 
company directors, company’s audit committee and company’s chief accountants who 
oversees internal control mechanism efficacy are not punished. 
In the same vein, the argument of Great who currently work for one of the top 5 audit 
firm in the UK corroborates the point Doubtful raised above. According to Great, 
“because the UK government has refused to punish fairly all the 
parties that are arguably responsible for the defectiveness of 
financial statements in the UK, this action can be construed to 
mean unfair treatment of auditors in the UK”. 
 
Great further argued and referred to the current practice in the US following the Enron 
scandal between 2000 and 2002. According to Great, both finance directors and chief 
executive officers of listed companies in the US risk jail terms if they purportedly 
window-dress financial statements, or they were fully aware that financial statements 
do not represent the true and fair view of the companies’ affairs and conceal the 
information that they have acknowledged. In the UK, reverse is the case as auditors 
in the UK are single-handedly held accountable and unfairly punished for the 
defectiveness of financial statements. 
The above finding corroborates with some existing studies. For example, according to 
ACCA, (2012), the unfair terms of contract as encapsulated in 1977 Act is still in vogue 
till date in the UK. Thus, the Act prevented auditors from negotiating their liability 
limitation with their audit clients. It could be argued that other forms of liabilities 
limitations are available in the UK. For example, Liability Limitation Agreement (LLA). 
This means that auditors in the UK can reached an agreement with their audit clients, 
subject to the approval of shareholders in the Annual General Meeting (AGM). 
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According to Davies (2010), colossal legal claims against statutory auditors in the UK 
is based on auditors’ affordability rather than professional negligence (deep pockets). 
Within Q31 and Q32 regarding the online survey that was conducted in the UK, it was 
also revealed that the large legal claims against auditors in the UK has been deemed 
to be unfair penalty because listed company’s top management who are arguably 
responsible for financial statements misstatements are not usually punished whenever 
audit risk crystallised.   This finding corroborates deep pockets factor as discussed 
above. 
Finally, the next factor that formed one of the drivers of auditors’ liability in the UK is 
ambiguity regarding the definition of auditors’ duties and responsibilities which 
cascaded into incongruous verdicts, based on Judges level of erudition and legal 
stance within the tropical topic. 
As evidenced within Q28 regarding the online survey that was conducted in the UK, 
97.8% of respondents strongly agree/agree that the UK Judges verdict is subject to 
their level of erudition or legal stance on auditors’ professional liability case. In the 
same vein, finding from Q33 from the same survey revealed that the definition of 
auditors’ duties and responsibility in the UK need to be redefined as a matter of law. 
97.6% of the respondents voiced this opinion as evidenced in table 6.25 above. 
According to the study carried out by Action, (2013), some Judges’ pronouncements 
regarding auditors’ liabilities cases were incongruous or inconsistent. This is a 
manifestation of ambiguity in terms of auditors’ duties and responsibility in the UK. For 
instance, in the case of Kingston Cotton Mill (No 2) [ 1895], the lower court presiding 
Judge Vaughan Williams J found the auditor guilty of negligence.  
However, Justice Lopes L.J who was the presiding Judge in the Appeal Court 
overturned the decision in his famous judgement as follows: 
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It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to 
perform that skill, care and caution which a reasonably 
competent, careful and cautious auditor would use. What is 
reasonable skill, care and caution must depend on the particular 
circumstances of each case. An auditor is not bound to be a 
detective or as was said to approach his work with suspicion or 
with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is 
a watchdog but not a bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried 
servants of the company in whom confidence is placed by the 
company. (BPP Learning Media, 2016; Pallisserry, 2012; 
ACCA,2013; Collings, 2014). 
 
The summary of Justice Lopes L.J judgement was that auditor is a watchdog and not 
bloodhound. Thus, a watchdog is one that report something that appears suspicious, 
while a bloodhound is one that detect something suspicious. 
However, both empirical findings and some literature within this study suggest that the 
duties and responsibilities of auditors in the UK is subject to presiding Judge legal 
stance or erudition resulting from inadequate definition of auditors’ duties and 
responsibilities in the UK. 
The interpretation that has been reached from the above discussion within the context 
of this question are of twofold: firstly, that there is an issue in the form of auditors’ 
duties and responsibilities definition in the UK as incongruous verdicts have been 
found among the presiding Judges. Secondly that the improper definition of auditors’ 
duties and responsibilities in the UK will continue to impact on statutory auditors’ 
liability in the UK. This revelation is deemed to be one of the significant of the study 
as it has revealed how inconsistent Judges verdict could impact on auditors’ liability in 
the UK thereby contributing positively to accounting literature. 
6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presents findings that were drawn from data analysis mainly based on 
the survey that was conducted in the UK within the study. Relevant information or 
quotations from preceding chapter being the semi-structure interview that was 
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conducted in the UK and literature that possibly corroborates or refute the findings 
within the chapter were referenced accordingly. In the same vein, tables, figures and 
participants group variable were developed in order to possibly enhance readers’ 
understanding about the background of participants in relation to their group 
categories, the nature of questions they were asked and their responses as they 
participate in the study.  
Empirical findings revealed that auditors’ liability capping can enhance financial 
statements integrity in the UK. It also revealed that auditor professional liability capping 
could facilitate a positive impact on the UK audit market that is currently dominated by 
the big four. Thus, young talents could be encouraged to venture into audit profession. 
This could in turn create healthy competition in the audit market and possibly cause a 
reduction in the audit fees.  
Having analysed and discussed empirical data that emanated from the survey and 
semi-structure interview that was conducted in the UK as evidenced within this 
chapter, the next chapter will present the study conclusion, contribution, and 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION; CONTRIBUTION; RECOMMENDATION FURTHER 
RESEARCH AND STUDY LIMITATION 
7.0.  INTRODUCTION  
This study investigated the impact auditors’ liabilities capping can possibly have on 
listed companies’ financial statements integrity, the audit market and audit profession 
in the UK being the overall aim of the study.  The specific objectives of this study have 
been to gain an understanding from the UK qualified and non-qualified Accountants’ 
perspective, whether auditors in the UK will relax their professional scepticism attitude 
if their liability is capped;  whether auditors’ liability capping can possibly demonopolize 
the UK audit market that is currently controlled by the Big Four international audit firms; 
and whether audit profession in the UK can survive and grow should the UK Chartered 
Accountants are continuously exposed to unlimited liability business risk. 
The research objectives of the study as mentioned above were revisited within this 
chapter. Thus, it aims to summarise the findings of the study and offer conclusions 
based on the findings as derived in the preceding chapter. 
Within the ambit of the preceding chapters, a large volume of empirical data was 
collected in the UK in the forms of semi-structured interviews and online survey in 
conjunction with the review of relevant accounting literature. These data were 
analysed and discussed exhaustively in the preceding chapter hence their summary 
in this chapter.  
In the same vein, this chapter also discuss the study’s contribution in relation to the 
existing knowledge in accounting and make a recommendation based on its findings. 
Finally, the study also makes recommendation for future research within this study, 
implications, limitation and ended the chapter with a brief summary. By adopting this 
structural approach, it is believed that the quality of the study has been enhanced and 
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that the study has been concluded expectantly by reflecting on whether the objectives 
of the study as mentioned in chapter one has been met.  
7.1.  RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS  
This section summarised the study findings as evidenced in the preceding chapter and 
offer conclusion based on the findings as follows:  
7.1.1.  PROFESSIONAL SCEPTICISM ATTITUDE 
Both empirical findings (interviews and survey) within the scope of this study had a 
positive correlation in relation to the research objective number one (to investigate 
whether auditors in the UK will relax their professional scepticism attitude if their 
liability is capped). Thus, they corroborated each other by claiming that auditors in the 
UK will maintain professional scepticism attitude if their legal liability is capped. 
Empirical findings within this study lamented that the claim or fear that auditors in the 
UK will do otherwise if their liability is capped is a child of myopia. It further cautioned 
that a non-capping strategy or policy from the UK government can possibly impact on 
the UK economy and audit profession in the UK adversely. 
The above empirical findings within the study is in consonance with the findings of 
DeFond and Zhang, (2014). Thus, they concluded in their studies that reputational risk 
factor could motivate auditors in enhancing financial statements integrity within 
countries in the EU that have adopted auditor liability capping. It can be argued that 
this specific finding cannot be generalised within the UK context because their studies 
were EU countries focussed rather than the UK. However, it must be mentioned that 
specific empirical finding within this study (survey) revealed that the fear of losing 
practicing license could motivate auditors in the UK to maintain professional 
scepticism attitude if their liability is capped. In the same vein, ASIC, (2012) finds no 
empirical evidence to suggest that audit quality is lower countries in countries within 
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the EU that have adopted liability capping. This further suggests that auditors in the 
UK will maintain professional scepticism attitude just like their professional colleagues 
in the EU countries. According to Europa.eu, (2012), “74.1% of respondents from 
outside the audit profession and from countries where audit limitation caps are in place 
favoured audit reform in Europe. However, Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) find 
support for higher audit quality in countries without a cap on auditor liability with the 
EU. However, this specific finding directly contradicts London Economics (2006) and 
other findings as discussed above in conjunction with the empirical findings from this 
study, thereby revealing the tropical and dichotomous nature of the research topic 
regarding the divergent constructs held by various stakeholders. 
Despite the empirical affirmatory evidences from the preceding chapter as derived 
from this study, critics could argue that previous studies that positively correlated with 
this study as evidenced within the above paragraph were not confined to the UK alone. 
The answer or response to this argument is that this study has acknowledged this 
lacuna, hence the scope of this research was mirrored to the UK only, thereby 
illuminating into this dark area in terms of knowledge gap. 
In summary, the main conclusion drawn on the above understanding based on 
empirical findings with this study is likened to prima facie (a case with living evidence) 
which could be difficult to argue in the court of law. Thus, statutory auditors in the UK 
will maintain a professional scepticism attitude when auditing the financial statements 
of companies in the UK if their legal liability is capped based on the following: 
• Firstly, in attempt to avoid losing their practicing license as it was in the case of 
Enron saga in the US in 2002. 
• Secondly, based on the need to avoid reputation risk damage in relation to 
specific audit firms and the professional body they belong.  
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Finally, empirical findings within this study concluded that it could be to the perils of 
the UK economy and audit profession in the UK if the expected liability reforms should 
fail.  
7.1.2.  CAPPING CAN HELP TO DEMONOPOLISE THE UK AUDIT MARKET 
Empirical findings within this study revealed that auditors’ liability capping can 
positively impact on the UK audit market. Thus, young talents could be encouraged to 
venture into audit profession and the current monopoly as maintain by the big four will 
become reduced. This could in turn create a healthy competition in the audit market 
and possibly cause a reduction in the audit fees. Empirical findings within this study 
equally revealed that there is impending danger if auditor’s liability in the UK is not 
capped. For example, the advantages of capping as mentioned above could become 
an illusion.  
However, one of the major issues at stake according to Bush, et al., (2007) is that if 
auditors’ liability is officially capped, it is possible that the big four could raise the cap 
ceiling themselves as a result of their financial muscles to flex. This specific literature 
finding should be accepted with caution. For example, it is speculative and not 
predictive. In contrast, Shimin, et al., (2010)  find out that despite the claim that the big 
four dominants the audit market, the quality of audit report has improved over the 
decade in the UK. By interpretation, if the audit quality in the UK has improved over 
the year without capping it can be construed that the effect of capping could positively 
have following impact. 
• Firstly, audit quality could further improve resulting from healthy competition in 
the UK audit market. 
• Secondly, effective audit cost culture could be stimulated in the UK. 
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• Thirdly, the number of registered auditors in the UK that is dwindling in current 
terms could improve on annual basis. 
Finally, the conclusion that has been reached within the context of the second 
objective of this study as mentioned above is that capping can possibly create audit 
fees cost effectiveness and efficiency. It can possibly enhance the GDP of the country 
resulting from competition. Therefore, auditors’ liability capping should be given a 
chance in the UK.  
7.1.3  AUDIT PROFESSION IN THE UK  
Relevant accounting literature within this study revealed that the numbers of registered 
auditors in the UK are decreasing on annual basis. In the same vein, empirical findings 
from this study revealed that the annual decrease in the number of registered auditors 
in the UK is attributable to auditors’ professional liabilities and that audit profession in 
the UK cannot survive and grow should they continually exposed to large legal 
professional liability.  
Empirical findings within the study also revealed that one of the drivers of auditors’ 
liability in the UK is auditors’ financial ability to settle large legal claim (deep pockets). 
By implication, the existence of large legal claims against auditors in the UK has 
placed limitations on medium sized audit firms’ growth in the UK and the willingness 
of some listed companies in accepting them in terms of audit engagement 
assignments. Empirical findings within the study described this to be an unfair 
treatment from auditor’s perspective. Thus, that the impact of this unfair treatment in 
terms of large legal liability against auditors in the UK could further cause a decrease 
in the number of registered auditors in the UK in the future, thereby impacting 
adversely on the growth and survival of the profession in the UK. 
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Similarly, according to  Davies, (2010), and Russell, et al., (2012), if auditors’ liability 
in the UK is not properly addressed as expected, audit profession could go into 
extinction. Thus, young talents could be discouraged from venturing into the 
profession, resulting from the existing threat of legal liabilities that could put their 
personal assets at risk. It could be interpreted that the above empirical and literature 
findings are in consonance with the European Union Commission (2008). The EU 
recommended to its member states to find a possible solution to auditors’ liabilities 
problems in Europe in order to avoid colossally unbearable consequences. 
According to Price Waterhouse, Ernest & Young (1999), Davies, (2010),  the number 
of insurance companies that are willing to accept some audit firms in the UK as their 
client are significantly limited compared to their demand. Arthur Andersen et al., 
(1996),  noted specifically that auditing firms in the UK are now limited to $50 million 
and $100 million as the maximum insurance companies are willing to cover for 
auditors. The implication of this limitation is that in the event of any successful legal 
claim against auditors in the UK that is higher than $100 million, auditors’ personal 
assets will be at risk. This further suggests that the audit profession in the UK cannot 
grow in the absence of capping. 
The conclusion that has been reached based on the empirical findings from this study 
and in conjunction with some corroborative findings within the literature  is that audit 
profession in the UK cannot grow should the UK Chartered Accountants are 
continuously exposed to unlimited liability business risk. 
7.2.  CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time a research of this magnitude 
investigated tropical subject area within accounting literature, thereby illuminating into 
a dark area within the literature. Thus, the impact of auditors’ liability capping can 
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possibly have on listed companies’ financial statements integrity, the UK audit market 
and its profession. Prior to this study, what was known in accounting literature was 
that the number of registered auditors in the UK are decreasing on annual basis. 
However, this study revealed empirically that the annual decrease in the number of 
registered auditors in the UK is attributable to auditors’ professional liability, thereby 
revealing the unknown. 
Both empirical findings have produced enormous evidences that advocate for auditors’ 
liabilities capping in the UK. The contribution the study has made within this context is 
therefore embedded on its finding. Thus, they suggest that capping can possibly 
promote the economic prosperity of the UK, resulting from a reduce audit fees, 
indemnity insurance cost and competition in the audit market that could be associated 
with capping.  
Another contribution that this study has made is within the possible consequence of 
non-capping in the UK as other auditors’ professional liability management strategies 
have failed. For example, the abolishment of joint-and-several-liability, the right to 
incorporate audit firm as legal entity and liability limitation and agreement. There is 
looming danger if the age-longed debate on auditors’ liability capping is not urgently 
resolved. The fact that this debate has lingered for more than a decade is a living 
testimony to the above claim. Moreover, both empirical findings corroborated each 
other on a positive note, demanding for capping. The findings equally suggest that it 
has become inexpedient to keep this debate in abeyance 
7.3.  STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS   
The recommendations that are made in this section reflect the research overall aim 
and its specific objectives as revealed in chapter one, in conjunction with the 
conclusion drawn on each specific objective as evidenced from the above. The main 
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conclusion drawn on objective number one from the above is that auditors in the UK 
will maintain a professional attitude if their legal liability is capped. On the other hand, 
it will be to the perils of the UK economy if the expected liability reforms fail.   
My recommendation based on this finding is that auditors’ liability in the UK should be 
capped as a multiple of audit fee. The expected benefits could come in variegated 
forms. For example, audit fees could reduce, young talents’ interest could be 
stimulated into audit practice, and indemnity insurance cost could also decrease. The 
net effects of these benefits could emerge as economic boom in terms of growth. 
The conclusion reached on objective number two was as mentioned above was that 
auditors’ liability capping in the UK can help to demonopolize the UK audit market that 
is dominated by the big four. Therefore, my recommendation based on the above 
finding and conclusion is that auditors liability capping in the UK should be given a 
chance as other strategies like the abolition of joint and several liability, incorporation 
of audit firms as a legal entity and Liability Limitation Agreement, (LLA) have failed in 
current terms. However, the UK government should consult legal liabilities experts on 
this issue. The benefits could lead to a proper definition of auditors’ duties and 
responsibilities in terms of fraud detection and prevention. It could also enhance 
consistency in terms of judges’ legal pronouncements and possibly avoid confusion 
as witnessed in the past legal precedents as revealed in literature. 
The conclusion that was reached within objective number three of the study was that 
based on the empirical findings from the preceding chapters, audit profession in the 
UK cannot grow should the UK Chartered Accountants are continuously exposed to 
unlimited liability business risk. Recall that the EU recommended professional liability 
minimisation from auditors’ perspective in 2008. The basis of its recommendation was 
to avert the big four decreasing into big three resulting from professional liability. The 
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UK government acknowledged this hence joint and several liability was abolished, and 
the choice to incorporate audit firms as legal entity and LLA was introduced. However, 
these strategies have failed in current terms as the number of registered auditors in 
the UK are decreasing on yearly basis due to arguably professional liability, suggesting 
that audit profession in the UK cannot survive and grow in the face of colossal legal 
claim against them.  
My recommendation within this objective and based on the above finding is that 
auditors’ liability in the UK should be capped based on audit multiple fee or base on 
the salary of the president of the UK supreme court. This recommendation is deemed 
to represent public best interest on this topic in relation to EU advice in 2008.  
7.4.  RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
This study was arguably thoroughly conducted within this contemporary topic. 
 
However, there are some dark areas within this topic that could have aid 
understanding and possibly alleviate fears in the mind of various stakeholders if a 
further study is conducted within the topic. For example, research should be conducted 
in countries like Greece, Belgium and Germany within the EU that have opted for 
auditors’ liabilities capping. A fuller understanding of audited financial statements 
integrity, audit market growth or demonopolization and the growth of audit profession 
in those countries and the holistic economic benefits could be gained. This could 
further enhance juxtaposition between pre and post capping periods, thereby 
demonstrating a convincing and robust basis for professional liability capping 
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7.5  IMPLICATION OF STUDY 
Previous sections discussed the contribution that this thesis makes and some 
limitations that it has. This section outlines several avenues for future research within 
the contemporary research topic. 
This qualitative study investigates the impart of auditors’ professional liability capping 
on listed companies’ financial statements, the UK audit market and its profession being 
the goal of the  study. Thus, it sheds the light on the aged long debate in the UK 
regarding capping and concludes that auditors’ liability in the UK should be capped 
based on its empirical findings which revealed that auditors in the UK will maintain a 
professional scepticism if their liability is capped. 
Moreover, this study investigates the views of qualified and non- qualified Accountants 
in the UK. while the former is accounting information user, the latter is intangible 
information supplier in the capital market. However, there are many other stakeholders 
who may also be involved in supplying or using related intangible  information, such 
as regulators, Lawyers and accounting lecturers. Therefore, future interview-based 
research could extend the present study by investigating the perspectives of other 
stakeholders as mentioned above.    
The conceptual framework of this qualitative study reveals that financial statements 
misstatements in the UK are products of agency behaviour. While directors are the 
primary agent, statutory auditors are the secondary agent. Therefore, it will prudent if 
future study is conducted in order to possibly establish who should be held 
accountable holistically whenever financial statements are materially misstated in the 
UK. 
The effort of the UK government and accounting regulatory bodies towards financial 
statements integrity strengthening was discussed within this study. However, further 
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studies should also be conducted, thereby evaluating the effectiveness of the UK 
government programme that has been designed to minimise the risk of financial 
statement defectiveness and that of accounting regulatory body which centred on 
financial statements reporting. 
7.6  PRACTICAL IMPLICATION   
Auditors professional liability has been found within this study to be a dichotomous and 
transcending debate as revealed specifically in the semi-structured interviews that was 
conducted in the UK within this study. 
This study provides evidence that there are perceived shortcomings in handling 
auditors professional liability in the UK. For example, FRC in 2012 set a new threshold 
regarding restated financial statements. Thus, this has changed from 77% to 90%. 
In the same vein, statutory auditors were required to detail much information on how 
they arrive at audit opinion (FRC, 2012). 
 The relevance of financial statements that is devoid of restatements has also been  
emphasised within this study in conjunction with the dilemma that auditors in the UK 
could face regarding duty of care. Legal verdicts were found to be incongruous and 
confusing within this study, thereby revealing the  complexities that currently confront 
statutory auditors in the UK. 
The latest version of IAS 18  and opinion paragraph within the audited financial 
statements in the UK are not expected to solve all of the problems that have been 
identified over the years regarding financial statements defectiveness as discussed in 
this study. There are several issues for the standard setters, accounting professional 
body in the UK and the UK government to address. These include but not limited to 
problems of materiality threshold,  specific duty of auditors in the UK, how to fairly 
punish agents that could purportedly contribute to the misstatement of financial 
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statements in the UK, the need to increase transparency, reflecting the need of 
accounting information user in the UK. 
The revised IAS 18 and opinion paragraph with the audited financial statements in the 
UK marked the beginning of a new phase in accounting standard setting that will 
require the input of more research studies as well as collaboration or at least, 
cooperation between the qualified Accountants and listed company directors in the 
UK.  However, further academic research could help to inform the development of 
standards by accounting professional bodies in the UK and the UK government 
regarding some of the issues as mentioned above. It is believed that the qualitative 
approach as adopted in this study could help in reaching a greater understanding of 
the needs of accounting information users regarding audited financial statements and 
within professional auditors’ liability being the focus of this study. 
7.7  POLICY AND MANAGERIAL  IMPLICATIONS  
The preceding section discussed practical implications of this study in relation to 
auditors’ professional liability in the UK. Thus, it looked at current measures that have 
been put in place by the UK government and accounting professional bodies in the 
UK. The section also looked at issues to be addressed by accounting professional 
bodies, the UK government and researchers being its practical implication. 
Therefore, this section looked into policy and managerial implications of the study as 
follows: 
For policy makers, this study has implications with respect to statutory auditors in the 
UK primary duty. Thus, is it that of “watchdog or bloodhound”? A watchdog is someone 
that reports something suspicious, while a bloodhound is a detective (Pallisserr, 2012; 
ACC, 2013; Collings, 2914). For example,  this study finds out that one of the sources 
of auditors’ liability in the UK is based on vague definition of auditors’ primary duty. 
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While auditors believe that their duty is that of a watchdog, users of accounting 
information believe that auditors’ primary duty is that of bloodhound. Similar 
contradictions were found in legal verdicts within this study with specific reference to 
auditors’ duty in the UK. Therefore, it is expected that policy makers should clearly 
define the primary duty of statutory auditors as a matter of law in order to possibly lift 
the existing legal veil and enhance consistency in legal verdicts regarding auditors’ 
liability in the UK. 
Furthermore, this study also has implication towards policy makers with specific 
reference to  information asymmetry issues. Shareholders acknowledged that they do 
not have daily operational information about their companies. Thus, that directors 
could engage in moral hazard practicing, thereby relegating the fiduciary confidence 
that have been reposed on them. As result, they hire the services of statutory auditors 
that could possibly to help to mitigate this risk (Felix, 2015, Okaro and Okafor, 2013). 
Therefore, it is expected that policy makers in the UK should make specific law that 
could help to solve the problem of information asymmetry and unethical practice in the 
UK. For the example, one of the intervieswee in this study called Great referred to the 
current practice in the US following the Enron scandal between 2000 and 2002. Thus, 
both finance directors and chief executive officers of listed companies in the US risk 
jail terms if they purportedly window-dress financial statements, or they were fully 
aware that financial statements do not represent the true and fair view of the 
companies’ affairs and conceal the information that they have acknowledged. In the 
UK, reverse is the case as auditors in the UK are single-handedly held accountable 
and punished for the defectiveness of financial statements. Thus, this current practice 
in the UK further reveal the extent that auditors in the UK are unfairly treated in relation 
to auditors’ liability. 
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Therefore, this potential inherent short coming should be addressed by the UK law 
makers through corporate code of governance. 
The managerial implication of this study is in relation to whistle blowing. Thus, 
managers of listed companies in the UK should report to the UK government or its 
agency whenever they uncover any unethical practice in their companies. For 
example, the overstatement of profit by Tesco in 2014 was uncover by a manager. 
This professional whistle blowing attitude is uncommon in the UK and this could 
arguably promote financial reporting irregularities in the UK which could in turn 
cascade into defective financial statements and auditors’ professional liability in the 
UK. 
Therefore, managers in the UK should integrate the culture of whistle blowing into their 
daily duties and responsibilities if the expected true and fair position of listed 
companies in the form of financial statements must not remain in abeyance.  
7.8 STUDY LIMITATION 
There are some limitations to this specific study. However, some of the limitations are 
inevitable. Thus, the study’s findings or results could be difficult to generalize in 
absolute terms.  It is however limited to individual’s opinion which could be bias or 
contingent upon their state of minds at the time of their responses. Moreover, the study 
heavily relied on various stakeholders’ participation through the administration of 
questionnaires, interview and literature review. It could be argued that this is not bias 
free as each group or individual stakeholder could respond to questions, interviews, 
or possibly produce literatures based on their ideological stance on the research topic. 
It must be mentioned clearly that this specific limitation is outside the control of the 
researcher.  
Furthermore, though the study is confined to the UK, the operations of the big four  
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accounting firms in the UK cut across international economies and travelling cost to  
 
different locations in the UK at different time and dates during the interview limits the  
 
sample size of the study. 
 
7.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The use of qualitative approach within this study was beneficial in uncovering the 
perceptions of qualified and non-qualified Accountants in the UK. Thus, in-depth 
individual semi-structure interviews were conducted with the participants of the study, 
specifically statutory auditors in the UK in order to possibly gain their perceptions or 
constructs regarding the age-long debate in the UK within the context of auditors’ 
professional liability. In the same vein, constructs of non-qualified Accountants in the 
UK were also explored through online survey. 
The conclusions of this study resulted in a more comprehensive understanding of what 
qualified and non-qualified in the UK perceptions are, and what should be possibly 
expected if auditors’ liability in the UK is capped. The findings within this study are 
expected to provoke intellectual rethinking regarding auditors’ liability in the UK among 
policy makers, managers, accounting professional bodies, Institutional investors and 
qualified Accountants in the UK. Based on this understanding, it can be construed that 
the study has been concluded expectantly by reflecting on the objectives of the study 
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APPENDIXES 





The impact of auditors’ liability capping on the integrity of listed companies’ 
Financial Statements, the audit market, and the auditing profession in the 
United Kingdom 
Date: 02/08/2017 
This request for interview is an important part of a PhD research in 
auditing at the University of Salford, Manchester, United Kingdom under the 
supervision of Prof, H. Yazdifar and Dr. M. Albahloul who support this investigation.  
This research aims to understand whether auditors in the UK will demonstrate a 
relaxed attitude that could adversely impact listed companies’ financial statements’ 
integrity if their professional liability is capped. It further investigates whether auditors’ 
liability capping can possibly demonopolize audit market that is currently attached with 
big four audit firms. This dominance has been attributed to auditors’ professional 
liability that could cause the demise of an audit firm in the event of audit failure. Thus, 
it is hopes that the results will be a further step towards understanding the auditing 
profession in the UK from a legal liability perspective. 
 
As a chartered accountant, or concerned with auditing profession, you have been 
selected to participate in this study. Although I am conscious about your limited 
availability and valuable time, I am fully hoping that you will be able to allocate me 
some time to undertake this interview (30 minutes approximately). On the other hand, 
I must emphasize you that all information you provide will be treated in strict 
confidence. Only   aggregate results of these interviews will be published, and no 
individual details will be disclosed.  
 
If you would like to receive a copy of the aggregated results of the interviews, and/or 
would be willing to discuss further the issues it addresses, please do not hesitate to 
contact me using either telephone, email or mail address mentioned below, and I will 
happy to contact you. I would appreciate it very much if you would confirm participating 
in this process so an interview can be organized at your convenient.  
 
Thank you in advance for your kind co-operation.  
 
Correspondence: 
Samuel O. Ebhodaghe 
Department: International Accounting & Finance 
Email: S.Ebhodaghe@edu.salford.ac.uk 
Tel: 0744 5432328 
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PART ONE: PERSONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERVIEWE 
QUESTION: Please, kindly provide answers to the following personal 
information questions: 
Your name, gender, age, your company’s name, and years of 
experience. 
PART TWO: INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
QUESTION: Have you had about the debate regarding auditors’ liability 
capping in the UK? 
What do you understand the terms “capping” to mean within the 
context of auditors’ professional liability debate in the UK?  
Please tell me why you are interested in auditors’ professional 
liability debate in the UK 
  When did your first interest on the debate began? 
PART THREE: UNDERSTANDING /AWARENESS ABOUT AUDITORS 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE UK 
QUESTIONS: What does “auditors’ professional liability” mean to you? 
What do you take auditors’ professional liability capping to be in 
the UK?  
Do you think that auditors’ liability needs a reform in the UK? If 
yes/no, what are your reasons?  
PART FOUR: POSSIBLE IMPACT OF AUDITORS’ LIABILITY CAPPING ON 
LISTED COMPANIES’ FINANCIAL STATEMENTS’ INTEGRITY 
IN THE UK. 
 
QUESTIONS: Have you had about professional scepticism attitude? If yes in 
your opinion, what do you understand professional scepticism 
attitude to mean in relation to auditors’ professional service?  
 
Do you think that auditors in the UK will maintain a professional 
scepticism attitude if their liabilities are capped? 
 
 If your answer to the above question is yes or no, could you 
please elaborate on your answer? 
 
In your opinion, how can auditors’ liability be capping in the UK 
impact on the integrity of listed companies’ financial statements? 
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Are you of the opinion that auditors’ liability in the UK should be 
capped? If yes/no, what are your reasons?  
 
Are you concerned about auditors’ professional behaviour in the 
UK if their professional liability is capped? If yes or no, please 
elaborate on your answers. 
 
 
PART FIVE: POSSIBLE IMPACT OF AUDITORS LIABILITY CAPPING ON 
AUDIT MARKET IN THE UK 
 
QUESTIONS: What do you understand audit market to be within the context of 
accountancy profession in the UK? 
 
What do you think about audit market in the UK in terms of 
competition in the market? 
 
 How could auditors’ professional liability capping impact on the 
audit market in the UK as a matter of opinion? 
 
Are you of the opinion that audit market in the market is currently 
uncompetitive? If yes/no, what are your reasons? 
 
What role do you think auditors’ liability capping can play in the 
UK current audit market in terms of competition? 
Have you had about the big four accountancy firms in the UK? If 
yes, who are they? Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, (Deloitte), 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Ernst & Young (E&Y) and 
Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) 
 
What is the position of the big four accounting firms in the UK in 
terms of their market share? 
 
Do you mean that big four dominant the UK audit market? 
 
How would the big four accounting firms respond to auditors’ 
liability capping as a matter of opinion? 
 
Do you think that the big four accounting firms will possibly raise 
the cap ceiling to possibly increase monopoly and dominant the 
audit market in the UK? 
 
PART SIX: POSSIBLE IMPACT OF AUDITORS PROFESSIONAL 
LIABILITY ON AUDIT PROFESSIONAL EXISTENCE IN THE 
UK. 
 
QUESITIONS:  What is your opinion regarding the possibility of auditors’ 
professional liability reducing the big four accounting firms in the 
UK to three or two in the future?  
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Do you think that young talent can be discouraged from venturing 
into audit profession to possibly safe guide their personal assets 
because of auditors’ professional liability in the UK? 
 
If the answer to the above question is yes, does this imply that 
audit profession in the UK could go into extinction one day? If yes, 
what can be done to salvage this situation by the UK government 
and the professional accountancy regulatory body? 
 
If auditors’ professional liability debate fails in the UK, could this 
have any adverse consequence on audit profession? If yes or no, 
how? 
 
Some of the big four accounting firms in the UK threatened to 
relocate their head office to tax haven countries if auditors’ liability 
reforms debate fails in the UK. What is your opinion about this 
assumption? 
 
Do you believe that audit firms in the UK could find it difficult   to 
secure professional liability insurance for their staff resulting from 
auditors’ liability? If yes, how could this impact on the profession’s 
existence and the audit mart in the UK? 
 
What can the UK government do to possibly help auditors in the 
UK in securing professional liability insurance? 
 
PART SEVEN: AUDITORS FAIR TREATMENT IN TERMS OF LEGAL 
LIABILITY IN THE UK 
  
QUESTIONS: What do you understand by audit failure or defective audit? 
 
  In your opinion, what do you understand by fair treatment? 
 
Whenever financial statements become defective, auditors are 
sued by the shareholders of the company, while directors of the 
same company go scotch free.  Does this suggest that auditors in 
the UK are not fairly treated in terms of professional legal liability? 
If yes, what can be done to remedy this treatment? 
 
The European Union Commission announced in 2008 that 
auditors’ liability needs a reform Europe to possibly avoid 
negative consequence. In your opinion, do you think that the UK 
is included among the countries that need audit reform? If your 
answer is yes, how can this be done? If your answers are no, what 
are your reasons? 
     
The EU recommendations in 2008 sounded like a corroborative 
statement. Thus, that auditors are not fairly treated when it comes 
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to legal liability. What is your opinion about this assumption 
regarding auditors in the UK? 
 
Auditors in the UK are permitted by company Act of 2006 to 
register their firms as limited liability corporations. Does this serve 
as a solution to the challenges auditors in the UK are currently 
facing in terms of legal liability? 
 
Do you understand the concept of Liability Limitation Agreement 
(LLA)? If yes, do you how it works in practical terms? If yes, 
please explain to me. 
 
Any LLA reached between company’s directors and auditors must 
be approved by shareholders. However, shareholders are 
permitted by company Act of 2006 to invalidate this agreement if 
they deem its “unfair and unreasonable”. Do you consider this to 
be a fair treatment from the UK auditors’ perspective? If yes or 
no, how? 
 
What is your definition of “fairness and reasonableness”? 
 
PART EIGHT: INTERVIEWEE ABOUT THE LONG PERIOD OF AUDITORS 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY DEBATE IN THE UK 
 
QUESTION: Auditors professional liability debate in the UK has lasted more 
than a decade without an end. How do you feel about this? 
  
 Do you feel auditors in the UK are not fairly treated as the liability 
debate lingers in the UK? 
 
 Do you feel sympatric for auditors in the UK in the light of auditors’ 
professional liability debate in the UK that current has no end? 
 
 
PART NINE: FINALLY 
Thank you very much for your time. Do you have any question 
that you would like to ask me? 
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9.3   APPENDIX C: SUPPORT LETTER FROM SUPERVISORS 
 
16th  July 2017  
 
 Academic Unit (International Finance, Accounting and Economics) Room 302, 
Maxwell Building,  University of Salford,  The Crescent, Salford,  Manchester, M5 4WT, 
UK t: +44 (0) 161 295 5594  |  e:M.AlBahloul@salford.ac.uk w:  
www.salford.ac.uk/business-school  
  
 To Whom It May Concern   
  
This letter will accompany a request for assistance in a research project being 
undertaken by Samuel Ebhodaghe. Mr. Ebhodaghe is currently pursuing a PhD at the 
University of Salford and we are supervising his research.  
  
Our reason for writing is to make clear our support for Mr. Ebhodaghe’s request and 
to emphasise a few points about the conduct of the research. First, we recognise that 
inviting individuals from the professional and business communities to participate in 
research can impose costs in time on those with busy schedules, but efforts have been 
made to ensure such costs are kept to a minimum. Second, the reason for 
approaching individuals for assistance in connection with the research is that is 
critically important that research of this nature should be informed by the views of key 
groups, in order that it might have the most relevance for the development of auditing. 
Finally, we recognise that with research of this nature involving professional issues, 
the way in which information is handled and confidentiality protected is extremely 
important. We have considerable experience of this type of work in our own previous 
research and can confirm that confidentiality problems have never been an issue in 
any of these studies.   
  
We do hope it will be possible for you to cooperate with Mr. Ebhodaghe’s request for 
assistance. We know that Mr. Ebhodaghe is strongly committed to his research being 
of benefit to the continued development of auditing in the UK and this approach clearly 
warrants support . 
  
Yours sincerely   
   
Dr. Mohammad Albahloul                                                                                    
Programme Leader: MSc Accounting and Finance,     
Lecturer in Accounting                                        
Fellow of the UK Higher Education Academy   
Prof. Hassan Yazdifar Professor of Accounting  
Head of Academic Unit (International Finance, Accounting and Economic 
